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Abstract
In the present thesis I study the contribution to firm value of inventories management
from a risk management perspective. I find a significant contribution of inventories to
the value of risk management especially through the operating flexibility channel. In
contrast, I do not find evidence supporting the view of inventories a reserve of liquidity.
Inventories substitute, albeit not perfectly, derivatives or cash holdings. The substitution
between hedging with derivatives and inventory is moderated by the correlation between
cash flow and the underlying asset in the derivative contract. Hedge ratios increase with
the effectiveness of derivatives. The decision to hedge with cash holdings or inventories is
strongly influenced by the degree of complementarity between production factors and by
cash flow volatility. In addition, I provide a risk management based explanation of the
secular substitution between inventories and cash holdings documented, among others,
in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). In a sample of U.S. firms between 1980 and 2006,
I empirically confirm the negative relation between inventories and cash and provide
evidence on the poor performance of investment cash flow sensitivities as a measure of
financial constraints also in the case of inventories investment. This result can be explained
by firms’ scarce reliance on inventories as a reserve of liquidity. Finally, as an extension
of my study, I contrast with empirical data the theoretical predictions of a model on the
integrated management of inventories, trade credit and cash holdings.
ii
Contents
Contents iii
List of Tables v
List of Figures vi
Introduction 1
1 Literature Review 4
1.1 Inventories in the Economic Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Risk Management Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.1 Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.2 Cash Holdings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3 Theories on Trade Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2 The Value of Inventories Management 31
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2.1 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2.2 Financial Hedging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3 Firm’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3.1 Optimal Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.4 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.2 The Contributions of Inventories and Derivatives to Firm Value . . . . . 52
2.4.3 The Contributions of Inventories and Cash Holdings to Firm Value . . . 68
2.5 Empirical Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
iii
3 Inventories as Collateral in Trade Credit Contracts 89
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2.1 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2.2 Financial Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.3 Firm’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Conclusion 102
Bibliography 105
Appendix 116
iv
List of Tables
2.1 Model Base Case Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2 The Marginal Contributions of Inventories and Derivatives to Firm Value . . . . 59
2.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Model with Capital, Inventories and Hedging with
Derivatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4 Stock Returns Sensitivities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5 The Negative Relation between Hedging and Inventories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.6 Hedging Policies Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.7 Average Percentage Enterprise Value Increases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.8 Descriptive Statistics of the Model with Capital, Inventories and Cash . . . . . . 70
2.9 Correlation between Inventories Ratio and Cash Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.10 Sample Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.11 Comparison with Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.12 Determinants of Inventories Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.13 The Sensitivity of Inventories Investment to Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.1 Working Capital Items Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
v
List of Figures
2.1 Firm Value as a Function of Capital and Inventories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2 Firm Value as a Function of Notional and the Underlying Asset of the Futures . 54
2.3 The Effect of Complementarity between Capital and Inventories on Firm Value . 56
2.4 The Effect of Complementarity on the Contribution of Inventories to Firm Value 57
2.5 The Effect of Liquidity on the Contribution of Inventories to Firm Value . . . . 58
2.6 The Contributions of Inventories and Derivatives to Firm Value . . . . . . . . . 60
2.7 The Marginal Contribution of Inventories and Cash Holdings to Enterprise Value 69
2.8 The Effect of Cash Flow Volatility on Inventories Ratio and Cash Ratio . . . . . 72
2.9 The Temporal Trends of Inventories Ratio, Cash Ratio and Cash Flow Volatility 76
3.1 The Incremental Contribution to Firm Value of Accounts Payable . . . . . . . . 101
vi
Introduction
In this thesis I study the contribution of inventories to firm value through the risk management
channel.1 Although operating motivations are important, I focus on financial factors that
provide complementary motivations for holding inventories. More specifically, I concentrate on
the study of inventories from a risk management perspective on top of other theories related
to operating processes. The area of risk management that I target is the hedging of cash
flow.2 3 The volatility of cash flow may cause significant costs for the firm like distress costs,
bankruptcy costs, increases of tax payments as emphasized by Smith and Stulz (1985), external
finance costs and underinvestment as in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), loss of tax shield
as in Leland (1998). Under the perspective of firm’s value maximization, the probability of
incurring these downside costs requires attention from firm’s managers who need to implement
suitable risk management strategies. Along with traditional risk management strategies, the
dynamic management of inventories constitutes a valuable alternative.
With the present work, I contribute to existing literature in a number of ways. First, I give
guidance on the magnitude of the contribution of inventories management to firm value through
the channel of risk management, isolating it from operating considerations. Specifically, I assess
how inventories management adds value through operating flexibility and through its role as a
reserve of liquidity and under which circumstances. Second, I compare inventories management
contribution to risk management in the presence of other traditional risk management tools like
derivatives and cash holdings. The objectives of this comparison are to gauge the contribution
to value of each risk management tool, to understand whether these hedging strategies are
substitutes or complements, to provide guidance in the integrated management of these three
1I consider total inventory taken as the total sum of raw materials, work-in-process products and finished
products. According to Ramey (1989) I classify raw materials and work-in-process products as input inventory
and finished products as output inventory.
2Traditionally, in the finance literature cash flow, or operating cash flow, or internally generated funds, refer
to cash flow from operations. Free cash flow is given by internally generated funds less investment expenditures.
External finance is given by funds obtained from financial markets.
3In contrast to cash flow hedging, value hedging refers to implementation of strategies aimed at preserving
the value of an asset or liability. For example, entering a derivative contract to swap a fixed with a floating
interest expense protects the value of debt but leaves firm’s cash flow exposed to fluctuation in interest rates.
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hedging tools. Of particular importance is the relation between inventories and cash holding in
light of recent studies, like Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), documenting a secular substitution
between these two working capital assets between the 1980’s and 2000’s. Third, in relation
to the role of inventories a reserve of liquidity, I provide theoretical and empirical evidence on
the weakness of investment cash flow sensitivities as a measure of financial constraints also for
inventories investment. Fourth, I investigate the relations between inventories, cash holdings
and trade credit under an operating and risk management perspective.
I organize my research in two stages. In the first part, I concentrate on the construction of
a theoretical model on inventories. In the second part, I empirically test the main predictions
of my model. The area of study of dynamic corporate finance is the natural theoretical environ-
ment in which I place my model.4 The investment in inventories along with other firm’s policies
involves an important dynamic dimension. In dynamic models on investment three or more
periods of time are required to fully analyze the causes and the effects related to real investment
policies that static models fail to capture. For example, assuming a three-periods discrete-time
environment, managers need to take into consideration the effects of investment decisions at
the time of the decision, time 0, and the subsequent periods, time 1 and time 2. At time 0,
the investment derives from the optimal allocation of firm’s resources several uses taking into
account budget constraint concerns. The optimality of an investment plan requires the balance
of cost of the investment at time zero with its expected return at time 1 and possible future
investment opportunities that realize at time 2. Also hedging and saving decisions require a
dynamic framework. For example, hedging with derivatives requires some down-payment, like
margin requirements, at contract inception and for this reason it vies with other possible uses
of funds, as emphasized in Rampini and Viswanathan (2010). At time 1, the derivative pays
off. The decision to hedge at time 0 is deeply influenced by the use of funds generated by the
derivative at time 1, then also for hedging decision it is important to consider the expected
return, realized at time 2, of the funds allocated at time 1. As for savings, at time 0 the firm
subtracts funds to investments and hedging to preserve resources that will be used at time 1.
Also in this case, the use of saved funds at time 1 influences the decision at time 0 to hold cash
against distributing it to shareholders.
The study is organized in three Chapters. In Chapter 1, I review the areas of study relevant
to my research. First of all, I report the main theoretical and empirical contributions on
inventories management in the economic literature. Secondly, I review the risk management
contributions that constitute the theoretical foundations of my work. Also empirical studies
4See Strebulaev and Whited (2012) for a review.
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on risk management are reported for comparison with predictions of theories. Thirdly, I study
the part of the literature on cash holdings most closely related to risk management. Finally,
I review also the main theories that explain the existence of trade credit as a background of
Chapter 3.
In Chapter 2, I study the channels through which the management of inventories contributes
to firm value in isolation and in presence of other risk management tools. Inventories contribute
to firm value first of all as a production factor. After controlling for their role in operations,
inventories constitutes a valuable risk management tool for two main reasons. First, according
to Ramey (1989), inventories provide operating flexibility in the form of avoidance of uncer-
tainties related to the production and sales processes. Operating flexibility increases operating
cash flow thereby mitigating financial constraints. Second, according to Fazzari and Petersen
(1993), inventories are a liquid assets and can be used as a reserve of liquidity in the event of
negative shocks to cash flow. In the prosecution of this work, we will see if these two sources
of value related to inventories are important and in which circumstances. In addition, I com-
paratively assess the risk management contribution of inventories management by comparing
it with hedging and cash holdings. In the first part of Chapter 2, I construct and solve a theo-
retical model on the integrated management of inventories with hedging or cash holdings. The
model is used to evaluate the risk management contribution of inventories and to analyze the
correlation between firm’s policies. One of the main predictions of the model is the negative
relation between inventories and cash holdings. I empirically test this prediction with particular
attention also to the impact of financial constraints on inventories investment. The sensitivity
of inventories investment to financial constraints reveals insights on the role of inventories as a
reserve of liquidity.
In Chapter 3, I extend the model developed in Chapter 2 to study the integrated manage-
ment of working capital items like cash, accounts payable and inventories. Trade credit is seen
as a flexible source of financing especially for financially constrained firms. However, collateral
requirements on inventories stock and enforcement of contracts attenuate the benefits of trade
credit. Secondly, I investigate the relation between trade credit and cash holdings.
3
Chapter 1
Literature Review
1.1 Inventories in the Economic Literature
Abramovitz (1950) argues that before the second World War inventories fluctuations accounted
for the most part of output recessions in the U.S. Blinder and Maccini (1991) report that in
the U.S. postwar recession inventories divestment accounted for the 87% for the GNP fall.
Blinder and Holtz-Eakin (1986) enlarge this measure to roughly the %100. Moreover, Blinder
and Maccini (1991) add that the reduction of inventories’ stock accounted for most part of the
GNP contraction during the 70’s crisis. Ramey (1989) report that during the 1981-1982 when
the U.S. real GNP fell by $105 billions, inventories, that averaged only a 0.7% of GNP, declined
by $95 billions accounting for 90% of GNP contraction, while fixed assets fell by $58 billions,
say, a 55% of GNP decline. Ramey and West (1999) report a very small aggregate inventories
investment across G7 countries at that time for the period 1956-1995. For example, inventory
investment averaged at most 1% of GDP in Italy and lower in other countries. Ramey and West
(1999), confirm previous findings also related to the relatively high volatility and procycclicality
of inventories investment.
Another stylized fact is the secular decline in inventories holdings in many developed coun-
tries from the end of the 1970’s to the 2000’s. The decreasing trend of inventories has been
documented in Hester (1994) and Ramey and West (1999) for the U.S. and by West (1992) also
for Japan. At the firm-level Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) emphasizes the substitution trend
between inventories and cash in the U.S. between 1980 and 2006. Larson (1991) attribute the
decline of inventories levels during the 1980’s to the increasing interest in just-in-time (JIT)
production by American firms. He adds that it would have been hard to observe a growing rate
of firms implementing JIT without deregulation of transportation, begun in 1980 in the U.S.,
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that hugely reduced shipping costs. White, Pearson, and Wilson (1999), using a survey-based
sample of U.S. manufacturers, find that JIT adoption is pervasive among large firms while small
firms, which are the 96% of the U.S economy, struggle to implement it. The motivations for
this difference relate to the lack of influence over suppliers, production schedule instability and
the lack financial resources to be invested in the implementation of JIT, that requires training
and organization improvements that are expensive. White, Pearson, and Wilson (1999) also
find that JIT system is more likely to produce performance benefits for large firms than for
their smaller counterparts. Chen, Frank, and Wu (2005) study the secular decrease in inven-
tories holdings between 1980 and 2000 in a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms. They provide
evidence on the decrease of the cross-sectional average of the use of inventories measured with
inventories to asset ratio, inventories to sales ratio and days in inventories. While the use of
raw materials and work-in-process substantially decreased over time, the use of output inven-
tories increased. More specifically, the authors suggest that supply chain and technological
improvements, like the adoption of just-in-time production or the reduction of transportation
costs, are responsible for the decrease of input inventories holdings and particularly for work
in process. Chen, Frank, and Wu (2005) provide also evidence on the relationship between
days in inventories and firm’s financial performance measured with stock returns. They employ
traditional asset pricing methods, like the popular Fama and French (1993) method, to test if
inventories holdings have impact on firm value. They find that firms with very large or very
small stock of inventories perform worse than firms between the second and fourth deciles of
the distribution of portfolios of stocks sorted on a measure of abnormal inventory days robust
to industry fixed effects. The authors conclude that even though technology factors, like the
just-in-time system of production, probably affected the firm’s inventories policy, it also true
that firms prefer to hold less inventories in a quantity that allows them to manage supply chain
risks and demand risks that just-in-time production, or reliance on multiple suppliers, cannot
eliminate.
Empirical evidence has stimulated the interest in inventories research aimed to explain the
economic motives behind inventories holdings. The theoretical research on inventories basically
started with the contribution of Holt, Modigliani, Muth, and Simon (1960) who developed
the foundations of the so-called production smoothing motive for holding inventories mainly
in the fields of microeconomics and operations management. In this theory, inventories serve
only to smooth the marginal revenue of production across time when product sales change
over time. The basic assumption is the existence of convex marginal cost of production and
production adjustment costs that make very costly to adjust production in response to demand
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variation. Having output inventories allows the firm to leave production decisions unchanged
and to satisfy demand. Abel (1985) provide support to the production smoothing motive by
removing the convex production costs assumption and relying on a time lag between production
and sales and on the possibility of stock-out which is a cost for the firm. Another feature of the
production smoothing theory is the positive relation between product demand volatility and
inventories investment. If product demand is stochastic firms may decide to hold inventories
as buffer against demand fluctuations in such a way that some quantity of inventories will be
held also by firms’ managers not willing to pursue an aggressive inventories policy.
The production smoothing theory, although very intuitive and reasonable, is at odds with
patterns in empirical data on inventories behavior at cross-sectional and time series level, ac-
cording to Blinder (1986a) and West (1986). The first flaw of the production smoothing theory
regards the variability of production predicted lower than the variability of sales even after
controlling for seasonal factors that strongly influence inventories behavior as in underscored
in Blanchard (1983). This is in sharp contrast with data showing exactly the opposite pat-
tern with production volatility exceeding sales volatility. Secondly, according to the production
smoothing theory firms invest in inventories when production costs are low which typically hap-
pens in periods of output expansion. However, according to Ramey and West (1999) who study
macroeconomic data of the G7 countries from the postwar period to 1995, inventories invest-
ment is strongly procyclical, in agreement with Rotemberg and Saloner (1989), very volatile
and not very persistent. Only the ratio of inventories to sales is negatively correlated with
output and quite persistent. These statistical characteristics of inventory behavior hold both
within the U.S. and across the most developed countries studied in Ramey and West (1999).
In order to fix the defects of the production smoothing framework various theoretical con-
tributions have been tried. The first answer was given by the contributions of Blinder (1986a)
and Eichenbaum (1984) where production cost shocks were added to the production smoothing
model in order to obtain production more volatile than sales. However, this approach has been
posed under question because of the lack of evidence on production cost shocks. Another more
promising theory was the one developed by Kahn (1987, 1992) and Bils and Kahn (2000) which
focuses on the stock-out avoidance motive for holding inventories, earlier introduced by Abel
(1985), and assumes a time lag between production and sales, that obliges firms to make deci-
sions before demand is known, and sales persistence. More specifically, Kahn (1987) shows that
firms invest in inventories taking into account the possibility of stocking out and consequently
loosing demand. On the other side, if demand realizes lower than expected, inventories are
carried forward with cost. The basic implication of Kahn’s model is that loosing sales is on
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average more costly than inventories carrying costs so that firms are stimulated to hold inven-
tories. The second implication of Kahn’s theory is that if demand is persistent firms will try to
catch it by increasing production and thereby inventories. On the contrary, if firms expect a
low demand they will cut inventories. This proposition is in agreement with empirical evidence
where inventories investment is positively correlated with sales in contrast with the production
smoothing theory that proposes a negative correlation. To this regard, Kahn (1987) writes of
inventories used to “counter”-smooth production rather than smooth it. Another prediction of
Kahn’s model is the higher volatility of production compared to sales volatility, in agreement
with previous empirical findings.
Bils and Kahn (2000), adding to the contribution of Kahn (1987), argue that firms do not
adjust inventories according to some target, as it is proposed in studies like Holt, Modigliani,
Muth, and Simon (1960) and Blanchard (1983) that adopts the linear-quadratic model in a
production smoothing framework. In contrast, firms follow the direction of product demand.
This theoretical proposition is in full agreement with the findings in Feldstein and Auerbach
(1976) who report that firms adjust inventories stock very slowly, compared to the speed implied
in models of production smoothing with target levels, after even very small changes in sales
targets. Then, it is reasonable to argue that the benefit of avoiding stock-outs creates a demand
for inventories besides any production-smoothing motive. The adjustment toward inventories
target levels is of secondary importance.
The framework of Kahn (1987) is coherent with the contribution of Ramey (1989) where
inventories are fully recognized as production factor providing a flow of services in the same
manner as fixed assets. To be fair, Kydland and Prescott (1982) previously introduced inven-
tories into a traditional neoclassical production function. However, this modeling approach
was introduced by Kydland and Prescott only to obtain a better fit of their model with em-
pirical data. One of the services provided by input inventories is the possibility to cope with
supply chain shocks that limit the quantity or the quality of input supplied. Output inven-
tories help to satisfy demand when production is stopped because of technology shocks like
machines malfunctioning. The services provided by inventories comprise also the avoidance of
production adjustment costs in the same spirit as the production smoothing models. However,
in Ramey (1989) avoiding production adjustment costs is already included in the revenue from
inventories investment in the form of marginal productivity. Finally, Ramey (1989) considers
also avoidance of stock-outs as an additional benefit from holding inventories. Here, and ac-
cording also to Bils and Kahn (2000), the difference with the production smoothing theory is
that firms adjust inventories mainly according to their expectations of future demand. Since
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demand is stochastic, expectations will change and also sales target will change accordingly.
If demand is expected low also the benefit of satisfying demand deviations from target sales
will be small and viceversa. Ramey (1989) emphasizes also the role of input inventories which
on average constitutes the largest share of total inventories and are by far more volatile than
output inventories, as observed in Blinder and Maccini (1991).
The approach of Ramey (1989) is taken also in real business cycle studies like Kydland
and Prescott (1982) and Christiano (1988) where inventories are considered a factor of pro-
duction included inside a neoclassical production function. The revenue from inventories in
these neoclassical models is given by marginal productivity which corresponds to the benefits
provided by inventories listed by Ramey (1989). In addition, the adoption in Kydland and
Prescott (1982) and Christiano (1988) of a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) produc-
tion function allows to appreciate the important flexibility value embedded in inventories given
by the substitutability with other production factors. For example, Ramey (1989) points out
that firms use inventories to satisfy demand when production is switched off for any reason.
Instead of producing, using capital and labor, inventories can be used to collect products to be
sold. More generally, the degree of substitutability of inventories with other production factors
importantly determines inventories return.
The commodities literature focused on the value of storage,1 intersects with the macroeco-
nomic literature on inventories thanks to the work of Pindyck (1994). The services provided
by inventories listed by Ramey (1989) and embedded inside the inventories marginal revenue
in neoclassical models, correspond to the convenience of holding inventories in Pindyck (1994).
Such a convenience is modeled by means of a cost function convex in inventories stock which is
equivalent to the concave revenue of inventories in the model of Kydland and Prescott (1982).
Besides the different modeling approach, Pindyck (1994) provide arguments similar to those
in Kahn (1987) and Ramey (1989) like, for example, the possibility to avoid stock-out costs
because of inventories. The avoidance of stock-outs, obtained by raising the level of invento-
ries stored, translates into a lower cost given the convex shape of the cost function adopted.
Pindyck (1994) empirically extends his theoretical study of inventories investment to a sample
of U.S. producers of heating oil, copper and lumber, observed between 1972 and 1988, and finds
a strong convenience of holding inventories declining with the level of inventories itself.
Another part of the inventories literature concentrates on fixed costs of obtaining inventories
incurred in each stage of the business. These costs are represented by input orderings, produc-
tion set-up and shipping costs as in Scarf (1960) and Fisher and Hornstein (2000). According to
1See Kaldor (1939), Working (1948, 1949), Brennan (1958) Telser (1958).
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these studies, firms hold inventories for example because it is costly to order production input
so that orders with optimal size are placed only when inventories stock falls below a certain
threshold level. The resulting inventory investment policy is called (s, S) where the s is the
threshold and S the size of the order. A merit of these studies is the focus on input inventories
which are significant component of total inventories.
Besides operating motives for holding inventories, a strand of literature has rather focused
on financial motives that may explain inventory behavior. In early literature on inventories little
or no attention at all was devoted to the relation between the real interest rate and inventories.
Later, it was proposed that financial markets frictions play a role in the propagation of business
cycle shocks, including monetary policy shocks, because of information asymmetries between
borrowers and lenders.2 The literature on the transmission of the monetary policy detects,
within the credit channel of policy transmission, basically two subchannels through which
financial frictions affect real investments according the emphasis posed on credit supply or
NPV considerations. The effect of the financial market frictions on credit, and consequently
on investments, can be detected through a net worth (or balance sheet) channel and a bank
lending channel. According to the former channel, a shock to firm’s cash flow and assets value,
like a restrictive monetary policy, determines a contraction of the firm’s net worth pledgeable
for financing. According to the latter channel, tight monetary policies reduce the amount of
funds available thereby reducing the possibility for banks to grant credit. The outcome of a
shock, which follows either of the two channels, is a reduction of external finance that leads to a
contraction of firm’s investments. Information asymmetries not only moderate the transmission
of monetary policies but may also lead lenders to ration credit, as explained by Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981), and push firms to prefer internally generated funds instead of issuing costly new
equity, as highlighted by Myers and Majluf (1984).
On the basis of theoretical propositions on the relation between financial constraints and
real investment, a series of empirical studies have been proposed especially for fixed capital
investment but also for working capital investment. The main proposition to be tested is
that, if capital markets are imperfect, firms with scarce internal funds will invest less and
find optimal to reduce investments or even cut some of their assets to raise liquidity. The
response to internal cash flow shock will be different from asset to asset according to the
relative degree of reversibility and liquidity. Since inventories are typically more easily reversible
and liquid than fixed assets they are more likely to be reduced after negative shocks to cash
flow. In summary, costly external finance raises up the cost of capital thereby discouraging
2See Gertler (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
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investment to the point that firms may even decide to cut assets starting from liquid assets.
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) provide evidence on the high sensitivity of working capital asset
to shocks to cash flows in an indirect manner. Using a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms
for the period 1970-1979, they show that it is possible to effectively overcome issues related to
possible mismeasurement of Tobin’s Q, a noisy proxy for investment revenues, by controlling
for investment in working capital in fixed capital investment regressions. They find a positive
and significant sensitivity of fixed capital investment to cash flow after controlling for working
capital that proxies for fluctuations related to expected marginal revenue of investment. In
this way, they obtain a investment sensitivity to cash flow that only measures the effects
of budget constraints, intuitively because, in the presence of fixed capital investment convex
adjustment costs, working capital variations according to cash flow help to smooth fixed capital
investment across time. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) examine the response of small compared
to large firms to tight monetary policies. Size is taken as a proxy for the access of a firm to
capital markets because constrained firms are typically small, young and risky firms with low
collateral, in agreement with Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). Using a sample from
Quarterly Financial Report of Manufacturing Corporations for the period 1958-1991, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) report that, in response to a restrictive monetary shock, small firms reduce,
among other variables, inventories more severely than large firms. In addition, such a behavior
is more pronounced during macroeconomic downturns indicting that the flexibility to reverse
inventories investment is particularly valuable in periods of low profits. Also important is
the finding in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) of strong predictive power of the coverage ratio
with respect to inventories investment in agreement with arguments in Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988). Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) investigate the effect of financial factors
on inventories investment in sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from COMPUSTAT database
around the 1981-1982 recession, typically considered as a monetary induced recession. They
find not only that financial factors, like liquidity measured by the cash ratio, have an impact on
inventories investment but also that firms more dependent on bank credit and with no access
to market debt decrease the stock of inventories much more sharply than firms with easier
access to capital markets. Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1994) and Carpenter, Fazzari,
and Petersen (1998) provide empirical evidence on the positive relation between firm internal
cash flow and inventory investment in a sample of U.S. firms drawn from COMPUSTAT for
the 1981-1992 period. Their basic hypothesis follows the arguments of Fazzari and Petersen
(1993).
Turning the attention to the relation between interest rates and inventories investment,
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the model in Ramey (1989) implies a negative relation between interest rate and inventories
investment through the rental rates of inventories. Price speculation would suggest that when
interest rates are expected to increase, so that prices are expected to decrease, firm will hold
less inventories. However, Blinder and Maccini (1991) report that no significant effect of real
interest rate on inventories investment is found in the empirical literature on inventories. In
addition, Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) suggest that the lending channel can explain,
better than the cost of financing (balance sheet) channel, the relation between shocks to mon-
etary policy and inventory investment. Moreover, they add that credit rationing may limit
the possibility to detect any relation between interest rates and inventories. In sharp contrast,
recent contributions, like Maccini, Moore, and Schaller (2004) and Jones and Tuzel (2013), pro-
vide different conclusions. Maccini, Moore, and Schaller (2004) provide evidence of a long-run
cointegration relation between real interest rate and inventories in the aggregate U.S. manu-
facturing between 1959 and 1999. They argue that previous studies failed to find any relation
between interest rates and inventories investment because they were focused on the short-term
variations of interest rates. Conversely, in the long-run the real interest rate is significantly and
negatively correlated with inventories investment. Then, according to Maccini, Moore, and
Schaller (2004) firms adjust inventories only in response to shift in the long-term mean of the
real interest rate.
Jones and Tuzel (2013) argue that the reason why previous studies do not find any significant
relationship between interest rates and inventories investment is that the real interest rate is
not the correct measure of the cost of capital. The proposition of Jones and Tuzel (2013)
confirms the findings in Thomas and Zhang (2002) where most part of the negative correlation
between accruals and stock returns is determined by inventories investment. Jones and Tuzel
(2013), coherently with the view of inventories accumulation as an investment in the same
manner as investments in fixed assets, develop a neoclassical model that support the negative
relation between the cost of capital and inventories investment. Their study is deeply related
to the intuition in Gomes, Kogan, and Yogo (2009) where the durability of output is tied with
the firm’s cost of capital. Firms with durable output, like firms in the automobile industry for
instance, are riskier than firms with non durable products because of the negative correlation
between the cost of capital and the stochastic discount factor. The production of durables is
very procyclical, this means that more products and profits are realized when the state of the
economy is good. Then investing in stocks of firms producing durables entails obtaining positive
returns when they are less valuable. This fact leads to lower possibilities of diversification and
consequently more risk which translates into higher stock returns. In agreement with the
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proposition in Gomes, Kogan, and Yogo (2009), Jones and Tuzel (2013) provide empirical
evidence on the negative relation between the cost of capital and inventory investment, with
cost of capital measured alternatively though analysts earning forecasts or regressions predicting
earnings or ROE. They use a sample of firms from a U.S. Census database, integrated with
data from COMPUSTAT, for the period 1958-2010. Jones and Tuzel (2013) perform also a
classical asset pricing test in which they examine how the risk of stock returns is related to past
inventories growth. Portfolios of stocks sorted on past inventory investment display a significant
premium between firms with low inventory growth and firms with high inventory growth. Their
results are consistent to those found in the work of Belo and Lin (2012) who adopt a theoretical
framework very similar to the one in Jones and Tuzel (2013). Belo and Lin (2012) match
business cycles and asset pricing stylized facts on inventories through a neoclassical model of
investment with fixed capital and inventories as production factors. As for business cycle facts,
their model reproduce the stylized positive correlation between sales and inventories investment.
As for asset pricing, they perform a portfolio asset pricing test on monthly stock returns for
a sample of U.S firms in the 1965-2009 period. Double-sorting portfolios on past inventory
investment and size, they find, in agreement with those in Jones and Tuzel (2013), a negative
correlation between the investment in inventories and stock return risk. Their empirical results
are replicated with simulations of their model.
1.2 Risk Management Literature
1.2.1 Risk Management
The risk management literature provide several motives for firms to hedge. Stulz (1984) argues
that in a Modigliani-Miller world hedging does not increase firm value because investors can
hedge on their own without having firm’s managers doing it. However, when risk averse man-
agers are remunerated with compensation schemes tied to firm value and face transaction costs
related to hedging, they may find optimal, for themselves but not for shareholders, to hedge
through the firm. The theoretical arguments in Stulz (1984) are derived from the optimization
of static model in continuous time where it is shown how optimal hedging does not depend on
the firm’s exposure to risk but instead on manager’s hedging transaction costs. DeMarzo and
Duffie (1995) stress the importance of good accounting standards to clearly disclose hedging
activity implemented by managers in order to understand if the manager is acting in the in-
terest of shareholders. Smith and Stulz (1985) proposes that the presence of both taxes and
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bankruptcy costs are good reasons to hedge. They develop a static model in which after-tax
income is a concave function of pre-tax income because of convex taxation. Then, in order
to reduce tax payments, firms should hedge to reduce to volatility of pre-tax income. Such
a beneficial effect of hedging with respect to taxes derives from taxation codes that typically
incorporate losses offset provisions and make the corporate tax function convex in pre-tax earn-
ings. Also bankruptcy costs make the after-tax income become a concave function of pre-tax
income so that the firm hedge in order to reduce pre-tax income volatility and, consequently,
the probability of incurring bankruptcy costs. Smith and Stulz (1985) underscore that also
distress costs are a main determinant of hedging basically for the same reasons explained for
taxes and bankruptcy costs. Specifically, firm value is increased by hedging thanks to the avoid-
ance of financial distress which generates deadweight costs, like fire-sales or external finance
costs,3 and bounds debt capacity, which in turn leads to a reduction of tax benefits of debt and
increases agency costs, given the market discipline provided by debt. Firms in financial distress
are exposed not only to direct losses of value but also to agency issues between shareholders
and debtholders. According to Myers (1977), in a situation of financial distress, shareholders
may be less inclined to undertake positive NPV investment projects if the benefits from such
investments primarily accrue to debtholders.
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) provide a rationale for hedging on the basis of capital
market imperfections that significantly affect real investment decisions. If it is costly for the firm
to raise external finance, hedging reduce the probability of incurring direct costs of external
finance. Moreover, with hedging firms can also avoid underinvestment costs. Technically,
external finance costs make the firm’s profits a concave function of internal funds so that hedging
helps to mitigate incurring costs deriving from a shock to internal funds. Froot, Scharfstein,
and Stein (1993) add that, in a framework with stochastic investment opportunities that are
positively correlated with cash flows from outstanding assets, there is less need for hedging. In
that situation, when cash flows are low, investment opportunities are less attractive so there
is less need of funds to be invested and the firm automatically avoids external finance costs.
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) take into account also the fact that the external finance
costs may be a negative function of the shock moving the cash flows. This means that there is
an high probability that the firm will incur external finance costs when cash flows are negatively
shocked. In that event, hedging is more valuable. Finally, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)
discuss the potential drawbacks from hedging plans. Firstly, firms adopting linear hedging
3Technically, external finance costs arise when uses exceed sources of funds, also in situations of no distress.
However, in the event of distress, the firm may obtain additional financing to avoid distress if external finance
costs are sustainable.
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through the trading of forward or futures contracts are exposed to contingent payments to the
counterpart in the contract. For example, consider an airline company that has hedged against
fuel price with a long position in futures whose underlying asset is positively correlated with
fuel price. Given the symmetric nature of the payoff, firm with position in futures, avoids
external finance costs when cash flow is low, because of high fuel price, and cash is gained
from the derivative. However, the firm cannot exclude the possibility of lower profits due to
obligations in the futures, or forward, when the state of the cash flow is good and the futures
pays off to the counterpart. Then, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) suggest that options
can be more effective risk management tools than futures. Secondly, a firm may be willing
to hedge risks that are only weakly correlated with those traded in financial markets. This
possibility creates a substantial basis risk that invalidate the performance of hedging. Thirdly,
the product market competition extends to hedging in such a way that firms hedging decisions
depends also on rivals’ hedging decisions. This happens because if hedging provide a firm with
additional funds to be invested, rivals should plan to hedge as well in order not to lose product
market share.
Risk management theory suggests that firms with more debt should hedge more because
fixed interest payments amplifies the effects of cash flow volatility through leverage effect which
in turn increases the probability of incurring financial distress costs. Stulz (1996) and Leland
(1998) emphasize that hedging increases firm value because it makes possible to increase debt
capacity and thereby interest tax deductions. Leland (1998) underscore that hedging increases
firm value through two different channels. The first channel relates to the possibility to increase
debt and so interest tax benefits, the second channel pertains to the reduction of expected
distress costs and default because of the reduced probability of incurring such events. The
effect of increasing debt capacity has also the benefit of reducing agency conflicts between
managers and shareholders because of the discipline that debt provides. Hedging provide
discipline to managers also in a more direct manner. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) show that
hedging improves the ability to evaluate firm’s management given the reduction of noise of
measures of profitability, say the volatility of cash flow. However, DeMarzo and Duffie (1995)
add that the power of hedging to mitigate asymmetric information costs is deeply conditioned
by the transparency of accounting disclosure.
One of the most important recent theoretical contributions to the risk management literature
is surely the study of Rampini and Viswanathan (2010). One of the crucial points of their theory
is the recognition of a trade-off between hedging with derivatives and debt financing. Also Mello
and Parsons (2000) recognize the costs of derivatives in terms of resources required to sustain the
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hedging policy. Both derivatives and debt contracts require promises of payments that the firm
must contemporaneously satisfy if the firm engage in both risk management and debt financing.
Consequently, current decisions on hedging and financing policies reflect this future trade-off
and eventually lead firms to give up risk management if they already have exhausted their debt
capacity. This intuition makes the theory in Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) coherent with
empirical findings on the scarce use of derivatives by financially constrained firms. In their
model the fundamental piece that connects risk management and financing is counterparty risk
in the form of collateral requirements imposed by creditors or risk management counterparts. In
addition, the negative relation between risk management and leverage is exacerbated by budget
constraints concerns if the firm has good investment opportunities. This result derives from the
trade-off between risk management and investment opportunities that is more likely to explain
why virtually all empirical studies on hedging found a positive relationship between size and risk
management. Indeed, derivatives require down payments when the firm enters the contract.
These payments are, for example, margin requirements for derivative trading on exchange
markets or option premiums. Paying for risk management means foregoing investment projects
that constitute a substantial opportunity cost especially for more productive firms which are
most of the time small firms.
Nance, Jr., and Smithson (1993) test theories on corporate hedging with a sample of survey
data on hedging usage complemented with COMPUSTAT relevant items for the year 1986.
The main dependent variable in their empirical work is the firm’s use of hedging. They employ
a logit regression method to identify the main determinants of hedging. They find that firms
with more investment tax credits in 1986 and with taxable income in the progressive region of
the taxation schedule hedge more in agreement with theories postulating that convex corporate
taxation induces hedging. In addition, they find that larger firms and firms with more growth
opportunities (proxied by R&D expenses) and higher payout ratios do hedge more. Firm’s
size is positively related to hedging because of a reduction in the expected value of financial
distress costs due to the better liquidability of assets. In addition, Mian (1996) report evidence
supporting scale economies relative to trading transaction costs and informational costs. The
measures of leverage used in Nance, Jr., and Smithson (1993), interest coverage ratio and debt
ratio, are, however, found not significant even if they report the correct sign on the estimated
regression coefficients.
Tufano (1996) empirically examines the gold mining U.S. industry in the years 1991-1993
relying on data from an equity analyst report. Using tobit analysis with delta-percentage4 as
4Delta-percentage is defined as the Black and Scholes (9173) delta divided by the size of the exposure to
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the dependent variable, Tufano (1996) finds little evidence for the Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein
(1993) arguments that relates external finance costs to hedging. However, Tufano admits that
such costs are less likely to be relevant in the industry studied. On the other side, Tufano reports
that managerial risk aversion plays a significant role in shaping risk management policies. He
finds that firm managers holding compensation schemes with a large component of convex
remuneration implement less hedging. Conversely, managers who hold firm’s stocks are more
prone to engage in hedging because of the possibility of incurring losses due to directional risk.
Another important result in Tufano (1996) is the significant negative relation between hedging
and other financial policies considered as substitutes. For example, firms with higher ratios of
liquid assets tend to hedge less.
Ge´zcy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) provide empirical evidence on the predictions of the
theory of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). They find that firms with good investment
opportunities and that are more financially constrained are more likely to hedge. They study
foreign exchange risk hedging in a sample of Fortune 500 firms in 1990. The channel through
which hedging acts is primarily the reduction of the likelihood of incurring downside costs
that may obstruct investment opportunities. In addition, they find evidence on the increase of
foreign exchange risk hedging in relation to the concomitant implementation of other hedging
polices related to other risks. This result supports the evidence in Mian (1996) of the presence
of economies of scale in the use of derivatives.
Graham and Smith (1999) analyze the tax-incentive to hedge. They highlight a common
problem for those who engage in empirical studies on hedging: the scarce reliability of data
on derivatives usage. Aware of this problem they adopt a simulation method to measure the
convexity of the tax function for a sample of COMPUSTAT firms in the period 1980-1994. The
tax function delivers the firm’s expected tax liability given taxable income. Graham and Smith
(1999) estimate the tax function and simulate firm’s taxable income to determine the expected
tax liability. They perform this exercise for different levels of the taxable income volatility to
gauge the magnitude of tax savings due to hedging. Their results indicate that tax savings,
induced by reduced taxable income volatility, average around 1% given a 1% decrease of taxable
income volatility. However, they point out that the tax incentive to hedging is relevant only
for small to medium size firms with high taxable income volatility and with average taxable
income equal to zero, a region of taxable income where the tax function is convex for all firms.
The tax incentive to hedge does not act only through the convexity of the tax function but
also through debt tax shield. Graham and Rogers (2002) perform an empirical study to discrim-
risk.
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inate which type tax incentive is relevant for firms to undertake hedging. Graham and Rogers
(2002) estimate a structural model by means of simultaneous equations approach in which
derivatives usage and debt ratio are the two dependent variables of interest. Derivatives usage
is measured through notional on derivative positions taken from SFAS 119 descriptions. The
simultaneous equations approach is suggested by the possible bi-directional causality between
hedging and debt. Graham and Rogers (2002) provide evidence on the positive relationship
between hedging and debt and on the reverse causality between these two policies. Specifically,
their results are supportive of theories that emphasize an incentive to hedge to increase debt
and consequently interest tax deductions. In addition, they find that the interest deduction tax
benefit in percentage of firm’s assets value averages 1.1% in agreement with numerical results
in Leland (1998).
Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) empirically examine the theory developed in Rampini
and Viswanathan (2010). They construct and empirically test a model in which firms optimally
manage real investments, leverage and hedging. More specifically, firms can hedge operating
costs using a forward contract. The model is tested on a sample of 23 U.S. airlines between
the years 1996 and 2009. The main results indicate that firms sample firms use hedging with
derivatives conditional on net worth, say, the sum of internal funds and liquidation value of
assets. This result is in agreement with other empirical previous works where larger, liquid and
profitable firms are found to rely more on financial hedging. In contrast, smaller firms prefer
not to use derivatives because of the high opportunity costs given by forgone investment oppor-
tunities. Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) match empirical tests with anecdotal evidence
taken from firms 10-K SEC filings where managers express great concern on the difficulty of
engaging in risk management because of the obligations required in derivatives contracts.
Starting with the study of Allayannis and Weston (2001) empirical studies in risk manage-
ment examine the impact of hedging activity on firm value. Allayannis and Weston (2001) test
the relation between the hedging activity of foreign exchange risk and firm value in a sample
of U.S. non-financial firms for the period 1990-1995. They find that hedging positively im-
pacts firm value with an the average 5% increase in Tobin’s Q for hedgers. Carter, Rogers,
and Simkins (2006) examine the relation between hedging activity of fuel cost and firm value
measured by Tobin’s Q in a sample of U.S. airlines between 1992 and 2003. They find an even
larger hedging premium, between 5% and 10%, than Allayannis and Weston (2001) and pro-
vide support for the predictions in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) on the positive relation
between hegding and future investment opportunities. Their basic argument is that airlines
will benefit from hedging because when they need to invest it is quite likely that they will
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experience high fuel costs that reduce internally generated funds from assets in place leading
the firm to bear external finance costs.
Guay and Kothari (2003) challenge the validity of the empirical results obtained in previous
studies on the effect of derivatives on firm value. To be specific, Guay and Kothari (2003) point
out that the magnitude of the effect of hedging with derivatives on firm value is very small.
They provide evidence on their claim by examining the hedging policy of a sample of 234 large
U.S. firms for the fiscal year 1997. The basic point in Guay and Kothari (2003) is that the
magnitude of the effect of derivatives on firm value, reported in many studies like Allayannis and
Weston (2001), hardly reconciles with the actual exposure firms have on derivatives. Exposure
is computed as the cash flow sensitivity and value sensitivity of the firm’s derivatives portfolio to
an extreme variation of the underlying assets in such a portfolio. This exposure is then scaled by
the variables, like operating cash flow or value, that the firm wants to hedge. Guay and Kothari
(2003) find so small hedge ratios that the use of derivatives is unlikely to determine a significant
effect on either operating cash flow or value. Consequently, Guay and Kothari (2003) argue that
the increase in firm value due to derivatives, reported in other studies, may be spurious and it
may also be deeply affected by other operating hedging strategies that are typically positively
correlated with financial hedging. Guay and Kothari (2003) report also empirical evidence
supporting existing theories on hedging in the proposed relationships between, for example,
size, leverage and growth opportunities and the use of hedging. Leveraged firms and firms with
good investment opportunities are found to hedge more because of having, respectively, more
chances to incur financial distress and more investment opportunities to be financed without
incurring external finance costs.
In addition to Guay and Kothari (2003), also Jin and Jorion (2006) cast doubts on the
findings in Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) providing
argument similar to Guay and Kothari (2003) and pointing out that q-ratios can be affected
by many factors that may make the positive relation between hedging activity and firm value
spurious. In previous empirical studies the magnitude of the effect of hedging on firm value,
when statistically significant, seems influenced by other firm’s policies not controlled for. For
instance, q-ratios vary substantially across industries so that hedging activity may be associated
to higher q-ratio just because we compare firms in different industries that at the same time may
adopt, however, different hedging policies. In Jin and Jorion (2006) this concern is mitigated
by the selection of firms belonging to the same oil and gas extraction industry where there
is also a wide variability in hedging activity. In contrast to Allayannis and Weston (2001)
who study only large firms, Jin and Jorion (2006) analyze also small firms that are adequately
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represented in their sample. Jin and Jorion (2006) define hedging activity as the aggregate delta
of firm’s derivatives portfolio scaled by either production volume or oil/gas reserves. They find
a statistically significant effect of hedging activity on firm’s sensitivity to oil or gas prices.
However, the impact of hedging on firm value, measured with three different proxy of q-ratio
and controlling for other factors that affect the q-ratio, is statistically not significant and even
negative. These findings hold for both cash flow hedging and value hedging.
Endogeneity, as in many other areas of study, is a typical concern in empirical risk man-
agement studies. Aware of this issue, more recently, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Yun (2013) exploit an
exogenous event like the introduction of weather derivatives in 1997 in the U.S. to assess the
impact of hedging on firm value. Their point is that firms that were highly exposed to weather
risk before the introduction of weather derivatives are more likely to benefit from hedging. In
agreement with this argument, they find an average hedging premium of 6% approximately.
Also in this study the proxy for firm value is Tobin’s Q. Similarly to Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Yun
(2013), Cornaggia (2013) employs an exogenous event to gauge the impact of the use of hedging
on firm value through the channel of productivity. Cornaggia studies the effect on productivity
of U.S. agricultural producers of the introduction of a new revenues insurance contract in 1997.
He finds that producers who engaged in the new insurance program increased their productivity
measured by crop yield. Cornaggia emphasizes that productivity is a channel though which
risk management positively impacts real assets and thereby firm value.
In Guay and Kothari (2003), one of the main concerns about the economic significance of
hedging activity on firm value is on the possibility that firms may engage in other policies
positively related to financial hedging. Consequently, endogeneity may significantly affect the
results of studies that do not control, for example, for forms of real hedging. Pantzalis, Simkins,
and Laux (2001) examine the effect of operating hedging on firm’s exposure to exchange rate
risk. More specifically, they study if firm’s international network of subsidiaries impact firm’s
exposure to exchange rate risk. The main independent variables in their regressions are the
breadth and depth of firm’s international network of subsidiaries, which measure operating
flexibility. For example, firms with many subsidiaries in several countries are more likely to
offset the negative impact of exchange rate risk on cash flows. This happens because these firms
can move production, sales, marketing activities etc. more easily than firms with subsidiaries
concentrated in few countries or that operate domestically. Exploiting such a flexibility trans-
lates into a lower exposure to exchange rate risk. In this study exposure is measured as the
regression coefficient of firm’s stock returns on the variation of exchange rate controlling for
market return. The sample is made by large industrial U.S. multinationals listed on NYSE and
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ASE in 1991.
Ge´zcy, Minton, and Schrand (2006) study the adoption of different risk management strate-
gies implemented by U.S. natural gas pipeline firms between 1978 and 1995 in response to
deregulation, started in the end of 1970’s, that exposed those firms to quantity and price risks.
Ge´zcy, Minton, and Schrand (2006) find evidence on the suitability of derivatives to hedge
price risk while other hedging strategies, like storage, perform better in hedging volumetric
risks. Besides derivatives and storage, they also study cash holdings and diversification of line
of business and geographic diversification as alternative hedging strategies. Storage of gas, in
the same manner as inventories for manufacturing firms, allows firms to avoid to avoid costs of
replenishment of reserves and more importantly to avoid costly stockouts. In addition, storage
can be primarily used to hedge against volume risk suggesting complementarity with deriva-
tives. Ge´zcy, Minton, and Schrand (2006) also find that financially unconstrained and profitable
firms rely more on storage and cash to manage risks while the opposite types of firms use al-
ternatively diversification or derivatives. Diversification is probably the most onerous hedging
strategy. Even if for many firms hedging is not the main objective of diversification, it is an
effective instrument to manage risk especially for multinational firms dependent on exchange
rate fluctuations.
A series of theoretical and empirical papers find a not perfect substitution effect between
operating and financial hedging like, for example, Mello, Parsons, and Triantis (1995) who show
a negative relation between the decision to switch production across countries and financial
hedging in response to exchange rate risk. Empirically, also Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston
(2001) and Bartram, Brown, and Minton (2010) provide evidence on the complementarity
between operating and financial hedging. Mauer and Triantis (1994) theoretically study the
interactions between firm’s investment and financing decisions. They develop a model in which
the firm has the operating flexibility to switch off production if the output price falls below
the marginal production cost. They find that operating flexibility significantly contributes to
firm value by reducing the probability to incur financial distress. This fact leads the firm to
sustain greater debt capacity and consequently to obtain larger tax shield. This benefit from
operating flexibility is of course moderated by the cost of switching mode of production and by
debt recapitalization costs. The higher the financial flexibility the lower the impact of operating
flexibility on firm value. In summary, Mauer and Triantis (1994) provide theoretical evidence
on the not perfect substitution between operating and financial flexibility.
MacKay (2003) empirically studies the interaction between real flexibilities and financing.
Real flexibilities can be operating flexibilities regarding the volume of production, the optimal
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mix of production inputs and the degree of reversibility of assets. Real flexibility reduces the
exposure to risk affecting cash flows as shown in Tufano (1998) where gold mining firms flexible
in adjusting production have lower stock returns exposures to fluctuations of the price of gold.
MacKay (2003) find evidence on the interaction between real flexibilities and leverage taking
into account also risk shifting and asset substitution. More specifically, MacKay (2003) finds
that operating flexibility increases the likelihood of risk shifting thereby leading creditors to
cut financing to the firm. In contrast, investment flexibility is positively related to leverage
because covenants in debt contract. Also MacKay (2003) documents a negative relationship
between real and financial flexibility.
Gamba and Triantis (2014) focus on integrating liquidity, operating flexibility and financial
hedging policies in a dynamic framework. Convex corporate taxes and equity issuance costs
are two reasons advocated in risk management literature to adopt risk management, however
in Gamba and Triantis (2014) the value of risk management in the presence of such frictions is
not huge. Instead the will to avoid distress costs jointly with equity issuance costs makes the
difference in terms of value increased by risk management. They find that liquidity management
is more effective than hedging. The increase in value due to cash is much greater than the one
associate to hedging. It must be said also that the effect of hedging on firm value is increasing in
the correlation between firm profitability and the underlying asset in the swap. However, even
in the case of perfect correlation between firm ’s cash flow and derivative’s underlying asset,
there is substantial space for cash management to increase value. For example, real frictions
like switching operation mode costs cannot be covered unless cash is available. Operating
flexibility is the dominant tool for value increase. It reduces both the need for cash and the
need for hedging. There are some elements, however, like operating leverage that cannot be
covered by operating flexibility and cash is needed to hedge from profit losses more likely when
operating leverage is high. In summary, also in Gamba and Triantis (2014) there is evidence
that real flexibility and financial flexibility are not perfect substitutes and the strength of the
correlation between different risk management strategies clearly depends on structural factors
like the distribution of stochastic variables, operating and financial overhangs and other real
frictions.
1.2.2 Cash Holdings
Among the motives for holding cash, the risk management motive relates to the possibility of
holding cash to avoid default costs, distress costs and external finance costs. Once we control
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for cash required by operations, we are left with cash used for other purposes. This is called
excess cash in many papers focused on agency conflicts between shareholders and managers.
However, this label can be misleading if we take into account other economic mechanisms that
influence cash holdings like tax incentives and risk management. In this Section, I review the
fundamental contributions in the literature related to cash hold for risk management purposes
because that is the field relevant to my research where cash holdings compete with inventories,
besides operational arguments. These two working capital items can be substitutes also in the
operations of the firm but this is not the focus of the present work.
Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) study the determinants of cash holdings in a dynamic
model where the firm invest in real assets, borrow and saves cash. The main determinant of cash
holdings are external finance costs given by direct costs of issuing securities, potential agency
issues and asymmetric information problems between the issuer and the purchaser of securities.
External finance costs are the prerequisite for the “precautionary” and “speculative” motive for
holding cash to hold, where the former relates to the benefit of holding cash to face unexpected
contingencies, the latter relates to the utility provided by cash to finance future investment
opportunities. The precautionary motive for holding cash goes back as far as Keynes (1936)
who argued that firms hold cash to avoid transaction costs related to convert non-cash items
into liquidity. The main predictions of the model in Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) are tested
on a sample of U.S. industrial firms between 1975 and 1994. Empirical results, in which they
control for industry effects that proxy for operational motives for holding cash, confirm many
relationships that agree with risk management view for holding cash. First of all, Kim, Mauer,
and Sherman (1998) find a positive relation between growth opportunities (future investment
opportunities), measured with Tobin’s Q, and cash holdings. More cash is hold when the firm
expects more need to finance investment projects in the future. Secondly, they find evidence
on the positive relation between cash flow volatility and cash holdings. Cash flow uncertainty
enhances the precautionary motive for hoarding cash by increasing the likelihood of bearing
future external finance costs. Finally, the spread between return on assets and the Treasury
Bill rate is used to proxy for the opportunity cost of forgone current investment opportunities
when the firm decides to save. The larger the spread the lower the incentive to save cash.
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) study the determinants of cash holdings in
a sample of U.S. firms between 1971-1994. They find strong support for the transaction cost
motive for holding cash early developed by Keynes (1936). In agreement with Kim, Mauer,
and Sherman (1998), they find that external finance costs deeply influence firm’s cash holding.
These costs belong to the category of transaction costs among which there are also asset liq-
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uidation costs, underinvestment costs, dividends reductions and debt restructuring. All these
sources of funds are costly, therefore it is valuable to save cash to finance future investment
opportunities without incurring transaction costs. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson
(1999), in agreement with the precautionary theory, empirically find that firms with good in-
vestment opportunities, smaller firms and firms with very volatile cash flows save more. Small
firms typically bear higher external finance costs, consequently they hold more cash. In ad-
dition, Mulligan (1997) provide evidence in support of economies of scale in holding cash to
avoid transaction costs. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) find also that net
working capital (net of cash) is negatively related to cash. Finally, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz,
and Williamson (1999) find statistically significant mean reversion of firm-level cash holdings
time series and little evidence of a joint increase of capital expenditures and cash in relation
to theories focused on agency costs. Jensen (1986) argues that managers, to avoid external
monitoring, tend to hold excess cash that will be eventually used to finance negative NPV
investments projects when managers would better distribute funds to shareholders. Opler,
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) do not find support for Jensen (1986) theory but they
do find that managerial risk aversion, exacerbated by managers’ ownership, leads firms to hold
excess cash as a risk management tool in the interests of managers rather than shareholders.
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) examine the extent to which financing constraints
affect the firm’s liquidity management. Their study is relevant because of the link between
internally generated funds and cash management and because of the provision of a measure of
financing constraints in the form of the cash sensitivity to cash flow. As for the first point, they
argue that constrained firms should display significant and positive sensitivity of cash to cash
flow while cash holdings of unconstrained firms, for which being short of funds is irrelevant,
should not be dependent on cash flows. In addition, they argue that the sign of the sensitivity
should be positive because firms are more likely to save after a positive realization of the
operating cash flow. The second point relates to the fact that the cash sensitivity to cash flow
is a better measure than the real investment sensitivity to cash flow simply because the former
is unaffected by future firm’s economic conditions as it is the latter. They provide evidence for
their arguments on sample of COMPUSTAT manufacturing firms between 1971 and 2000. They
find that the cash sensitivity to cash flow is positive and significant for constrained firms while
it is not significantly different from zero for unconstrained firms. The procedure followed is to
sort firms by their likelihood of bearing financial constraint, measured with specific variables
provided in the literature,5 and then to assess the relative sensitivity of cash to cash flow
5Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Whited and Wu (2006) provide measures of financial constraints.
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through a simple regression analysis.
Riddick and Whited (2009) challenge the conclusions in Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach
(2004) for two reasons. Firstly, it is at least questionable that the cash sensitivity to cash flow is
a good measure of financial constraint only because it is not a real variable not correlated with
future economic growth of the firm. Indeed, firms save to meet future investment opportunities,
then cash is also correlated with future economic growth. Secondly, in the model of Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach (2004) the important link between cash flow and firm’s technology
is missing. Consequently, any increase in firm’ cash flow due to investment in capital is not
captured in their model. If cash flow is high and the stochastic factor(s) that moves it is (are)
persistent, good investment opportunities are available. Consequently, the firm dissaves, and
uses funds to finance current investments, aware that in the next period financing constraints
will not bind thereby reducing the advantage of holding cash. Given this second argument, the
model in Riddick and Whited (2009) predicts a negative relation between cash flow and savings
after controlling for Tobin’s Q. The relation between cash flow and savings is tested on empirical
data from different countries (U.S., Japan, U.K., France, Germany). Using an estimator robust
to measurement error in Tobin’s Q, Riddick and Whited (2009) find significant evidence on the
negative relation between cash flow and cash for all countries examined.
Gamba and Triantis (2008) study in a dynamic model the value of financial flexibility, say,
the value of obtaining funds when the firm needs to finance investments or to avoid distress,
without incurring external finance costs. Financial flexibility depends on financial and credit
markets frictions as well as on cash holdings. Gamba and Triantis (2008) consider both equity
issuance costs and debt issuance costs. The latter crucially impacts the willingness of the firm to
tap credit markets to obtain tax shield and to fund investments. Cash is a valuable alternative
financing option in presence of debt issuance costs that are the key element that differentiate
debt from cash. The value of financial flexibility depends on firm’s growth opportunities, taxes
and assets reversibility. In an environment where the firm obtains funds with cost, holding cash
adds value to the firm. This result is empirically confirmed by Faulkender and Wang (2006)
who find that cash holdings are more valuable for firms with good investment opportunities
and financially constrained firms. In agreement with Gamba and Triantis (2008) and Bolton,
Chen, and Wang (2011), they also find decreasing returns for holding cash. Indeed, if the firm
has plenty of cash there very little gain from further savings because of the very low likelihood
of incurring external finance costs. Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011) further explain the real
consequences of financing constraints that make cash valuable to the firm. More specifically,
they derive that optimal investment is constrained by financial constraints, as in Myers and
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Majluf (1984), and that the firm will optimally choose to invest less if the value of cash is
high, thereby deciding to save. Similarly to Gamba and Triantis (2008), the question if cash
is negative debt is addressed also in Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007). In this study,
it is shown that even if both cash holdings and debt reductions are substitutes in terms of
hedging future downside costs, firm prefer to hoard cash when there is enough probability
that future investment opportunities occur in the state of the business in which cash flow is
low. The element that differentiate cash from debt is the intersection between hedging needs
and financing needs where external finance costs play an important role. Specifically, the firm
is indifferent on the choice between cash and debt unless cash flows from asset in place are
negatively correlated with investment opportunities so that when cash flow is expected to be
low the firm needs funding that can be more easily obtained from existing cash.
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) document a dramatic increase in cash hold by firms in their
sample of U. S. firms between 1980 and 2006. The cash ratio increased from 10.5% in 1980 to
23.2% in 2006. The puzzling fact is that firms should have decreased cash holdings because
both firm and financial intermediaries improved the way to manage and reduce transaction
costs of financing. However, Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) argue that the secular increase of
cash flow volatility, documente in Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) and Irvine and
Pontiff (2009), has led firms to increase cash holdings, particularly for nondividend payers firms.
This fact brings evidence in support of cash hold for precautionary reasons. In the same period
also net working capital (net of cash), especially inventories stock, decreased. Thirdly, net debt
(debt minus cash) also decreased in the same period mainly because of the increase in cash
holdings. Firms also cut of capital expenditures and increased R&D expenses. Current capital
expenditures are in competition with savings in the optimal allocation of firm’s resources. R&D
expenditures signal higher growth opportunities, say more need of fund in the future, but also
more risk and thereby more likelihood to experience distress. Then, firms engaging in research
and development activities hold more cash on average. Overall, the evidence in Bates, Kahle,
and Stulz (2009) support the transaction costs and precautionary theories for holding cash while
agency problems do not appear to be relevant after the authors explicitly control for them. For
example, one might argue that nondividend payers firms, with bad investment opportunities,
increased cash because of entrenched managers. However, Bates et al. show that also firms with
good growth opportunities increased cash holdings. In addition, cash policies do not display
significant differences between firms with different levels of the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick index of
manager entrenchment.
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Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find further evidence on the marginal contribution of cash on
firm value. They develop an empirical analysis on a sample of U.S. firms between 1985-2006.
Their main findings are that firms hoard cash in response to financing needs to avoid incurring
external financing costs. Moreover, they provide evidence on the benefit provided by cash in
terms of increased spending in valuable investment projects using a 3SLS estimation procedure
that allows to control for endogeneity between savings and investment decisions. Finally, they
find that firm with very low cash holdings typically have low operating margins and high capital
expenditures.
Also agency conflicts between managers and shareholders play a role in explaining cash
holdings. In many studies it is found evidence in this sense. Dittmar, Mahr-Smith, and Servaes
(2003) show that firms in countries with poor investors protection hold more cash. Gao, Harford,
and Li (2013) confirm this prediction also within U.S. boundaries finding that privately owned
firms, less subject to agency conflicts, hold less cash holdings. Turning the attention to the
effect of agency issues to firm value, Dittmar and Mahr-Smith (2007), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (2006) and Nikolov and Whited (2014) support theoretical arguments on value
destroying mechanisms in firms more exposed to agency issues. The literature provides also
reasons related to taxes and market-timing to explain high cash holdings. For example, Foley,
Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) find that U.S. multinationals tend to hoard piles of cash
abroad because of repatriation taxes. Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2014) tie the decision to
hoard cash to stochastic financing conditions arguing that firms, instead of saving, may prefer
issue external finance when this is cheap. They basically propose a time-varying benefit for
holding cash according to the different magnitude of financing costs that firms face in different
periods. Agency costs, taxes and market timing are all important factors that affect cash
holdings. However, for pertinence and tractability reasons, I only focus on the risk management
perspective.
1.3 Theories on Trade Credit
In this Section I review of the main theoretical contributions that explain the existence of trade
credit.6 Literature on trade credit basically starts in the macroeconomic framework with the
works of Meltzer (1960) and Brechling and Lipsey (1963) where particular attention is devoted
to the study of the effectiveness of the monetary policy. The premise of this early literature
6With trade credit I refer to credit granted (accounts and notes receivable, AR) and received (accounts and
notes payable, AP) resulting from supplier-buyer commercial deals. In what follows I define firms granting
credit as sellers or suppliers and firms receiving credit as buyers or customers.
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is the existence in the economy of large highly liquid firms with easier access to traditional
financing that grant credit to smaller firms when funds are scarce in the financial system. A
restrictive monetary policy reduces resources available in financial markets to the point where
financially constrained firms cannot finance new investment projects. Meltzer (1960) argues
that the allocation of funds from larger to smaller firms neutralizes the impact of tight monetary
policies. Brechling and Lipsey (1963) refine Meltzer proposition postulating that the presence
of trade credit in the economy leads to a relaxation of the effects of monetary policy only when
receivables are financed with cash. On the other side, when suppliers finance trade credit with
the sale of assets a deflationary effect is produced that reinforces the restrictive monetary policy.
White (1964) confirms Brechling and Lipsey (1963) predictions but he adds that although trade
credit may act against the direction of monetary policies such effect is not enough to nullify the
anti-inflationary force of restrictive monetary policies. Laffer (1970) strengthens the conclusions
in Meltzer (1960) underscoring the role of unused trade credit as a significant component of
money stock jointly with cash and bank accounts. Then, money and trade credit are seen as
substitutes methods of payment. Nadiri (1969) formally develops the point in Meltzer (1960) on
the productivity of trade credit for the supplier. Specifically, Meltzer (1960) sees trade credit as
a way for suppliers to increase sales by taking advantage of liquidity needs of customers. Nadiri
(1969) considers trade credit as an expense that, in the same manner as advertising, enhances
the supplier’s product demand. The increase in sales provided by trade credit compensates
the costs of lending given by the opportunity cost and possible missed repayment of debt by
customers.
Schwartz (1974) introduces a pure financial motive for granting trade credit. Schwartz’s
work hinges upon one of the main assumptions of early literature on trade credit and mone-
tary policy, say, the existence of firms with easier access to financing like bank loans and the
recognition of trade credit as a mean of payment. Another important building block behind
Schwartz’s theory is the evidence on credit rationing that negatively impacts riskier firms fi-
nancing (Jaffee and Modigliani (1969)) and creates a demand for trade credit. According to
Schwartz, liquid suppliers extend trade credit only when the return exceeds the the cost of
forgone current payment of products and the increased marginal cost production represented
by the cost of granting credit.
A series of studies concentrate on financial markets imperfections to explain the existence
of trade credit. Lewellen, McConnell, and Scott (1980) state that trade credit is irrelevant in
a Modigliani-Miller world. Information asymmetries between firms and financial institutions
design a specific role for trade credit that is granted by supplier that have more information
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on buyer’s creditworthness because of the trading relationship. Suppliers can lower the costs
of granting credit because of their better enforceability of credit with respect t financial inter-
mediaries. Ferris (1981) proposes a transaction costs motive for both suppliers and customers
for engaging in trade credit agreements. On the customer side, the possibility to detach the
moment of the purchase from the moment of payment of products contributes to the reduction
of transaction costs like forced assets liquidation. On the suppliers side, there is a reduction of
costs related to the factoring of receivables. In sum, organized payments decrease incurring in
deadweight costs deriving from a mismatch between real operating needs and financial obliga-
tions. Brick and Fung (1984a,b) examine the impact of taxes on trade credit without recourse
to credit market or payment financial imperfections. Specifically, Brick and Fung (1984b),
assuming accounting on cash basis, demonstrate that a convenience for trade credit, as op-
posed to immediate payment, as long as the tax shield earned by customer firm for immediate
payment is lower than the tax shield implicit in the repayment of trade credit. Emery (1984)
recognizes two motives for credit extension from suppliers. Firstly, from the supplier point of
view, trade credit is an operating flexibility tool that can be used to tune product demand by
varying the credit contact terms. For example, lowering interest rate or lengthen credit period
for the same interest rate may convince the customer to buy products. Secondly, Emery (1984)
regards trade credit as a value enhancing instrument as long as it helps to reduce the spread
between borrowing rates and lending rates on credit markets. Smith (1987) develops a static
model focusing on the interest rate charged in trade credit contracts as a screening device to
detect buyers’ creditworthness. In this sense there is no difference between a supplier and a
bank about credit provision. However, Smith (1987) proposes that the interest rate on trade
credit is lower than the one on bank loans because of supplier’s asset specificity, for which the
supplier is willing to apply a low cost on credit to salvage his or her investment.
Meltzer (1960), Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979) , Mian and Smith (1992) propose that
suppliers use trade credit to price discriminate between buyers. Brennan, Maksimovic, and
Zechner (1988) develop a model based on suppliers’ market power and the presence of buyers
with different creditworthness. The supplier can discriminate between rich and poor buyers
by means of trade credit thanks to the unelastic product demand in the trade credit market.
Basically, poor or risky buyers cannot afford to buy supplier’s product with cash because of
lack of funds so they can only buy on credit. The interest rate charged on the credit contract
is such that the supplier will extract all the surplus from future income of the poor buyers. In
this way the supplier can charge rich buyers with an higher cash price and at the same time can
offer trade credit to poor buyers at an interest rate typically above the risk free rate. Brennan,
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Maksimovic, and Zechner (1988) rely on strong assumptions like suppliers’ market power and
the degree of financial constraints suffered by customers. However, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan
(2012) find that also large and creditworthy firms demand trade credit.
Lee and Stowe (1993) propose a model in which customers decide the amount to be pur-
chased on account versus cash payment. The buyer is exposed to a trade-off between the will
to inspect the quality of the product purchased and the higher price that must be paid if a
trade credit is started. Conversely, if immediate cash payment is chosen, the price paid is lower
but the buyer is left exposed to the product quality risk. Lee and Stowe (1993) assume that
the supplier’s product quality is exogenously given so extending credit to the customer with a
discount provision for immediate payment let the supplier share risk with the customer.
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) and Fisman and Love (2003) emphasize the char-
acteristics of the wide economic environment that lead to the use of trade credit. The level
of development of financial markets contributes to the overall economic growth of a country.
Then, in less developed countries, where the financial market cannot reach many small and
riskier firms, trade credit represents an effective instrument to allocate funds also to those
firms. Secondly, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) provide evidence on the complemen-
tarity between bank credit and trade credit in countries where the cost of providing credit are
high for banks. For example, in countries with laws that prevent banks from holding large
stock shares in firms monitoring costs are higher. In this case, suppliers may provide credit
demanding an interest rate on trade credit lower than the prevailing bank loan rate because of
the better ability to monitor customers. Coherently, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001)
and Fisman and Love (2003) conclude that trade credit and banks credit are complementary.
Petersen and Rajan (1997), Frank and Maksimovic (2004), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004)
and Fabbri and Menichini (2010) focus on firm-specific characteristics that lead suppliers and
buyers to stipulate trade credit contracts because of the reduction of credit enforcement costs.
Frank and Maksimovic (2004) argue that the buyer’s collateral quality is a key driver for trade
credit. Suppliers offering standardized products bear lower credit costs. They can easily re-
sell products to other customers after collection from defaulting buyers. This proposition is
reinforced by Petersen and Rajan (1997) findings that firms with a high percentage of finished
good inventories systematically obtain less trade credit than otherwise identical firms. Indeed,
the more a product goes through the production process the harder is to resell it because of
the loss of standardization. Fabbri and Menichini (2010) confirm the role of collateral as a
crucial determinant of trade credit. They argue that suppliers’ liquidation and informational
advantages, over traditional banks, contribute to the existence of trade credit. The liquida-
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tion advantage pertains to the possibility for the suppliers to resell collateral through selling
channels. Liquidation of goods is much more costly for banks. The informational advantage
relates to Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) intuition on the nature of trade credit: unlike cash,
goods cannot be diverted. This advantage increases the recovery value of trade credit for the
suppliers. In contrast, financial intermediaries cannot lend goods but only liquidity that can
be more easily diverted.
Cunat (2007) focus on the value of the trading relationship between supplier and customer
as a crucial determinant of trade credit. Buyers with supplier-specific assets cannot change
supplier without cost so they are more prone to repay trade debt. On the other side, the
supplier, who cares on the future revenues from the trading relationship, not only is eager to
extend credit but he/she also allows the buyer to postpone credit repayment, when the buyer
is temporarily financially constrained. This practice is empirically found also by Boissay and
Gropp (2007) in a sample of French firms. Of course, postponing the repayment of debt means
a cost for the supplier for which it must be compensated. Such cost is included as an additional
premium in the interest rate charged in trade credit contracts.
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Chapter 2
The Value of Inventories Management
2.1 Introduction
Inventories play a prominent role in business cycle fluctuations, accounting for the most part
of GNP variations as reported in Blinder and Maccini (1991). More recently, Alessandria,
Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) find similar patterns also for the economic crisis of 2008-2009
in the United States. Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1994) document a strong positive
correlation between inventory investment and operating cash flow. Firms adjust inventory very
quickly in response to cash flow shocks because of the higher liquidation value compared to
fixed assets.
Even though previous literature highlights the role of inventory as an effective source of
liquidity, there are significant costs associated with carrying inventory thereby supporting a
drastic reduction of the stock of inventory to improve operating margins. A supply chain
manager interviewed in Manuj and Mentzer (2008) as part of their qualitative study, defines
inventory as a “no brain” and inefficient tool to manage risk, given its cost. Surely, starting
from the early 1980’s, many technological advancements contributed to a secular decline of
inventory holdings, documented for the U.S. by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) among others.
For example, the adoption of just-in-time production, IT systems innovations, practices of
vendor managed inventory and deregulation of the transportation sector made the flow of
materials along supply chains more efficient. In the same period, firms also started to focus
on different strategic plans like outsourcing with reliance on multiple suppliers, transforming
supply relations from adversarial to cooperative as reported in Helper (1991) and product
diversification.
In contrast to these views mostly concerned with efficiency rather than risk management,
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Juttner, Peck, and Christopher (2003) highlights the importance of mitigating operating risks
with suitable risk control strategies among which inventories management plays a crucial part.
In support to this view, Chen, Frank, and Wu (2005) empirically demonstrate that low in-
ventories holdings are not associated with better financial performance. In addition, in their
sample of U.S. manufacturers between 1980 and 2000 average stock of the input inventories has
declined while output inventories did not. Moreover, although many technological and regula-
tory innovations improved firm’s efficiency, they also contributed to expose firms to new market
risks. For instance, deregulation intensified competition in many sectors. Ge´zcy, Minton, and
Schrand (2006) underscore how natural gas pipelines needed to take risk management into se-
rious consideration to face exposures to risks spurred by the creation of competitive markets
by deregulation. As another example, outsourcing has become more internationally focused to
the point that firms are more exposed to political and operational (logistic) risks. Transporta-
tion costs are still a big concern for global supply chain managers interviewed in Manuj and
Mentzer (2008). Overall, domestic and global competition also increased in the last decades, as
underscored by Blinder (2000) and Bils and Klenow (2004). Competition stimulated demand
volatility contributing to the increase of the average firm’s sales volatility, as reported by Comin
and Philippon (2006), and consequently to the increase of cash flow volatility. In efficient mar-
kets, cash flow volatility is turned into stock returns volatility as Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu (2001) and Irvine and Pontiff (2009) show. In this sense, Irvine and Pontiff (2009)
provide evidence that product market competition is a major determinant of stock returns
volatility.
Given the increased cash flow volatility, firms implement several risk management strategies
among which inventories management remains a valuable option. Here, I examine the contri-
bution to firm value of inventories through the cash flow hedging channel along with more
obvious risk management tools like derivatives and cash holdings and I explain under which
circumstances firms would rely more (or less) on inventories rather than derivatives and cash
holdings.
Following MacKay (2003), I classify inventories management as real flexibility as opposed
to financial flexibility, which is achieved with cash holdings or derivatives. Real flexibility can
be decoupled in operating flexibility and investment flexibility. inventories provides substitution
flexibility, a form of operating flexibility which constitutes the actual return from the invest-
ment in inventories. Substitution flexibility relates to the possibility of inventories to substitute
for other production factors in the event of any operating shock that impede firms to satisfy
the demand of their product. In my model, I model substitution flexibility in reduced form.
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The contribution of substitution flexibility to the value of risk management is gauged through
its effect on cash flow. The concept of substitution flexibility is explained in Ramey (1989)
where inventories are considered as a production factor in the same manner as fixed capital
and labor. The view of inventories as a production factor is also considered in Kydland and
Prescott (1982), Kahn (1987) and Christiano (1988). According to this view, inventories en-
hance firm value through the flexibility of substitution with other factors of production. For
example, firms holding input inventories avoids production disruptions due to supply chain
shocks that negatively impacts the quantity and quality of production inputs. Moreover, stop-
ping production leaves capital and other production factors idle thereby increasing the actual
opportunity cost of the stop, as pointed out by Ramey (1989). In addition, firms holding in-
put inventories avoid ordering materials too frequently. Besides avoiding ordering transaction
costs, this fact leads to employ workers in other more productive activities rather than the
preparation of delivered materials for production. Work-in-process inventories are important
when firm faces production set-up cost due to a reschedule of the production process. In this
event, it is convenient for the firm to hoard work-in-process goods that would be finished when
production is activated, thereby increasing productivity. On the output side, in the event of a
production disruption or unexpected product demand increases, firms can continue to satisfy
demand relying on output inventories.1 Output inventories also helps reducing the number of
deliveries of finished products to customers which means employing workers elsewhere. Finally,
firms holding inventories save on transaction costs by avoiding ordering inputs and delivering
output too frequently, as remarked in Fisher and Hornstein (2000) and Khan and Thomas
(2007). The convenience of holding inventories, inclusive all the benefits described above, is
considered in reduced form also in the neoclassical modeling approach I follow and adopted
in recent asset pricing contributions on inventories investment like Belo and Lin (2012) and
Jones and Tuzel (2013). More specifically, the return from investment in inventories, in terms
of marginal productivity, comprises the flexibility of substitution with other production factors.
The macroeconomic literature suggests that another important benefit provided by inven-
tories is the flexibility to adjust the stock of inventories according to the state of the firm’s
business. Using MacKay (2003) terminology, this benefit relates to the investment flexibility of
inventories. Managers confronted with low product demand may want to shut down or reduce
production, then they can rely on inventories to satisfy demand. Furthermore, the flexibility
of adjusting inventories can be particularly important for firms with high operating leverage
1Kahn (1987) proposes a stockout avoidance theory for holding inventories. In addition, Pindyck (1994) pro-
vide theoretical and empirical evidence on the convenience of holding inventories in sample of U.S. commodities
producers. In his model the convenience of holding inventories includes the avoidance of stock-outs.
33
and for financially constrained firms for which the bad states of the business are very costly.
According to Fazzari and Petersen (1993), if capital markets are imperfect so that external
finance is costly, firms reduce the stock of assets in response to a negative shock to cash flow.
However, assets differs in remuneration and the degree of reversibility, then inventories are more
likely to be divested after a shock to internal funds. Indeed, liquidation of inventories allows to
avoid reducing the stock of capital to raise funds. According to Arrow (1968), adjusting capital
capacity downward is more costly than increasing it because of liquidation costs. From a risk
management point of view, the possibility of divesting inventories can be framed in the work
of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) as the case in which future investment opportunities
are positively correlated with the return from assets in place. In the case of a bad state of the
business also investment opportunities are less attractive, then liquidating assets is a convenient
way to raise funds without undertaking any other hedging policy. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994),
Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) and Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1994) all provide
empirical evidence in this sense using different measures of financial constraints. Within this
view of inventories as a reserve of liquidity there are, however, a few critical points. First, par-
tial irreversibility concretely bounds the effectiveness of inventories liquidation. In addition, the
return from outstanding assets is penalized in bad states of the business. Second, inventories
investment respond to future revenues so it is possible that, regardless of cash flow, the firm
decides to invest in inventories. Reducing investment or even liquidating inventories entails
a non-negligible opportunity cost, when they promise a good return. These costs limit the
performance of inventories as an hedging tool thereby leaving space for other risk management
instruments.
I consider inventories in the context of integrated management along with traditional risk
management tools like derivatives and financial slack. Firms manage risk to prevent costs
triggered in states of the world in which internally generated funds are scarce. These costs can
be external finance costs as in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) when firms need to finance
investment. Liquidity shortage leads also to distress costs when firms cannot meet operating
or financial obligations, as in Smith and Stulz (1985).2 One of the objective of this study is
to assess the contribution of inventories to risk management, in the presence of derivatives and
cash holdings. Of course, the interactions between operating and financial flexibilities have been
previously studied. Mauer and Triantis (1994) show that production flexibility substitutes for
financial flexibility given by the possibility to adjust debt level. Mello, Parsons, and Triantis
2Other costs include bankruptcy costs as in Smith and Stulz (1985), the loss of tax shield as emphasized by
Stulz (1996) and Leland (1998), information asymmetries costs in DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), underinvestment
in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993).
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(1995) also find a substitution effect between the flexibility of moving production between
countries and financial hedging. More recently, Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011) examine the
integrated management of real investment, cash holdings and risk management. They first
of all show that the marginal cost of investment in real assets, inclusive of possible external
finance costs, depends not only on marginal Q but also on the marginal cost of financing. In
the model of Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011) cash, asset reversibility and hedging can be all
used to avoid external finance costs. One important point in Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011) is
their recognition of the interactions between financial risk management and operating decisions
linked by their role as endogenous sources of liquidity. Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011) find
complementarity between cash holding and hedging with derivatives mainly because of cash
acting as collateral for hedging. Secondly, they show that in situations of binding financial
constraints firms may prefer to liquidate asset instead of using derivatives to improve the risk
management outcome. Disatnik, Duchin, and Schmidt (2014) exploit the difference between
cash flow hedging and fair value hedging to study the effect of hedging with derivatives on cash
holdings, credit lines and firm value. Concentrating on cash flow hedging they find a significant
negative relation between hedging and cash holdings and a positive relation between hedging
and credit lines. In their model the explanation for this result derives from the possibility to
relax covenants on credit lines with hedging. Covenant relaxation not only allows the firm to
rely on credit lines in the future but also to avoid holding cash which is costly. Gamba and
Triantis (2014) focus on the integrated management of operating flexibility, cash holding and
derivatives from a pure risk management perspective. They find that cash adds significant value
to the firm not only by reducing the impact of external finance and distress costs but also by
limiting the impact of firm-specific real frictions, costs of switching of operation mode in their
model. Secondly, they find that derivatives are very effective only when correlation between
operating cash flow and the underlying asset is very high. In those cases, the substitution effect
between derivatives and operating flexibility is even more strong.
Empirical studies, like Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001), Pantzalis, Simkins, and Laux
(2001), MacKay (2003), Ge´zcy, Minton, and Schrand (2006), Hankins (2011) also provide
evidence on the negative relation between the use of operating flexibility and hedging with
derivatives. One of the key elements that leads firms to choose between operating and financial
hedging is the narrow scope that derivatives have to hedge many important risks like quantity or
quality risks. Basis risk is an important determinant of hedging ratios a reported in Haushalter
(2000) for a sample of oil and gas producers between 1992 and 1994. In contrast to derivatives,
inventories can be thought as a customized risk management tool in terms of the better ability
35
to cover firm-specific shocks related, for example, to input supply quantity and quality, machine
failures, production adjustment costs and output demand fluctuations. As noted in Mello and
Parsons (2000), another important cost associated with the use of derivatives is the counterparty
risk compensation required by the counterpart in the contract. This requirement can take the
form of a price charge as in Gamba and Triantis (2014) or a collateral guarantee as in Rampini
and Viswanathan (2010). Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) provide empirical evidence
on the negative effect of collateral constraints on the firm’s hedging policy in sample of U.S.
airlines between 1996 and 2009.
The overall evidence on the relation between the use of hedging with derivatives and firm
value suggest that basis risk and counterparty obligations deeply impact the performance of
derivatives. Guay and Kothari (2003) and Jin and Jorion (2006) report a negligible and statis-
tically not significant impact of hedging on firm value. Studies that report a significant effect of
hedging with derivatives on firm value typically examine market-to-book variation (Allayannis
and Weston (2001), Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Yun (2013)) or
productivity (Cornaggia (2013)) in response to hedging implementation in regression analy-
sis where endogeneity cannot be fully excluded though. Another important point is that, in
the risk management literature, many studies concentrate on very few industries like airlines,
as in Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006), and commodities, as in Tufano (1996, 1998) and
Haushalter (2000). However, I know little on the contribution of hedging to firm value in many
important industries like manufacturing or retailing in which investment in inventories is rel-
evant. Disatnik, Duchin, and Schmidt (2014) emphasize that industry effects are important
determinants of cash flow hedging implicitly suggesting that results in studies focused on few
industries cannot be easily generalized. I contribute to fill this gap by constructing a model
suitable also for industries, like manufacturing, to which the risk management literature has
reserved little attention.
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) provide evidence on the secular increase of cash stock held by
U.S. firms between 1980 and 2006. Among other factors, the contemporaneous increase in cash
flow volatility and the reduction in net working capital, inclusive of inventories, are proposed
to explain the trend followed by cash holdings. According to the precautionary motive for
holding cash, proposed in Keynes (1936), and empirically tested in Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999) among others, firms hoard cash in order to avoid distress costs and to take
advantage of future investment opportunities without incurring external finance costs especially
when cash flows are very volatile. In this study, I argue that the secular increase of cash flow
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volatility documented in the last forty years,3 among other factors, contributed to a substitution
effect between cash and inventories. One of the economic reasons behind the preference of cash
over inventories when cash flow is very volatile is that firms bear liquidation costs also for
liquidating inventories. Secondly, the return from inventories becomes more uncertain. For
these two reasons, firms may find profitable to save rather than invest in inventories that
promise a riskier return and can be liquidated with costs. Also, Han and Qiu (2007), Gamba
and Triantis (2008) and Riddick and Whited (2009) provide evidence on the positive relationship
between cash flow volatility and cash holdings. For example, Gamba and Triantis (2008) find
that increasing the persistence parameter of the productivity shock from 0.62 to 0.85, which
translates into higher cash flow volatility, leads to a 60% increase of the cash/value ratio.
The secular increase in cash flow volatility cannot completely explain the decrease of inven-
tories holdings documented in the sample of Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). Other operating
and technological changes like the improvements in supply chain management, the reduction
of transportation costs, the adoption of different systems of production, like the just-in-time
production, may have reduced the contribution of inventories to firm value. Although, also for
tractability reasons, I have excluded these operating elements from my study, I can indirectly
take them into account thanks to comparative statics on technological parameters that proxy
for all technological factors that decrease the relative importance of inventories with respect to
other assets. Indeed, if the benefits provided by inventories have become smaller, firms prefer
to allocate resources to more remunerative assets and to use alternative hedging tools like cash
holdings.
Recently, a few studies have been proposed which are partly related to my work. Dasgupta,
Li, and Yan (2014), on the basis of findings in Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Carpenter,
Fazzari, and Petersen (1994), study the relation between financial constraints and output in-
ventories management. In their model, firms invest in inventories when production costs are
relatively low and disinvest when production are relatively high, especially when firms face
liquidity constraints and capital is costly to adjust. Their main prediction is that financially
constrained firms (small firms) vary inventories stock more aggressively than their financially
unconstrained counterparts (large firms) in response to production costs. However, they em-
pirically find that financially constrained firms sluggishly respond to positive cost shocks and
that both types of firm are not sensitive at all to negative production costs shocks. Their em-
pirical evidence casts serious doubts on the proposed responsiveness of inventories investment
to internal funds fluctuations. The message of Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Carpenter,
3See Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), Comin and Philippon (2006) and Irvine and Pontiff (2009).
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Fazzari, and Petersen (1994) that, if firms need to cut assets, they will probably start from
liquid assets is correct. However, if this need to cut assets coincides with negative shocks to
operating cash flows is highly questionable.4 In the context of my model, this means that firms
invest in inventories not in response to cash flow but rather on future revenues they can get by
exploiting inventories’ operating flexibility thanks to inventories. More clearly, a firm is eager
to invest in inventories also when it is financially constrained as long as the return from the
investment is higher than the direct cost of the investment possibly augmented with external
finance costs. In agreement with this argument from traditional Q theory, Kahn (1987) argues
that firms invest in inventories to capture future demand, rather than to save on production
costs.
Gao (2014a) proposes that the reduction of input inventories stock and the contemporaneous
increase in cash holdings for U.S. corporations can be explained by the adoption of just-in-time
production by many firms starting from the beginning of 1980’s. Basically, firms adopting just-
in-time production do not need to hold inventories because they can buy materials when they
need them. In the presence of external finance costs, this leads firms to increase cash holding
because of the increased probability of running out of cash to be used to pay materials. In
Gao’s model firms hold cash only for transaction purposes because there is always a need of
cash also in situations of no financial distress or financial constraint typically addressed in the
risk management literature. Therefore, in Gao’s contribution the choice between inventories
and cash can be framed as a operating choice rather than a risk management choice. In
another contribution, Gao (2014b) examine how firm’s market power in the output product
market determines the choice between of output inventories and cash. Assuming an equal
degree of liquidity between output inventories and cash, she finds that firms with more market
power prefer to invest in inventories rather than hoarding cash because of the possibility to
manipulate the return from inventories with pricing power. The inventories’s return boosted
by market power and no liquidity spread between inventories and cash lead firms to privilege
inventories to cash. However, it is at least questionable that inventories and cash share the
same degree of liquidity mostly because of inventories adjustment costs. In addition, also in
Gao (2014b), the firm’s decision between inventories and cash is driven by motivations other
than risk management.
Kulchania and Thomas (2014) provide empirical evidence on the sensitivity of cash holdings
to exposure to supply chain risk, one of the factors that contributed to the documented secular
4Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Erickson and Whited (2000) question the validity of the sensitivity of
investment to cash flow3 as a measure of financial constraints proposed in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988).
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substitution between inventories and cash holdings. In their empirical analysis, they find that
the negative relation between inventories and cash holdings is exacerbated in presence of proxies
of the expected costs of supply chain disruptions. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, they use
transportation deregulation in the U.S. as an exogenous factor that allows to isolate the change
in inventories not related to endogenous management decisions that involve cash holdings. In
this way, they show that the causal relation goes from inventories reduction, due to technological
innovations, to cash holdings increases. In both the study of Kulchania and Thomas (2014)
and that of Gao (2014a), the focus on is on operating motivations to explain the substitution
between inventories and cash holdings. While in Gao (2014a) the reason for holding cash in place
of inventories is a transaction motive, in Kulchania and Thomas (2014) cash holdings increased
because innovations that reduced inventories left firms exposed to supply chain disruptions.
Consequently, cash is used as a production factor in substitution of inventories, independently
from risk management concerns.5
With respect to previous related contributions, I frame my work in a more general risk
management perspective which includes all flexibilities provided by inventories and interactions
with derivatives and cash and I exclusively focus on financial motivations for holding inventories.
I do not exclude that operating motivations are important to explain inventories behavior but
at the same time I isolate financial factors that are valid across different systems of production
and above any operating motive to substitute cash for inventories and . Secondly, I take into
account the total stock of inventories while most of other studies concentrate only on single
components.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Technology
I consider an all equity financed firm that produces one product using as production factors
capital and inventories. I model firm decisions on the integrated management of inventories
and financial hedging in a discrete-time infinite-horizon setup with risk neutral agents. Firm’s
managers, who are aware of the future consequences of current choices, decide investment in
fixed capital (only capital in what follows), inventories and either derivatives or cash holdings.
I chose the neoclassical modeling approach that allows us to capture both the substitution
5The link between supply chain disruption risk and cash holdings is provided in Kulchania and Thomas (2014)
with an example on Ford’s reaction to increased supply disruptions due to financial distress of its suppliers in
2008. In order to secure input supply, Ford started to provide financing to suppliers thereby reducing cash
holdings.
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flexibility of inventories and its liquidity component. Following Belo and Lin (2012), the gross
profit, or operating cash flow, is
f
(
kt, nt, zt
)
= g
(
kt, nt, zt
)− fc = [αk−νt + (1− α)n−νt ]− θν − fc, (2.1)
where zt > 0 is a profit shock that determines the state of the firm’s business, kt ≥ 0 is the stock
of capital, nt ≥ 0 is the stock of inventories, α ∈ (0, 1) is the relative contribution of capital
to output, ν ∈ (0,∞] is a parameter gauging the degree of complementarity between capital
and inventories. ν = −1 implies perfect substitution between capital and inventories while
ν = +∞ implies a Leontief technology where capital and inventories are perfect complements.6
θ ∈ (0, 1) is the return to scale parameter that measures the productivity of assets. fc are fixed
operating costs including any operating overhang in the firm’s business.
The natural logarithm of the shock log(zt) follows an AR(1) process
7
log(zt+1) = φz log(zt) + σzε
z
t ,
where the autoregressive parameter satisfies |φ| < 1, σz is the conditional standard deviation of
zt and ε
z
t are i.i.d. shocks with Normal distribution truncated within three times the uncondi-
tional standard deviation. The production function g
(
kt, nt, zt
)
has the usual properties. It is
increasing in the technology shock zt, increasing and concave in both capital kt and inventories
nt given that gk > 0 and gn > 0 and the associated Hessian matrix is negative definite with
gkk < 0, gnn < 0 and gkkgnn ≥ g2kn, where subscripts indicate partial derivatives.8 The CES
specification of the production function assumes inventories as a positive factor of production,
which provides a flow of services in the same manner as capital.9
6ν = 0 coincides with the Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function. The elasticity of substitu-
tion is ES = 11+ν < 1.
7The mean reverting process is a standard choice in literature to represent firm specific technology shocks.
See, among others, Gomes (2001), Hennessy and Whited (2005), Zhang (2005), Gamba and Triantis (2008).
8Pindyck (1994) adopts a convex cost function of inventories stock as opposed to a concave production
function to shape the high convenience value from holding inventories. The results that I obtain, given the
differences of the two models, are equivalent. Additionally, Pindyck (1994) empirically finds a significantly
convex cost function for the natural resource industries he studied, indicating a strong convenience for holding
inventories.
9See Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Christiano (1988). The neoclassical production function I adopt is
broadly consistent also with standard production smoothing theory early developed by Holt, Modigliani, Muth,
and Simon (1960) in which firms invest in inventories when costs are low to be able to sustain production in
the future. Indeed, production smoothing means investing in inventories when operating costs are low and
viceversa. Even if I do not specify a convex production cost function, inventories are increased when the cost of
the investment is relatively low with respect to the state of the business. For example, when product demand
is high, firms invest in inventories because the cost is low in relation to the benefit they obtain. The opposite
happens when the state of business is less favorable.
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Excluding asset liquidation, that will be discussed later on, capital and inventories evolve
according to the dynamic equations
kt+1 = (1− δk)kt + IKt,
nt+1 = (1− δn)nt + INt,
where Ijt and δj, for j = k, n, are investments and depreciation rates, respectively, for capital
and inventories. Inventories depreciation includes all costs of carry, such as opportunity costs,
risk costs (obsolescence, damages, thefts), storage costs and insurance costs. The firm purchases
capital and inventories at prices both equal to one if investments are positive, at prices `k and
`n if assets are liquidated. The investment cost function is
ηj(Ij, `j) =
Ij if Ij ≥ 0`jIj if Ij < 0,
for j = k, n. As pointed out in Arrow (1968) and Abel and Eberly (1994), firms obtain lower
prices when assets are sold because of adverse selection issues in the market of used capital
goods or because the assets to be sold are firm-specific. Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein
(1994) find that in highly leveraged industries firms may find very difficult to resell assets
because the likely purchasers of assets are the firm’s cash scrapped competitors.10
I set `k and `n lower than one in agreement with Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1994),
who provide empirical evidence on the relative higher flexibility of adjusting inventories in terms
of liquidation costs. For simplicity, I only include in my model the linear component of the
investment cost function proposed in Abel and Eberly (1994, 1997). However, I do not ignore
the asymmetric nature of the investment cost function emphasized in Abel and Eberly (2002)
and Zhang (2005).
2.2.2 Financial Hedging
I separately study the interaction between the investment in inventories and hedging with
derivatives and with cash holdings because the integrated management of derivatives and cash
has been already analyzed by Mello and Parsons (2000), Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011),
Disatnik, Duchin, and Schmidt (2014) and Gamba and Triantis (2014) and, to some extent,
also by Rampini and Viswanathan (2010). My approach allows to genuinely assess the role
10Although Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) focus on financially constrained firms, it is reasonable
to assume that even if they are not in financial distress, firms with considerable debt or operating overhang
would refuse to buy assets at full price.
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of inventories from a financial point of view without involving interactions between derivatives
and cash holding that may contaminate my results. These interactions may include the will to
hold cash in response to possible liquidation costs of assets to meet obligations in derivatives
contracts.
Cash flow risk can be hedged not only through the flexibility provided by inventories but
also entering a short position in a futures contract with one period to expiration written on a
traded asset xt, which can be thought of as the price of a commodity. Assuming that the firm
enters an outstanding contract, I take into account the fact that hedging with derivative may
restrict or enlarge the firm’s budget constraint. This assumption encompasses a large set of
real life cases. For example, a firm close to default may enter the contract only to raise funds
regardless of future obligations.
The natural logarithm of the price log(xt) follows an AR(1) process
11
log(xt+1) = φx log(xt) + σxε
x
t ,
where |φx| < 1, σx is the conditional standard deviation of xt and εxt ∼ N(0, 1) are i.i.d. shocks
with Normal distribution truncated within three times the unconditional standard deviation.
The stochastic factor εzt driving the technology shock is contemporaneously correlated with ε
x
t
so that E[εzt εxs ] = ρ ∈ [0, 1] for t = s and E[εzt εxs ] = 0 for t 6= s. Similarly to Gamba and
Triantis (2014), an important feature of the model is that the performance of hedging with
derivatives crucially depends on the correlation between zt and xt. This correlation depends
on the extent to which the set of technology risk factors intersects with the set of risk factors
traded in financial markets, so that the firm can hedge by buying a derivative contract. The
underlying assets of derivative contracts are typically strongly correlated with systematic risk
factors while inventories are rather firm-specific. In agreement with these arguments, Disatnik,
Duchin, and Schmidt (2014) find that the decision to hedge with derivatives is significantly
influenced by industry effects.
The correlation between zt and xt may capture also industry-specific characteristics. As
pointed out in Gomes, Kogan, and Yogo (2009) and Jones and Tuzel (2013), the qualitative
composition of inventories changes across industries sectors generating varying exposures to
systematic risk. For example, firms in the extraction and mining industries have inventories
that are correlated sometimes perfectly with underlying assets of some commodity derivatives.
Conversely, manufacturers hold inventories of goods that in general are not traded in financial
11The mean reverting process is a natural choice for a commodity price. See Schwartz (1997).
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markets with low correlation with systematic risk factors.
The payoff of the futures purchased at time t − 1 and expiring at t is ht
(
F − xt
)
where
ht is the notional amount and F is the futures price. The price of the futures purchased at t
and expiring at t+ 1 is P (xt) = β E
[
(F − xt+1)|xt
]
, where β is the discount factor. The total
cash flow from trading derivatives at t is the difference between the payoff of the outstanding
contract and the investment in the new futures contract, ht
(
F − xt
) − ht+1P (xt), where F is
predetermined so that P (xt) can have either sign. Therefore, the futures can also be a source
of funding for P (xt) < 0.
I introduce a collateral constraint for the position in the futures. This is consistent with
practices in exchange traded derivatives markets, where collateral in the form of a margin is
required.12 Assuming that cash flows are not pledgeable, as in Rampini and Viswanathan
(2010), the collateral constraint is
ht(xt − F ) ≤ `k(1− δk)kt + `n(1− δn)nt. (2.2)
The left-hand side of (2.2) is the payment required to the firm in the event the underlying
asset xt is higher than the forward price F . The right-hand side of (2.2) is the total value
of collateral available at expiration of the futures. The maximum possible amount that firm
must pay is ht(xu − F ) where xu is the assumed maximum possible value that xt can take.
From the collateral constraint I derive the upper bound for the notional amount of the futures
hu(kt, nt) =
[
`k(1− δk)kt + `n(1− δn)nt
]
/(xu − F ). The lower bound hl of the notional is zero
assuming that no derivatives can be purchased when the firm has no assets.13
At expiration of the futures, the firm may not have sufficient internal funds to cover pay-
ments in the futures and consequently managers have to liquidate a fraction of the assets. This
entails a real cost related to hedging. More specifically, since inventories are relatively more
easily reversible and provide a lower return than capital, if the cash flow from operations is
insufficient to pay the futures payoff, ht(xt−F ) > f(kt, nt, zt), the firm will first sell inventories
and then capital stock. In summary, the payment ht(xt − F ) − f(kt, nt, zt) is first covered
with the liquidation value of inventories stock `n(1 − δn)nt, and for the residual part with a
fraction of the liquidation value of capital `k(1 − δk)kt. Therefore, the investments in capital
12Also in over-the-counter agreements derivatives must be collateralized. For example, the counterpart of
the firm in an over-the-counter derivative contract may require a price premium to account for the possibility
that in the future the firm may not be able to meet the contingent obligations deriving from the contract.
Alternatively, the counterpart may require as collateral a part of firm’s assets.
13I restrict my analysis, with no loss of generality, to a positive correlation parameter and so the firm will
consider taking short positions in the futures, as it is easy to prove. Alternatively, one may consider a long
position in a futures contract with correlation parameter ρ ∈ [−1, 0] to hedge cash flow risk.
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and inventories become
INt = nt+1 − (1− δn)nt + min
{
max
[
ht(xt − F )− f(kt, nt, zt)
`n
, 0
]
, (1− δn)nt
}
IKt = kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + max
[
ht(xt − F )− f(kt, nt, zt)− `n(1− δn)nt
`k
, 0
]
,
Liquidation of assets is very costly not only because it weighs down investments/disinvestments
but also because it contributes to incur external finance costs.
As an alternative to hedging with derivatives, the firm can hold cash to limit the impact
of the costs induced by cash flow risk. In each period, the firm decides to allocate available
funds among the investments in capital and inventories or to save it in a money market account
in order to meet future potential investment opportunities without incurring external finance
costs. On the other hand, cash will be inefficiently held also in states of the world in which
cash flow from operations is high. In addition, firm holding cash incur a penalty on its return
given by taxes and by agency costs between managers and shareholders. The tax penalty for
holding cash is given by the difference between corporate taxes, paid if cash is retained in the
firm, and personal taxes charged on investors if cash is distributed. Jensen (1986) underscore
that holding excess cash may induce lower monitoring over managers that, in this way, are
more likely to invest in negative NPV projects. In my model I do not include tax payments
nor agency costs but I do take into account these costs in reduced form by assigning to cash a
return rcb lower than the risk-free rate, rcb < 1/β−1. Finally, the opportunity costs of investing
in more remunerative assets discourages saving in favor of current investment opportunities.
2.3 Firm’s Problem
Firm value is the result of the maximization of the present value of an infinite sequence of
dividends to shareholders et with respect to the control variables kt+1, nt+1 and ht+1, or in the
version of the model with cash holdings, cbt+1 in place of ht+1 is replaced by . Dividends can be
either positive or negative according to whether the firm pays out or issues new equity. Firm
value at time zero is
v(kt, nt, ht, zt, xt) = max{kt, nt, ht}∞j=t+1
E
∞∑
i=t
βi−t e(ki, ni, hi, ki+1, ni+1, hi+1, zi, xi), (SPh)
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if hedging is implemented with derivatives, and
v(kt, nt, cbt, zt) = max{kt, nt, cbt}∞j=t+1
E
∞∑
i=t
βi−t e(ki, ni, cbi, ki+1, ni+1, cbi+1, zi), (SPcb)
if cash holding is a control variable in place of hedging. More compactly I indicate endoge-
nous state variables with u = (k, n, h) ∈ Uh or with u = (k, n, cb) ∈ Ucb in the second version,
and exogenous stochastic state variables with s = (z, x) ∈ Sh or with s = z ∈ Scb in the second
version. Primed variables will indicate values at time t+ 1.
The technology shock z and underlying asset of the option x have compact support, respec-
tively, in Z = [zl, zu] and X = [xl, xu], with Sh = Z × X , given my assumptions on the error
terms εzt and ε
x
t . Scb = Z in the model with cash holdings. I assume capital and inventories
take value, respectively, in K = [0, ku] and N = [0, nu] where ku and nu are uniquely deter-
mined given the concavity of the production function and linear depreciation costs. Capital
and inventories values, respectively, outside [0, ku] and [0, nu] are not profitable and can be
ignored without affecting my results.14 h lies in H = [0, hu] where the lower bound and hu
are defined according to the collateral constraint presented in the previous section. Finally, cb
belongs to C = [0, cbu] where cbu is chosen large enough to encompass all the levels of cb that
are economically valuable to the firm, given the assumption on rcb.
In each time period a budget constraint must be satisfied. Specifically, in the version of the
model with derivatives, since the uses of funds must equal the sources of funds, the cash flow is
cf(u, u′, s) = f(k, n, z) + h(F − x)− h′P (x)− ηk(IK, `k)− ηn(IN, `n). (2.3)
With cash holdings in place of hedging the cash flow function becomes
cf(u, u′, s) = f(k, n, z) + (1 + rcb)cb− cb′ − ηk(Ik, `k)− ηn(In, `n). (2.4)
I indicate A = U × S the set where the cash flow function is defined for both versions of the
model where U stands for either Uh or Ucb and S stands for either Sh or Scb.
Corporate risk management, obtained by either inventories, derivatives hedging or cash
holdings, limits incurring distress costs and external financing costs, as in Froot, Scharfstein,
and Stein (1993). Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) identify three main costs associated
14In the Appendix I describe the method used to compute ku and nu.
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with equity issuance: tax costs, adverse selection costs as in Myers and Majluf (1984), and
flotation costs. I capture the three cost components in reduced form with the function Λ(cf) =(
λ0 + λ1cf + λ2cf
2
)
where λj > 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 as in Hennessy and Whited (2005). Dividends
are defined as e(u, u′, s) = cf(u, u′, s) + χcf<0Λ(cf(u, u′, s)).15
According to the principle of optimality (Bellman (1957)) I transform the program (SP)
into the associated Bellman equation
v(u, s) = max
{[
max
u′∈Γ(u,s)
e(u, u′, s) + β
∫
S′
v(u′, s′)µ(s, ds′)
]
, 0
}
, (B)
where v(u, s) is the value function corresponding to the value of firm’s equity, Γ(u, s) is the
feasible set where controls take value and µ(s, ds′) is the probability measure defined on the
σ-algebra on S ′, conditional on state si. In the event of default the sum of internally generated
funds from operations and futures payoff if positive and the funds raised from assets liquidated
are used to partially repay operating fixed costs and possible obligations related to the futures
contract. After default, a new firm starts business endowed with a random level of assets.
The following propositions, that can be easily extended to the version of the model with
cash holdings, proved in the Appendix, identify the main characteristics of the value function
v(u, s) and of the optimal policy function in the model with hedging with derivatives.
Proposition 1. The solution of the Bellman equation (B) exists, it is continuous and it coin-
cides with the unique maximum attained solving the program (SP).
Proposition 2. The firm value function is monotonically increasing in k, n and h.
Proposition 3. The firm value function is concave and the optimal policy function is unique
and continuous.
2.3.1 Optimal Policies
In this section I provide an analytic explanation of the economic mechanisms governing the
allocation of resources to capital, inventories and either futures or cash holding. I derive the
the Euler equations with respect to the control variables. I take advantage of Theorem 9.10 in
Stokey and Lucas (1989) by assuming that the value function is continuously differentiable in the
three controls k′, n′ and h′ for all (z, x) ∈ S. I assume also that the probability measure µ(s, ds′)
is non-atomic so that kink points related to indicator functions can be ignored in the derivation
15χA is the indicator function of event A.
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of the Euler equations. In addition, assume evaluating optimal policies in states (u, s) for which
real investments are nonzero, k′ 6= (1−δk)k and n′ 6= (1−δn)n, and the firm neither distributes
nor issues new equity, e(u, u′, s) 6= 0. To simplify notation, I indicate with i = {e(u, u′, s) < 0}
the event of equity issuance, with lc = {h(x−F )−f(k, n, z) > 0} the event of asset liquidation
due to obligation in the futures contract and with lcn = {h(x− F )− f(k, n, z) > `n(1− δn)n}
the event of total liquidation of inventories to meet the obligations in the futures contract.
I derive the Euler equations for k and n for the version of the model with hedging. The
corresponding optimality conditions for the model without financial hedging and the model with
cash holdings are given by the same equations after deleting the parts related to liquidation
costs related to hedging. The optimality condition for investment in capital stock is
ηkk′(IK, `k)
[
1 + χiΛk′(cf)
]
= β
∫ {
fk′(k
′, n′, z′) + ηkk′(IK
′, `k)
[
1− δk + `−1k χlcnfk′(k′, n′, z′)
]
+
ηnk′(IN
′, `n)`−1n χlc(1− χlcn)fk′(k′, n′, z′)
}[
1 + χi′Λk′(cf
′)
]
µ(s, ds′). (2.5)
The marginal cost of investing in capital, in the left-hand side of equation (2.5), is given by the
investment expense ηkk′(IK, `k) augmented with contingent external finance costs proportional
to the size of the investment because of the increased likelihood of incurring external financing
costs due to the investment decision. The marginal cost of the investment becomes a marginal
benefit if the firm decides to liquidate capital. At the same time, the marginal benefit of
capital in the right-hand side of equation (2.5) is reduced. The present value of the marginal
benefit of investing in capital can be decomposed in four parts. The first term between braces
fk′(k
′, n′, z′) is the marginal productivity of capital. The second term (1− δk) is the marginal
value of depreciated capital stock. The third term `−1k χlcnfk′(k
′, n′, z′) is the marginal value of
capital in terms of reduction of capital liquidation costs because of incremental cash flow from
operations. Both the second and third terms are valued one or `k in relation to the investment
decision for the next period. The fourth term ηnk′(IN
′, `n)`−1n χlc(1 − χlcn)fk′(k′, n′, z′) is the
reduction of inventories liquidation costs related to marginal cash flow generated by capital.
These four terms together decrease the likelihood of incurring external financing costs. In the
version of the model with no financial hedging and in the version with cash holdings the Euler
equation for capital is simply given by
ηkk′(IK, `k)
[
1 +χiΛk′(cf)
]
= β
∫ {
fk′(k
′, n′, z′) + ηkk′(IK
′, `k)(1− δk)
}[
1 +χi′Λk′(cf
′)
]
µ(s, ds′).
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The optimality condition related to inventories is
ηnn′(IN, `n)
[
1+χiΛn′(cf)
]
= β
∫ {
fn′(k
′, n′, z′)+ηkn′(IK
′, `k)`−1k χlcn[fn′(k
′, n′, z′)+`n(1−δn)]+
ηnn′(IN
′, `n)
[
1− δn + `−1n χlc(1− χlcn)fn′(k′, n′, z′)− χlcn(1− δn)
]}[
1 + χi′Λn′(cf
′)
]
µ(s, ds′),
(2.6)
where the investment expense, augmented with possible equity issuance costs, in the left-hand
side of (2.6) equals the present value of marginal benefit of inventories investment in the right-
hand side. Also in this case, if the firm decides to liquidate inventories it will get a lower
marginal benefit in the future. The first component fn′(k
′, n′, z′) of the marginal benefit of
inventories between braces is the operating convenience of inventories as a production factor.
The convenience of holding inventories crucially depends on technology parameters like the
elasticity of substitution parameter ν. The higher the complementarity between capital and
inventories the higher the contribution to value of investing in inventories given the positive
dependence of marginal productivity from ν. In addition, the state of z impacts the marginal
productivity of inventories. For example, input supply shocks or production disruptions that
impede the firm from satisfying product demand, are much more costly if demand is high
as reflected by an high realization of z. Consequently, the avoidance of costly stockouts is
particularly valuable when z is high implying a higher return from inventories.
The second component ηkn′(IK
′, `k)`−1k χlcn[fn′(k
′, n′, z′)+`n(1−δn)] is the reduction of capital
liquidation costs because of additional operating cash flow generated by inventories and because
of the possibility to use inventories as a buffer before liquidating capital. This component is
valued at one or `k depending on the capital investment decision for the next period. The
third term, (1 − δn), is the marginal value of depreciated inventories stock. The fourth term
of marginal revenue of inventories, `−1n χlc(1 − χlcn)fn′(k′, n′, z′), is the reduction of inventories
liquidation costs provided by incremental internal funds generated by inventories stock. The
fifth component, χlcn(1− δn) , is the marginal cost of holding inventories due to the priority in
liquidation due to obligations in the futures contract. These last three components of the right-
hand side of (2.6) are valued at one or `n according to the inventories investment decision for
the next period. As in the case of capital, the marginal benefit provided by inventories, in the
right-hand side of (2.6), besides directly contributing to firm value, decreases the likelihood of
incurring external financing costs. This is the risk management benefit provided by inventories
with respect to external finance costs. In summary, the contribution of inventories to firm
value derives from substitution flexibility, embedded in inventories marginal productivity, and
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from its role as a reserve of liquidity. Simplifying notation with respect to expectation and
discounting, the marginal contribution of inventories to firm value through the channel of
substitution flexibility is
fn′(k
′, n′, z′)[1 + ηkn′(IK
′, `k)`−1k χlcn + η
n
n′(IN
′, `n)`−1n χlc(1− χlcn)],
and the contribution through the channel of liquidity is
(1− δn)[ηkn′(IK ′, `k)`−1k χlcn`n + ηnn′(IN ′, `n)− (1− χlcn)].
In the versions of the model without financial hedging or with cash holdings, the benefits of
inventories are simply given by fn′(k
′, n′, z′) and ηnn′(IN
′, `n)(1− δn) and the Euler equation is
ηnn′(IN, `n)
[
1+χiΛn′(cf)
]
= β
∫ {
fn′(k
′, n′, z′)+ηnn′(IN
′, `n)(1−δn)
}[
1+χi′Λn′(cf
′)
]
µ(s, ds′).
The optimality condition related to the investment in futures is
P (x)
[
1 + χiΛh′(cf)
]
=
β
∫
(F − x′)
{
1 + ηkh′(IK
′, `k)`−1k χlcn + η
n
h′(IN
′, `n)`−1n χlc(1− χlcn)
}[
1 + χi′Λh′(cf
′)
]
µ(s, ds′).
(2.7)
The marginal cost of investing in the futures is given by the price of the futures and by the
possible equity issuance costs due to the hegding decision. Conversely, when the price of the
futures is negative, the firm receives additional funds by entering the futures. This decision
implies a reduction of the likelihood of incurring external financing costs. In the right-hand
side of (2.7), the present value of the marginal benefit of hedging with the futures is given by
the payment F − x′ if positive. If F − x′ < 0, it is an outflow for the firm and in the event
internally generated funds are not enough to make the payment, assets must be liquidated. This
implies two additional marginal costs related to hedging with futures given by the liquidation
of inventories and capital, respectively, the second and the third terms between braces in the
right-hand side of equation (2.7). These costs are higher when the firm pursues investments
because they are valued at one which is the price paid for new capital and inventories. The
benefits or costs provided by the futures in the right-hand side of (2.7) reduce or increase
the likelihood of bearing future external financing costs. This fact highlights that real assets
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actually service obligations in the futures thereby providing a lower incentive to hedge.
The Euler equation related to cash is given by
[
1 + χiΛcb′(cf)
]
= β
∫
(1 + rcb)
[
1 + χi′Λcb′(cf
′)
]
µ(s, ds′), (2.8)
where in the left-hand side I have the cost of holding cash increased by possible external equity
costs due to saving instead of distributing cash. In the right hand side of equation (2.8) I have
the marginal benefit of holding cash given by the interest income and the reduced likelihood of
incurring external equity costs. The benefit provided by cash, in the right-hand side of (2.8),
is given by savings augmented with earned interests plus the reduced likelihood of incurring
external finance costs.
2.4 Numerical Results
In this section I numerically study the effect of the integrated management of inventories and
hedging, implemented with either derivatives or cash holdings, on firm value using the model
developed in previous sections. Given the properties of the value function, I solve (B) using
a successive approximations method to find firm value and the optimal policies for capital,
inventories and hedging. I discretize the capital set K, and the inventories set N between
zero and ku and between zero and nu respectively with points chosen as ku(1 − δk)j/4 and
nu(1− δn)j/4 with j = 1, ..., 21. The sets of h and cb are discretized respectively in [0, hu] and
[0, cbu] with 21 equally-spaced points. The stochastic variables z and x define a reduced-form
vector autoregression that I approximate through a discrete-state Markov chain with 9 points
for each variable with truncated support in [−3σuj , 3σuj ], j = x, z, where σuj = σj/
√
1− ρ2j is
the unconditional standard deviation for j = x, z. The discrete abscissae and the risk neutral
Markov transition probabilities are computed according to Terry and Knotek (2011) extension
of Tauchen (1986) method, which is based on Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule but allowing for
nonzero correlation.
2.4.1 Calibration
I calibrate my model in annual frequency. The autoregressive coefficient of z, φz, is set to 0.62
and σz to 0.15 according to Gomes (2001). The autoregression φx and the volatility σx are also
set, respectively, to zero, 0.62 and 0.15 in order to have a marginal distribution of x comparable
to that of z. The correlation parameter ranges between 0 and 1 and I set it to 0.1 for the base
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case. However, I will show results also for other values of of ρ.
As I adopt the same technology specification as in Belo and Lin (2012), I select the technol-
ogy parameters accordingly except for the return to scale parameter, θ, that I conservatively set
to 0.45, instead of 0.7 as in Belo and Lin (2012), not to overstate the return from inventories
investment. Moreover, my choice is in the range of values used in literature. For example,
estimates in Basu and Fernald (1997), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1995) and Basu,
Fernald, and Shapiro (2001) are very close to constant returns to scale. Jones and Tuzel (2013)
set the returns to scale respectively to 0.30 but they use also depreciation rates for capital
and inventories lower than mine. I set the parameter measuring the relative contribution of
capital to output α = 0.78 and the elasticity of substitution parameter ν = 0.5 as in Belo and
Lin (2012). For comparison, Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Christiano (1988) estimate a
complementarity parameter respectively equal to 4 and to 3.6. However, both studies use a
different production function comprising labor and focus on the U.S. economy in the post-war
period until the beginning of the 80’s. In contrast, recent asset pricing contributions focus on
a wider time span from the post-war period to 2009-2010 and set the complementarity param-
eter between 0.5 and 2. For example, Belo and Lin (2012) estimate ν = 0.5 by matching the
simulated inventories-to-sales ratio with the empirical counterpart of 17% in a sample of U.S.
firms between 1965 and 2009. In a sample of U.S. firms between 1958 and 2010, Jones and
Tuzel (2013) calibrate parameters in their model with values ν ranging between zero and 2 and
using ν = 1 as their base case value. For these reasons I will present a sensitivity analysis
of my results on ν. Capital depreciation rate δk is set to 0.12, in agreement with Kydland
and Prescott (1982), Gomes (2001), Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006). Consistently with Belo and Lin (2012), the inventories depreciation rate δn is set to
0.24 which is in the range 0.19-0.43 reported by Richardson (1995) and approximately equal
to 0.25 reported in Ramey (1989). For comparison purposes, Jones and Tuzel (2013) adopt a
quarterly 0.05 depreciation rate, which corresponds to an annual 0.2. I set fixed operating costs
to 0.65 which is in the range 0.45-1.35 adopted in Moyen (2004). I set `k = 0.85 and `n = 0.93
to match corresponding values in Belo and Lin (2012) who adopt an asymmetric investment
cost function with fixed and convex components. The forward price F for the futures contract
is set to 1, which is also the unconditional average value of the price of the underlying asset.
The equity issuance cost parameters λ0, λ1 and λ2, are set, respectively to 0.389, 0.053 and
0.0002 which are the lowest values estimated for large COMPUSTAT firms by Hennessy and
Whited (2007). my choice of λ1 is also not far from estimates in Hennessy and Whited (2005)
of 0.059 and in Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) of 0.0515. I set the discount factor at β = 1/1.05
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and the interest rate on cash holding rcb to 0.045. All parameters values are summarized in
Table 2.1.
Parameter Symbol Value
Returns to scale θ 0.45
Capital contribute to output α 0.78
Elasticity of substitution parameter ν 0.5
Capital depreciation rate δk 0.12
inventories depreciation rate δn 0.24
Capital liquidation price `k 0.85
inventories liquidation price `n 0.93
Fixed operating costs fc 0.65
Autoregression of zt φz 0.62
Volatility of zt σz 0.15
Autoregression of xt φx 0.62
Volatility of xt σx 0.15
Correlation ρ 0.1
Forward price F 1
Equity issuance costs
λ0 0.389
λ1 0.053
λ2 0.0002
Discount factor β 1/1.05
Cash holdings return rcb 0.045
Table 2.1. Base Case Parameters.
2.4.2 The Contributions of Inventories and Derivatives to Firm Value
One of the challenges of this work is to disentangle the role of inventories as a production factor
from its role as a risk management tool. Then, in what follows I select as the benchmark the
model in which capital can be controlled, inventories are constant at the unconditional average
and no hedging is performed. In addition, the choice of this benchmark model is dictated also
by the fact that I are studying firms that use inventories as a factor of production so it is not
correct to exclude inventories from the production function. In such a case I would deal with
a completely different technology which is not comparable with the technology specification I
adopt. In this way, I can compute the risk management contribution of inventories to firm value
holding constant its contribution as a production factor. Against this benchmark, I compute the
relative contribution to risk management of inventories, derivatives and cash holdings. I will add
to the benchmark model these controls in order to assess their individual and joint contribution
to the value of risk management. I label “Inventories” the model in which inventories can be
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managed bu the firm has no access to derivatives; “Derivative” the model in which the firm uses
futures, while inventories is kept constant at the steady state level; “Inventories & Derivative”
the model where the firm controls capital, inventories and hedging.
Unconditional averages of endogenous variables are computed with simulation of the “in-
ventories & Derivative” model with 10000 paths and 200 time periods from which I deleted the
first 50 observations for each path in order to exclude for any influence of the initial conditions
of the simulations. I control for the fact that the unconditional average of inventories can be
different among variations of the model. However, from my simulations it turns out that such
difference among unconditional averages of inventories is negligible so that the results are not
influenced by the choice of unconditional average inventories.
In Figure 2.1and Figure 2.2 I plot firm value as function of variables. In Figure 2.1 firm
value is shown as a function of capital stock k and inventories stock n. Firm value is increasing
and concave in both variables meaning that marginal value that managers can add by increas-
ing assets stocks is bounded. The concavity of the firm value with respect to inventories stock
derives from decreasing return to scale of inventories. Pindyck (1994) adopts a different mod-
eling approach by specifying a cost function convex in the stock of inventories. In his model
drawing down inventories is very costly. This cost is progressively reduced as the firm increases
the stock of inventories. The cost of not having inventories are given by stockout costs. In this
work I follow the neoclassic modeling approach by specifying a production function but the
economic mechanism is the same as in Pindyck’s model.
In Figure 2.2 I plot firm value as a function of the notional of the futures h and the underlying
assets x. The payoff of the futures for the firm is linear as long as liquidation costs do not come
into play. The firm is more likely to liquidate asset to meet obligations in the futures when x is
in the right-tail of the distribution. In this event the firm not only needs to pay the counterpart
in the futures but it also bear liquidation costs if internally generated funds from operations
are not enough to make the payment. The effect of liquidation costs can be seen observing in
Figure 2.2 firm value that is concave in x. Obviously, liquidation costs are heavier if the firm
allocate more resources to hedging for high values of h.
53
1.2
0.92
Inventories Stock (n)
0.64
0.36
0.081
1.65
Capital Stock (k)
2.3
2.95
3.6
1
2
3
4
5
6
Fi
rm
 V
al
ue
Figure 2.1. Firm Value as a Function of Capital and Inventories. In this figure I plot firm value
as function of capital stock k and inventories stock n. Firm value is shown for the average values of the shock
z = 1 and the underlying asset of the futures x = 1 under base case parameters.
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Figure 2.2. Firm Value as a Function of Notional and the Underlying Asset of the Futures. In
this figure I plot firm value as function of notional h and the underlying asset x of the futures. Firm value is
shown for the average values of capital stock k = 2.24 and inventories stock n = 0.68 under base case parameters.
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In the literature, while the relative higher liquidity of inventories has been widely docu-
mented, the complementarity between inventories and capital has not been investigated from a
financial point of view. In Figure 2.3, I show the percentage value increase in the “inventories”
case for different values of the complementarity parameter ν against the base case level of 0.5.
As expected, increasing complementarity (higher ν) negatively impacts the risk management
value of inventories. When capital and inventories are complement, inventories cannot sub-
stitute for capital, for example, in the event of a production disruption, which entails losing
sales that leads to a lower cash flow. Furthermore, for high complementarity the firm must
hold a quantity of all production factors essential to the production process. This generates an
implicit cost related to the lower return from inventories influenced by (1−α) and depreciation
δn. Even if the substitutability value of inventories increases with lower ν this is not enough to
compensate this loss of return with respect to capital. As it is shown in Figure 2.3, increasing
the degree of complementarity from 0.5 to 0.75, firm value decreases on average by about 10%
(being twice as bigger for ν = 1). On the other hand, reducing complementarity from ν = 0.5
to ν = 0.25 leads to an average value increase of about 14% (and about 32% for ν = 0.01).
Although firm value increases with lower complementarity between assets, the relative contri-
bution of inventories however becomes smaller as it can be seen in Figure 2.4, where I plot
the percentage value increase due to adding inventories management to the benchmark model
(without the dynamic management of inventories) including the base case value of 0.5. As
reported in Table 2.2, for ν = 0.25 the value increase is on average 2.27% which increases to
4.53% for ν = 0.5 and to 5.68% for ν = 0.75. As complementarity increases, although firm value
is overall lower, the value contribution of inventories becomes larger because it provides unique
services in the production process. On the other hand, if the firm for a given level of production
can easily substitute factors of production it will be convenient to invest in more remunerative
factors like capital. In summary, I detect two channels through which lower complementarity
affects firm value: first, it increases firm value due to higher flexibility between the two pro-
duction factors; second, a substitution effect in the optimal mix of production factors penalizes
assets with lower returns. This effect can be seen observing Table 2.3 where I report descriptive
statistics of inventories ratio (n/(k+n)), hedge ratio (h/(g(k, n, z)/z)) and hedge-to-assets ratio
(h/(k + n)) computed in the “Inventories & Derivative” case. Hedge ratio equals the notional
amount in the futures scaled by production, say, the production function divided by z assuming
that z subsumes the price of the output. This hedging measure is adopted, among others, in
Tufano (1996) and Jin and Jorion (2006) where the hedge ratio is defined as the derivatives
portfolio’s delta multiplied by the derivatives portfolio’s notional scaled by production. In my
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case the derivative’s delta is one since I only consider a futures. The average inventories ratio
increases with complementarity, from 19.3% with ν = 0.25, to 23.2% with ν = 0.5 and to 26%
with ν = 0.75.
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Figure 2.3. The Effect of Complementarity between Capital and Inventories on Firm Value.
For the “Inventories” case I depict as a function of z the percentage difference in firm value due to different
levels of complementarity between capital and inventories, ν, with respect to the base case with ν = 0.5. Firm
value is shown for the average levels of the variables computed simulating optimal policies in the base case with
ν = 0.5, which are 2.24 for capital and 0.68 for inventories.
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Figure 2.4. The Effect of Complementarity on the Contribution of Inventories to Firm Value. In
this figure, I show, against the shock z, the firm value percentage increase due to adding inventories management
to the benchmark model. I show firm value increase in five different scenarios identified by the complementarity
parameter ν. Firm value is shown for average levels of k and n in each case, which are, respectively, 2.77 and
0.46 for ν = 0.01, 2.45 and 0.58 for ν = 0.25, 2.24 and 0.68 for ν = 0.5, 2.06 and 0.72 for ν = 0.75, 1.89 and
0.75 for ν = 1.
The second channel through which inventories contribute to firm value refers to their role
as a reserve of liquidity. The relevant metric in this case is the ratio `n/`k, which summarize
the degree of liquidity of assets in a relative manner. I compute the contribution to firm value
of inventories by only varying `k below the base case value of 0.85. In Figure 2.5 I graphically
expose results. The average value increase is 4.53% under base case value `k = 0.85, 5.42% with
`k = 0.50 and 6.22% with `k = 0.15. These results suggest that inventories play a significant role
in mitigating the impact of capital illiquidity. However, the value increase due to inventories
management derives from both the operating flexibility and its role as a liquidity reserve.
To isolate these components, I compute the marginal contribution of inventories management
under the same values of `k previously used but with `n = 0. In this case, inventories are
fully irreversible and cannot be used as a reserve of liquidity. I find average value increases of
4.51%, 5.32% and 5.98%, respectively, for `k equal to 0.85, 0.50 and 0.15. Given the negligible
difference between the base case `n = 0.93 and `n = 0, these results indicate that most of
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the contribution of inventories management to firm value derives from operating substitution
flexibility. Conversely, the component of value that can be attributed to inventories as a reserve
of liquidity is quite small.
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Figure 2.5. The Effect of Liquidity on the Contribution of Inventories to Firm Value. In this
figure, I show, against the shock z, the firm value percentage increase due to adding inventories management
to the benchmark model. I show firm value increase for `k equal to 0.85 (base case), 0.50 and 0.15. Firm value
is shown for average levels of k and n, respectively, 2.24 and 0.68 in three scenarios considered.
Having studied the effect of production complementarity and liquidity, the two channels
through which inventories management influence firm value, I can move to the study of the
interaction between inventories and hedging. In Figure 2.6 I show the percentage value in-
creases due to the addition of the management of inventories and hedging with the futures to
the benchmark model under base case parameters. The numerical value of average percentage
value increases is reported in Table 2.2 for the base case and a selection of other cases. I ob-
serve that inventories and hedging contributions to firm value are progressively less important
as the state of the firm’s business improves, as intuitively marginal benefits of risk management
decrease with the state of the business. Secondly, I observe that, on average, inventories con-
tributes to firm value slightly more than hedging. Under base case parameters, the contribution
of inventories to value equal to 4.53% while the percentage value increase due to hedging with
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futures averages 2.42% as shown in the case “Derivative”. Once added the dynamic manage-
ment of inventories, the incremental contribution of the futures, computed as the difference
between the value increases in the “Inventories & Derivative” case and the “Inventories” case,
approximately averages 0.77% given a joint contribution of inventories and hedging with futures
equal to 5.30% in the “Inventories & Derivative” case.
In the third column of Table 2.2, I report the contributions of inventories and hedging to
firm value with ν = 0.75, whereby capital and inventories have a higher complementarity. The
marginal value contribution of inventories and hedging with futures are, respectively 5.68% and
3.86% on average. Inventories management and hedging become especially valuable given the
reduced flexibility due to higher complementarity. The joint contribution of inventories and
hedging to firm value averages 6.86% with the incremental contribution due to the management
of the futures equal only to 1.18% leaving again most of the firm value increase attributable
to inventories management. In Table 2.3, the inventories ratio increases with higher comple-
mentarity reflecting the higher need of inventories when capital cannot substitute for it. The
resources devoted to hedging also increase, leading to an increase in the hedge ratio from 20.7%
with ν = 0.5 to 23.4% with ν = 0.75.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Variable BaseCase ν = 0.25 ν = 0.75 fc = 0.6 fc = 0.7 ρ = 0.5 ρ = 1 σz = 0.10 σz = 0.20
Inventories 4.530 2.269 5.679 2.159 10.445 4.530 4.530 0.117 5.119
Derivative 2.421 0.964 3.860 0.746 3.744 3.869 6.944 1.157 1.123
inventories & Derivative 5.298 2.925 6.858 2.719 11.985 6.366 8.697 0.870 5.131
Table 2.2. The Marginal Contributions of Inventories and Derivatives to Firm Value. In this
table I report the average percentage firm value increases due inventories management, “inventories”, hedging,
“Derivative”, and controlling inventories and hedging, “Inventories & Derivative”, in addition to capital. The
percentage value increases are reported for the average value of the shock z = 1, for the value of x = 0.866 for
which the futures most frequently pays to the firm and for the values of endogenous variables in the respective
sets closest to unconditional averages of capital, inventories and notional in each parameter setting.
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Figure 2.6. The Contributions of Inventories and Derivatives to Firm Value. In this figure, I show,
against the shock z, the average percentage firm value increases of inventories, “Inventories” case, hedging with
the futures, “Derivative”, and the joint contribution of these controls, “Inventories & Derivative” case, with
respect to the benchmark model in which only capital can be controlled. Percentage value increases are shown
under base case parameters and for the unconditional average values of k, n and h, respectively, 2.26, 0.68
and 0.25, computed with simulation of “Inventories & Derivative” model and for the most frequent value of
x = 0.866 for which the futures pays to the firm, say, the value right below the long term mean in the grid of x.
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Variable Mean Median St.Dev.
Base case
Inventories Ratio 0.232 0.232 0.014
Hedge Ratio 0.207 0.117 0.255
Hedge/Assets 0.089 0.048 0.112
ν = 0.25
Inventories Ratio 0.193 0.198 0.011
Hedge Ratio 0.207 0.127 0.266
Hedge/Assets 0.088 0.048 0.114
ν = 0.75
Inventories Ratio 0.260 0.257 0.016
Hedge Ratio 0.234 0.117 0.281
Hedge/Assets 0.104 0.048 0.127
fc = 0.6
Inventories Ratio 0.236 0.243 0.012
Hedge Ratio 0.216 0.127 0.246
Hedge/Assets 0.094 0.048 0.109
fc = 0.7
Inventories Ratio 0.225 0.232 0.037
Hedge Ratio 0.209 0.114 0.284
Hedge/Assets 0.093 0.048 0.140
ρ = 0.5
Inventories Ratio 0.231 0.232 0.013
Hedge Ratio 0.446 0.378 0.383
Hedge/Assets 0.196 0.143 0.173
ρ = 1
Inventories Ratio 0.236 0.241 0.011
Hedge Ratio 0.774 0.637 0.505
Hedge/Assets 0.341 0.286 0.239
σz = 0.1
Inventories Ratio 0.229 0.230 0.010
Hedge Ratio 0.222 0.118 0.298
Hedge/Assets 0.085 0.048 0.108
σz = 0.2
Inventories Ratio 0.231 0.232 0.015
Hedge Ratio 0.774 0.637 0.505
Hedge/Assets 0.094 0.048 0.128
Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics of the Model with Capital, Inventories and Hedging with
Derivatives. In this table I report, under various parameters settings, the descriptive statistics of inventories
ratio n/(k+n), hedge ratio of production h/(g(k, n, z)/z), and hedge/assets ratio h/(k+n), for the “Inventories &
Derivative” model. Unconditional moments are estimated from a panel of 10000 firms for 150 periods simulated
using the optimal policy functions.
Inventories and hedging with derivatives importantly affect the firm’s cash flow in the pres-
ence of significant operating leverage. Ramey (1989) explains that the benefit provided by
inventories in terms of avoidance of input supply and production disruptions is valuable also
because other factors of production can be continuously employed when such events occur. For
example, here fixed operating cost may comprise fixed payments to labor which must be met in
any state of the business. If inventories is available, workers can continue to work in production
in the event of a supply shock and in sales in the event of a production disruption. Continuity
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in production and sales sustain cash flow so that fixed operating costs becomes less binding.
This benefit from inventories derives from substitution flexibility that becomes very valuable
when the operating cash flow is close to the level of fixed costs. Then, in that case having
inventories sustain cash flow above fixed costs. Also inventories liquidity impacts positively
the value of firms because in bad states of the business, if operating leverage binds, additional
funds can be raised liquidating inventories, therefore avoiding external finance costs.
To gauge the impact of risk management tools for different levels of operating leverage, in
columns four and five of Table 2.2, I report firm value increase in the “Inventories”, “Derivative”
and “Inventories & Derivative” cases with fixed costs set respectively to 0.6 and to 0.75, around
the base case value of 0.65. First of all, I observe that the value increase is smaller in all cases
cases when the operating leverage is set to 0.6. In the “Inventories” case the value increase
is 2.16% while in the “Derivative” case it is 0.75%. In contrast, if operating leverage is 0.7
the marginal contribution of inventories dramatically increases to 10.45% lending support to
Ramey (1989) arguments. The value increase in the “Derivative” case is also higher, averaging
3.74%, with higher operating leverage. Secondly, inventories still dominates futures for different
levels of the operating fixed costs but the marginal contribution of inventories for fc = 0.7 is
by far greater than that of the futures.
The correlation between the technology shock z and the futures underlying asset x crucially
influences the performance of hedging with derivatives. In columns 6 and 7 of Table 2.2, I report
the average contributions to firm value of inventories and hedging with the futures with ρ = 0.5
and ρ = 1. Firstly, I note that the contribution of hedging is greatly enhanced by correlation
set higher than the base case level 0.1 because of the increased effectiveness of hedging cash
flow. The value increase in the “Derivative” case averages 3.87% with ρ = 0.5 and 6.94% with
ρ = 1. This result is in agreement with the findings in Gamba and Triantis (2014) where
derivatives’ contribution to value is in general very low except for the cases in which there is
perfect conditional correlation between the cash flow and the underlying asset of the derivative
contract.
Inventories becomes incrementally less valuable with higher ρ if the firm implements hedging
with derivatives. The joint contribution of inventories and hedging to value averages 6.37% with
ρ = 0.5 and 8.70% with ρ = 1 and for ρ = 1 derivatives account for the most part of the value
gain that can be attributed to risk management leaving a 1.76% incremental value increase due
to inventories management. In Table 2.3, I observe that the hedge ratio are higher with higher
values of correlation. For example, the hedge ratio equals on average 44.6% with ρ = 0.5 and
77.4% with ρ = 1, much higher than 20.7% with ρ = 0.1 (base case).
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I find that increasing the technology shock volatility leads the firms to invest more in inven-
tories and to hedge more with the futures. High volatility notoriously enhances the performance
of reversible investments. In agreement, I find that the marginal contribution to firm value in
the “Inventories” case averages 5.12% with σz = 0.20 compared to 4.53% under the base case
level σz = 0.15, as reported in Table 2.2. In Table 2.3 I observe that the hedge ratio increases
with σz set to 0.2. However, the contribution to firm value of hedging with futures reduces to
1.12%. This results derives from the fact the firm invest more in real assets when volatilty of
the technology shock is high because both inventories and capital are reversible. This explains
the slight change of the hedge to assets ratio between the base case with σz = 0.15 and the
case with σz = 0.20. So, even if hedging is more valuable when z is very volatile its marginal
contribution gets reduced because real assets (mainly inventories) become even more valuable.
Contrasting my results with previous studies on the contribution of hedging with deriva-
tives to firm value, my findings are in general consistent with the risk management literature.
Allayannis and Weston (2001) find on average a 5% increase in firm’s Tobin’s Q for U.S. non-
financial firms adopting risk management policies on currency risk in years from 1990 to 1995.
Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) provide a range of 5% to 10% market-to-book increase
for firms hedging fuel risk in their sample of U.S. airline companies. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Yun
(2013) report an average increase in market-to-book ratio of 6%-8% statistically significant only
for U.S. energy utilities between 1960 and 2007 with a very high exposure to weather risk.
As for hedge ratios, in Table 2.3, I observe an hedge ratio of 20.7% (11.7%) on average
(median) under base case parameters, of 44.6% (37.8%) on average (median) with ρ = 0.5 and
of 77.4% (63.7%) on average (median) with ρ = 1. The average (median) hedge ratio increases
to 77.4% (63.7%) with σz = 0.2 greater than the 0.15 value in the base case. Hedge ratios
are computed in variety of ways in the literature so my measure of hedging activity is directly
comparable with some studies but it is different from other measures of hedging activity adopted
in others. For example, Tufano (1998) measures hedging activity with the ratio of derivatives
portfolio’s delta over production for a sample of U.S. firms in the gold mining sector. He
finds an average hedge ratio of 27%. Guay and Kothari (2003) adopt the ratio of derivatives’
portoflio cash flow sensitivity to operating cash flow finding a median 10% in their sample.
Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) in their sample of U.S. airlines between 1992 and 2003 find
that firms hedge on average 15% of their expense in jet fuel. Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan
(2014) report similar results for the same industry finding that U.S. airlines in their sample
hedged on average less than 25% of their fuel expense in the period 1996-2009. Finally, Jin
and Jorion (2006) report an average of 33% for the ratio of derivatives’ portfolio’s delta scaled
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by production for U.S. oil and gas producers in the years between 1998 and 2001. my results
are broadly consistent with findings in other studies given the differences in measuring hedging
activity and the heterogeneity in hedging policies across firms and industries.
In the spirit of traditional empirical tests in the risk management literature, I estimate,
with data obtained through simulation of the model, the following regression
rit = γ0 + γ1 rzit + εit,
where rit are stock returns and rzit are returns of z for firm i at time t and εit are i.i.d.
errors by definition orthogonal to rzit. This exercise allows us to understand that the source
of value increase previously discussed actually derives from additional flexibility provided by
inventories and hedging with derivatives. This flexibility translates into a lower sensitivity of
firm’s stock returns to the technology shock z that moves the operating cash flow. In Table
2.4 I report the estimate of γ1 in each of the versions of the model and for different parameter
settings. As expected γ1 is always high, between 0.833 and 0.909, in the “Benchmark” model.
Secondly, adding either inventories or hedging with futures, I observe a decrease of γ1 due to
additional flexibility that neutralizes part of the the effects of z on stock returns. In agreement
with my previous findings on the contribution of inventories to firm value, I find that the
dynamic management of inventories reduces the sensitivity of stock returns to returns of z.
More specifically, γ1 reduces to 0.778 in the “Inventories” case. This effect is stronger as σz
increases. In Column 5 of Table 2.4, I report γ1 equal to 0.746. In agreement with Tufano
(1998), hedging reduces the sensitivity of stock returns to cash flow shocks even more for
flexible firms with very volatile cash flows. The value of flexibility is in fact enhanced by higher
volatility.
I observe a reduction of γ1 also when the firm implements hedging with futures especially
when ρ is high. This is not surprising since the firm has more chances to effectively hedge cash
flow when the technology shock is perfectly correlated with the underlying asset in the futures
contract. Also in the “Derivative” case I observe a reduction of γ1 with higher volatility even if
this effect is less pronounced than in the “Inventories” case. γ1 is minimized in the “Inventories
& Derivative“ case for all parameters settings with the exception of the case with ρ = 1 where
the futures alone reduces γ1 even more than jointly with inventories.
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1 2 3 4 5
Variable BaseCase ρ = 0.5 ρ = 1 σz = 0.1 σz = 0.2
Benchmark 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.875 0.833
Inventories 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.800 0.746
Derivative 0.841 0.718 0.337 0.840 0.826
Inventories & Derivative 0.768 0.684 0.452 0.772 0.755
Table 2.4. Stock Returns Sensitivities. In this table I report the estimates of the parameter γ1 in the
regression of firm’s stock returns on the returns of the technology shocks z, rit = γ0 + γ1rzit + εit. Returns are
computed on a panel of 10000 firms for 150 periods simulated with optimal policy functions computed in the
“Benchmark”, “Inventories”, “Derivative” and “Inventories & Derivative” versions of the model. All estimates
are statistically significant.
I study the sign of the relation between the investment in inventories and hedging in my
model by estimating the following regression
hedge ratioit = µ0 + µ1 inventories ratioit + µ2 networth ratioit−1 + ωit,
where hedge ratioit = hit/(g(kit, nit, zit)/zit), inventories ratioit = nit/(kit + nit), and
networth ratioit = [f(kit, nit, zit)+hit(F−xit)+`n(1−δn)nit−liqnit+`k(1−δk)kit−liqkit]/(kit+nit),
where liqj are contingent liquidation costs due to obligations in the futures, and ωit are i.id.
shocks orthogonal to regressors. The estimates of coefficients µj for j = 0, 1, 2 are reported in
Table 2.5. Firstly, I find, in agreement with Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) and Rampini,
Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014), a positive relation between net worth and hedging. Secondly,
and more importantly for this study, I find a strong negative relation between hedging with
inventories and hedging with the futures in all parameters settings. The only exception is the
case with σz = 0.1. This result suggests that inventories and financial hedging are substitutes
even after controlling for net worth which is the budget available to the firm. In unreported
regressions, I estimated the same equation above replacing inventories ratio with the lags of
inventories growth and the capital growth ratios finding a negative coefficient for the former
and positive for the latter variable. Since inventories ratio summarizes the real investment
decisions taken in period t−1 together with hedging decision, I decided to estimate regressions
with only inventories ratio in addition to net worth ratio. I observe that the negative relation
between inventories ratio and hedge ratio is stronger with higher operating leverage and higher
correlation ρ. Higher fixed costs stimulate investment in inventories at the expenses of hedg-
ing with futures. On the other hand, hedging with futures absorbs more resources when the
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correlation between z and x is higher.
Observing the results from my model, I provide further evidence on the substitution effect
between real flexibility and financial flexibility documented in other studies. For example,
Mauer and Triantis (1994) and MacKay (2003) provide, respectively, theoretical and empirical
evidence on the negative relation between real flexibility, mainly in the form of production
volume flexibility, and financial flexibility in the form of flexible debt financing. Restricting
the scope to studies that explicitly compare various hedging strategies, Mello, Parsons, and
Triantis (1995) document a substitution effect between the flexibility of sourcing production
and hedging with derivatives in response to exchange rate risk. Ge´zcy, Minton, and Schrand
(2006) in their sample of U.S. pipelines, find that firms that rely on cash holding and storage use
less or do not use any derivatives. Regarding the form of the relation between real and financial
hedging, in agreement with Gamba and Triantis (2014), I find that the substitution effect
between operating and financial flexibility is stronger with high operating leverage and higher
effectiveness of hedging with derivatives when the underlying asset of the derivative is highly
correlated with the stochastic factor that shocks operating cash flow. Of course, substitution
between hedging and inventories is not perfect given the significant joint contribution of these
risk management tools reported in Table 2.2 in the “Inventories & Derivative” case for all
parameters settings.
Parameters Setting Intercept(µ0) Inventories Ratio(µ1) Net Worth Ratio(µ2)
BaseCase 0.040 -1.389 0.517
ν = 0.25 -0.280 -0.347 0.582
ν = 0.75 -0.011 -0.499 0.397
fc = 0.6 -0.098 -0.963 0.561
fc = 0.7 0.163 -2.247 0.607
ρ = 0.5 0.997 -3.629 0.303
ρ = 1 0.698 -9.779 2.515
σz = 0.1 -0.854 1.645 0.707
σz = 0.2 -0.105 -0.292 0.415
Table 2.5. The Negative Relation between Hedging and Inventories. In this table I report the
estimates of the regression of hedge ratio of production h/[g(k, n, z)/z] on the inventories ratio n/(k + n) and
the net worth ratio networth/(k+n) where networth = f(k, n, z)+h(F−x)+`n(1−δn)n−liqn+`k(1−δk)k−liqk
and liqj for j = k, n are liquidation costs due to obligations in the futures contract. Variables are computed
on a panel of 10000 firms for 150 periods simulated with the policy functions computed in the “Inventories &
Derivative” version of the model. All estimates are statistically significant.
In Table 2.6, I report data on hedging activity of a group of U.S. airline firms taken from
Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014). Hedging is measured as the fraction of next year fuel
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expenses hedged with derivatives. I can only measure hedging as a time series average between
1996 and 2009, so I can only compare hedging activity between but not within airlines. For each
airline I report also the time average of inventories ratio that I took from COMPUSTAT files
by matching airline name. By comparing hedging with inventories ratio I can get information
about the degree of substitutability between derivatives and inventories as hedging tools. Even
though the limited number of observations precludes any generalization of the results, it is
interesting to notice some patterns in the data that confirm the predictions of my model. In
Table 2.6, airlines are sorted on hedging activity with derivatives.
First of all, I observe that hedging with derivatives is used more by larger firms in agree-
ment with empirical risk management literature. Secondly, airlines have low inventories ratios
compared to firms in other industries because of technological reasons but also because they
can hedge fuel expenses more effectively given the lower basis risk between jet fuel and, for ex-
ample, oil derivatives. Thirdly, I observe that the inventories ratio is decreasing with the hedge
ratio and size. For example, in Table 2.6, I observe that airlines with hedge ratio between
0% and 12.5% have higher inventories ratios compared to airlines with an hedge ratio between
12.5% and 25%. This pattern is even more clear if I compare airlines that hedge between 0%
and 25% of fuel expenses with those with hedge ratio between 25% and 62.5%. As an extreme
observation “GREAT LAKES AVIATION LTD ” do not hedge at all with derivatives but it
has the highest inventories ratio of 12% on average. The use of pass-through agreements16
may signal an higher need of hedging, as the hedge ratio for those firms is extremely high.
However, the negative relation between hedging with derivatives and hedging with inventories
holds also for this group. With the exception of “EXPRESSJET HOLDINGS INC”, airlines
with pass-through agreements also exhibit a substitution between hedging with derivatives and
hedging with inventories. For example, in this group, “MESA AIR GROUP INC” has an hedge
ratio in 62.5-75% with an average inventories ratio of 4.65%, while “REPUBLIC AIRWAYS
HLDGS INC”, that hedges 100% of its fuel exposure, has an average inventories ratio of 1.58%.
In summary, this simple comparison of hedging and inventories policies in the airline industry
broadly supports my model’s predictions, even though the paucity of data makes it impossible
to draw any general conclusion.
16In pass-through agreements a carrier provide fuel and other services to a regional airline that provide jet
service on behalf of the carrier. In this way the airline is naturally hedge against fuel price fluctuations.
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Airline Hedging Inventories Ratio Pass-through Size
GREAT LAKES AVIATION LTD 0 12 (10.7) No 4.57
MIDWAY AIRLINES CORP 0 1.39 (1.42) No 5.42
US AIRWAYS GROUP INC -OLD 0 - 12.5 2.6 (2.7) No 9.02
FRONTIER AIRLINES HOLDINGS 0 - 12.5 1.25 (1.19) No 6.02
MIDWEST AIRRGOUP INC 12.5 - 25 2.29 (2.36) No 5.64
CONTINENTAL AIRLS INC -CL B 12.5 - 25 2.24 (2.16) No 9.15
UNITED CONTINENTAL HLDGS INC 12.5 - 25 1.72 (1.68) No 10.26
NORTHWEST AIRLINES CORP 12.5 - 25 2.17 (2.88) No 9.48
US AIRWAYS GROUP INC 12.5 - 25 2.92 (3.18) No 7.74
AIRTRAN HOLDINGS INC 12.5 - 25 1.95 (2.06) No 6.82
JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP 25 - 37.5 0.47 (0.48) No 8.22
ALASKA AIR GROUP INC 25 - 37.5 1.93 (1.89) No 8.25
DELTA AIR LINES INC 25 - 37.5 0.73 (0.75) No 10.26
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES 50 - 62.5 1.20 (1.21) No 9.08
MESA AIR GROUP INC 62.5 - 75 4.65 (3.97) Yes 6.52
SKYWEST INC 62.5 - 75 2.74 (2.68) Yes 7.12
MAIR HOLDINGS INC 75 - 87.5 2.85 (3.37) Yes 5.18
EXPRESSJET HOLDINGS INC 100 5.12 (4.99) Yes 6.20
PINNACLE AIRLINES CORP 100 2.33 (2.26) Yes 5.91
REPUBLIC AIRWAYS HLDGS INC 100 1.58 (1.58) Yes 7.42
Table 2.6. Hedging Policies Comparison. In this table I report the time series average of hedging
activity, measured as the percentage fraction of fuel expense hedged, inventories ratio and size, measured as the
log of total assets for a group of U.S. airlines between 1996 and 2009 in the sample studied by Rampini, Sufi,
and Viswanathan (2014). In column Pass-through it is reported whether the airline had or not a pass-through
agreement.
2.4.3 The Contributions of Inventories and Cash Holdings to Firm
Value
I solve the dynamic programming problem related to the integrated management of capital,
inventories and cash holdings using the same set of parameters in Table 2.1 and examine the
relative and marginal contribution of inventories and cash holdings to the enterprise value, which
is firm value less the cash balance. I call “Cash” the model where the firm controls capital and
cash balance while inventories is constant at the unconditional mean, “Inventories & Cash” the
model where the firm controls capital, inventories and cash balance. In the benchmark model
and in the “Inventories” model the enterprise value coincides with firm value.
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Figure 2.7. The Marginal Contribution of Inventories and Cash Holdings to Enterprise Value. In
this figure, I show, against the shock z, average percentage enterprise value increases of inventories, “Inventories”
case, and cash balance, “Cash”, and the joint contribution of these controls, “Inventories & Cash” case, with
respect to the benchmark model in which only capital is controlled. Value increases are shown under base case
parameters and for the unconditional average values of k, n and cb, respectively, 2.23, 0.69 and 0.19, computed
with simulation of the “Inventories & Cash” model.
In Figure 2.7, I show the percentage value increase in the “Inventories”, “Cash” and “Inven-
tories & Cash” cases. In Table 2.7, I report the average percentage enterprise value increases in
the same three cases under different parameters settings.17 Inventories and cash management
significantly contribute to enterprise value. Under the base case parameters, the average per-
centage value increase in the “Inventories” case is 4.77% while in “Cash” case it is 3.40%. As
in the previous section, I find that risk management becomes more important if complementar-
ity between capital and inventories increases because of a reduction of substitution flexibility
that must be compensated somehow. The average percentage enterprise value increase in the
“Cash” case is 3.40% with ν = 0.5, while it is 5.84% with ν = 0.75, also exceeding the marginal
contribution of inventories. In general, higher complementarity entails less freedom of adjusting
the mix of capital and inventories in response to supply chain shocks, production disruptions
or sudden demand increases. Consequently, the firm saves more in response to such a reduced
17The contributions to value in the “Inventories” case are different compared to those in Table 2 because they
are shown for different levels of the variables in the respective grids.
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value of substitution flexibility as I observe in Table 2.8 where cash ratio increases from 6.3%
with ν = 0.5 to 9.5% with ν = 0.75.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variable BaseCase ν = 0.25 ν = 0.75 fc = 0.6 fc = 0.7 σz = 0.1 σz = 0.2
Inventory 4.773 2.269 5.679 2.159 9.525 2.875 5.119
Cash 3.403 1.010 5.844 0.634 5.253 0.818 3.548
Inventory & Cash 6.084 2.998 8.221 2.637 11.235 3.280 7.275
Table 2.7. Average Percentage Enterprise Value Increases. In this table I report the average
percentage present enterprise value increases due to controlling inventories, “Inventories”, controlling cash
holdings, “Cash”, and controlling inventory and cash holdings “Inventories & Cash”, in addition to capital, under
different parameters settings. Percentage value increases are reported for the average value of the technology
shock z = 1 and for the values of control variables in the respective sets closest to unconditional averages of
capital, inventories and notional in each parameter setting.
Variable Mean Median St.Dev.
Base case
Inventories Ratio 0.220 0.220 0.025
Cash Ratio 0.063 0.048 0.077
ν = 0.25
Inventories Ratio 0.186 0.194 0.018
Cash Ratio 0.044 0.016 0.063
ν = 0.75
Inventories Ratio 0.234 0.234 0.028
Cash Ratio 0.095 0.088 0.094
fc = 0.6
Inventories Ratio 0.227 0.233 0.021
Cash Ratio 0.039 0.000 0.063
fc = 0.7
Inventories Ratio 0.211 0.215 0.033
Cash Ratio 0.071 0.048 0.079
σz = 0.10
Inventories Ratio 0.228 0.232 0.015
Cash Ratio 0.025 0.000 0.043
σz = 0.20
Inventories Ratio 0.208 0.204 0.029
Cash Ratio 0.104 0.098 0.104
Table 2.8. Descriptive Statistics of the Model with Capital, Inventories and Cash. In this table
I report, under various model parameters settings, descriptive statistics of inventories ratio n/(k + n+ cb) and
cash ratio cb/(k + n + cb) of the “Inventories & Cash” model. Unconditional moments are estimated from a
panel of 10000 firms for 150 periods simulated with the policy functions computed in the “Inventories & Cash”
version of the model.
In Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.7, I show the effect of operating leverage on the contribution
to enterprise value of inventories and cash. I find that the percentage value increase due to
inventories averages 9.53% while the individual contribution of cash averages 5.25%. In contrast,
the contribution of inventories and cash to enterprise value becomes very small with operating
leverage fc = 0.6, lower than the base case 0.65, with a joint contribution of inventories and
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cash averaging 3%. This happens because the firm has lower probability to incur external
financing costs with low operating leverage and, consequently, there is less need of hedging
cash flow. The individual performance of cash holdings falls with lower operating fixed costs
averaging 1%. This effect can be seen also looking in Table 2.8 at the drastic decrease of the
cash ratio to 3.9% on average and 0% in median.
In Columns 6 and 7 of Table 2.7, I observe that the contribution of inventories and cash to
the enterprise value become higher the higher the volatility of the cash flow. As for inventories,
the contribution to enterprise value is 2.88% with σz = 0.10 and 5.12% with σz = 0.20. As
explained in Pindyck (1982) and Leahy and Whited (1996), when assets are easily reversible,
an increase in the cash flow volatility leads to an increase of investment, to take advantage of
large increases of z, while (costly) asset allows to absorb negative shocks. Also cash holdings
contribute more to enterprise value with higher volatility, in agreement with the precautionary
motive for holding cash. More specifically, the individual contribution of cash averages 0.82%,
3.40% and 3.55% with σz equal respectively to 0.10, 0.15 and 0.20, and the cash ratio increases
from 6.3% with σz equal to 0.15 to 10.4% with σz equal to 0.20.
Increasing σz and consequently the cash flow volatility leads also to a reduction of the inven-
tories ratio. This result can be attributed to a substitution effect between inventories and cash
given the increase of the cash ratio in response to higher cash flow volatility for precautionary
reasons. In addition to higher cash flow volatility other operating and technological changes,
like improvements in supply chain management or more efficient systems of production, led
to a reduction of the contribution of inventories to firm value in the last thirty years. These
technological changes can be approximated by a reduction of ν. In Figure 2.8, I observe that
the substitution effect between inventories and cash holds under different settings of ν. Com-
plementarity between production factors shifts up inventories ratio which displays in all Panels
of Figure 2.8 a convergence pattern as volatility increases. Cash ratio steadily increases with
cash flow volatility at a higher rate as ν increases as it can be seen observing how the slope of
the dashed line changes from one case to the other. In agreement with Han and Qiu (2007),
Gamba and Triantis (2008) and Riddick and Whited (2009) I find support for the precautionary
motive for holding cash postulating that higher cash flow volatility leads to higher cash stocks.
This result is in line also with Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) who find a substitution effect
between the cash ratio and the net working capital (net of cash) ratio that can be attributed,
among other factors, to the secular increase in idiosyncratic volatility documented in Campbell,
Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), Comin and Philippon (2006) and Irvine and Pontiff (2009) for
the U.S. and reasonably also for the rest of the world.
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Figure 2.8. The Effect of Cash Flow Volatility on Inventories Ratio and Cash Ratio. In this
Figure, I show against the technology shock volatility σz, the average inventories ratio, n/(k+n+ cb), and cash
ratio, cb/(k+ n+ cb), computed on a panel of 10000 firms for 150 time periods simulated with the “Inventories
& Cash” model, according to different levels of ν.
In Table 2.9, I report the unconditional correlation between the inventories ratio and the
cash ratio in the “Inventories & Cash” case. I observe that the substitution between inventories
and cash is driven by both the degree of complementarity between production factors and
the technology shock volatility. The negative correlation between inventories ratio and cash
ratio becomes stronger as ν increases and also when σz is higher. With high complementarity
between capital and inventories the latter promises a higher return because it is essential in
the production process. However, higher complementarity reduces the flexibility of adapting to
technology shocks thereby increasing the need for cash. On the other hand, cash flow volatility
crucially determines the return from cash holdings in terms of avoidance of external finance
costs but at the same time the reversibility of inventories is enhanced by a more variable
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business environment. In summary, inventories and cash provide hedging benefits boosted by
complementarity and cash flow volatility that influence the strength of the substitution between
them.
σz = 0.10 σz = 0.15 σz = 0.20
ν = 0.01 -0.601 -0.757 -0.827
ν = 0.25 -0.748 -0.856 -0.870
ν = 0.50 -0.842 -0.909 -0.909
ν = 0.75 -0.861 -0.942 -0.946
Table 2.9. Correlation between Inventories Ratio and Cash Ratio. In this table I report uncondi-
tional correlation of inventories ratio n/(k+n+ cb) and cash ratio cb/(k+n+ cb) computed in the “Inventories
& Cash” model according to the complementarity parameter ν and technology shock volatility σz.
2.5 Empirical Tests
In this section I pursue two objectives. Firstly, I empirically test the predictions of the model
previously developed with specific attention to the relation between cash ratio and inventories
ratio explained under the risk management perspective. Secondly, I test the relationship be-
tween cash flow and inventories investment as a way to test the role of inventories as a reserve
of liquidity. This exercise is useful also to assess the significance of the sensitivity to cash flow
inventories investment.
I develop the first part of the empirical analysis also on the basis of findings in Bates, Kahle,
and Stulz (2009) who find a negative relation between net working capital (net of cash) ratio
and cash ratio for U.S. industrial firms in the period from 1980 to 2006. Many factors may
explain such findings. First of all, a trend toward liquidity in the choice of production factors
can explain a substitution effect between working capital assets. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)
report that the decline in net working capital ratio, mainly due to a reduction of inventories
and receivables, has led firms to hold more cash. This argument, although reasonable, misses
the important element that cash and other working capital items like inventories are typically
endogenously chosen by firms’ managers. This fact may lead to significant bias in the estimation
of the magnitude and the sign of the relation between variables so that endogeneity must be
addressed.
Operating factors cannot completely explain the substitution between inventories and cash
holdings. Another factor that may have influenced the negative correlation between these work-
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ing capital items is the secular increase in cash flow volatility documented in Irvine and Pontiff
(2009). Firms facing high cash flow volatility hold more cash for precautionary reasons. At
the same time, cash flow volatility seriously also impacts firm’s investment policies, including
inventories investment. Pindyck (1982) explains that higher uncertainty may lead to higher
levels of assets depending on the shape of assets’ adjustment costs. In a later contribution,
Pindyck (1988) identifies reversibility of investment as of the main factors influencing the rela-
tion between risk and investment. Irreversibility makes the marginal revenue from investment
a concave function of the stochastic factor driving the revenue itself. Consequently, higher
uncertainty translates into lower investment rates. This proposition is empirically confirmed in
Leahy and Whited (1996) in a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms between 1981 and 1987.
I analyze the relation between inventories and cash and the effects of cash flow volatility in
a sample of U.S. firms, in the same period as in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), taken from
COMPUSTAT Industrial files in 2014. I construct my sample by taking all the universe of firms
in COMPUSTAT from which I delete firms with negative or zero values of relevant balance sheet
items like total assets, sales, gross capital stock, cash stock, number of shares outstanding, stock
price, book equity and observations that do no comply with standard accounting identities. I
excluded also firms with total assets below 2 millions of dollars and with fixed capital below
one million of dollars to avoid rounding errors. Finally, I excluded from my sample utilities and
financial firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999 and between 6000 and 6999. My final
sample includes a total of 17283 firms between 1980 and 2006.
I define variables basically according to Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) and according to
common practice in the finance literature. My dependent variable is the inventories ratio defined
as total inventories (invt - #3 )18 over total assets (at - #6). I select from Bates, Kahle, and
Stulz (2009) explanatory variables that are likely to explain the inventories ratio. I include
the cash ratio defined as the cash and short term securities (che - #1) over total assets. I
expect a negative relation between cash ratio and inventories ratio for both operating and risk
management reasons. Cash flow is defined as income before extraordinary items (ib - #118)
plus depreciation and amortization (dp - #14) and the cash flow ratio is measured as cash
flow over total assets. Cash flow is found positively correlated with inventories investment in
Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1994) because budget constraint for investments is reduced
when internally generated funds are low and external finance is costly. Moreover, inventories
are a very liquid asset that can be liquidated when cash flow is low. However, controlling for
investment opportunities may change the sign of the relation between cash flow and inventories
18I report between brackets the reference label and number of items as referenced in COMPUSTAT.
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ratio. Industry cash flow volatility is constructed in two steps according to Opler, Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009): firstly, I compute for each
time period and for each firm the cash flow volatility using observations of cash flow from the
previous 10 years, secondly I average cash flow volatility across firms in industries categorized
with the first two-digits of the SIC code. Cash flow volatility should be negatively related to
inventories ratio because of reversibility reasons previously explained.
I include in my list of explanatories a measure of investment in fixed capital defined as
capital expenditures (capx - #128) over total assets. I expect a negative effect of investment in
capital on inventories ratio because of fewer resources available for other types of investment
if the firm allocates more resources to capital expenditures. Tobin’s Q ratio (market-to-book
ratio) proxies for investment opportunities and it is measured as the log of total assets minus
book value of common equity (ceq - #60) plus the market value of equity scaled by total asset
as in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). The market value of equity is given by the closing annual
stock price (prcc - #199) multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding (csho -
#25). I use also two different measures of Tobin’s Q related to fixed capital and inventories.
Specifically, I compute Tobin’s Q of capital as the log of the value of assets minus the book
value of inventories over the book value of capital given by gross property, plant and equipment
(ppegt - #7). In a similar manner, I compute Tobin’s Q of inventories as the log of the
value of assets minus the book value of capital over the book value of inventories. I expect a
negative and a positive relation, respectively, between market-to-book of capital and inventories
ratio and between Tobin’s Q of inventories and inventories ratio. Although both capital and
inventories investments are driven by future productivity, it is reasonable that there are factors,
captured by individual Tobin’s Q, that influence the choice between the investment in capital
and inventories. To take into account financing of working capital assets like inventories I
construct a proxy of short-term financing as the sum of debt in current liabilities (dlc - #34)
and trade accounts payable (ap - #70) over total assets. I define size as the log of total assets
and I use it as an explanatory of inventories ratio because it is an inverse measure of access to
capital markets since large firms obtain external funds more easily than small firms. Inventories
are very procyclical and thereby positively correlated with sales. For this reason, as in Jones
and Tuzel (2013), I include sales growth, computed as the rate of growth of sales (sale - #12).
Finally, I control for leverage computed as the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term
debt (dltt - #9) over total assets. I use leverage to control for financial obligations that may
constrain investment in inventories.
In Table 2.8 I report descriptive statistics of the dependent variable of interest, inventories
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ratio, and other explanatory variables. The average inventories ratio is 16.5% for the whole
sample. In agreement with Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) I find that the cross-sectional av-
erage of inventories ratio exhibits a decreasing trend in the period from 1967 to 2014. In the
same period, cross-sectional average cash ratio and cash flow volatility increased. The secular
trends of inventories ratio, cash ratio and cash flow volatility can be clearly observed in Figure
2.9. Inventories ratio averaged 24-30% from 1967 to 1980 and it decreases to an average in
15-20% in the 20 years after 1980. Slightly before the end of the 1990’s the inventories ratio
averaged in 13-15%. Conversely, cash ratio exhibit a constant positive trend from 1967 to 2014
ranging from a value slightly below 10% in 1967 to a value very close to 20% in the years from
2002 to 2014. Inventories ratio, as well as cash ratio, is very volatile with a standard deviation
of 0.159 while the capex ratio is much less volatile, 0.078 on average, indicating that much
of the variability in the inventories ratio derives from adjustments in inventories, say, in the
numerator or adjustments of other not fixed assets in the denominator of the ratio.
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Figure 2.9. The Temporal Trends of Inventories Ratio, Cash Ratio and Cash Flow Volatility.
In this figure I depict the cross-section average of inventories ratio, cash ratio and cash flow volatility against
time for the whole sample.
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Variable Mean Median Std Min Max
Inventories ratio 0.193 0.163 0.159 0.000 0.962
Cash Flow ratio 0.053 0.083 0.198 -10.640 11.07
Industry CF sigma 0.054 0.052 0.018 0.021 0.101
Sales Growth 0.110 0.093 0.340 -9.32 8.557
Cash ratio 0.126 0.063 0.158 0.000 0.981
Tobin’s Q 0.422 0.304 0.661 -3.480 6.570
Tobin’s Q Capital 1.009 0.836 1.146 -6.677 8.156
Tobin’s Q Inventories 1.908 1.690 1.752 -8.356 12.341
Capex ratio 0.074 0.051 0.078 -0.343 2.354
Short-term financing 0.168 0.130 0.135 0.000 1.057
Size 4.924 4.668 2.180 0.693 13.59
Leverage 0.246 0.230 0.188 0.000 1.030
Table 2.10. Sample Descriptive Statistics. In this table I report descriptive statistics of the dependent
variable, inventories ratio and of the explanatory variables cash flow ratio, industry cash flow volatility, sales
growth, cash ratio, Tobin’s Q of total assets, Tobin’s Q of fixed capital, Tobin’s Q of inventories, capital
expenditures ratio, short-term financing, size and leverage.
In Table 2.9 I report estimates of the model specified in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009).
In the same manner as in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), I use also R&D-to-sales ratio, R&D
expenses (xrd - #46) scaled by sales, acquisition activity measured by acquisitions (aqc - #129)
scaled by total assets, and a dividend dummy, dividend (dvc - #21) equal to one if the firm
pays dividends. I replicate results from Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) to ascertain that there
are no mistakes in the construction of my sample. The regression estimates have the expected
sign. For example, the volatility of cash flow has a positive and significant effect on the cash
ratio. Secondly, the sign of the coefficient of inventories ratio is negative and significant across
different estimators. Also the coefficients of size, market-to-book and cash flow-to-assets are
significant and have the expected sign, in agreement with findings in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz
(2009). Finally, the presence of few outliers does not significantly influence estimation. For the
explanation of the relation between other variables and cash ratio I refer the reader to Bates,
Kahle, and Stulz (2009).
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1 2 3 4
Model POLS Changes Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable Cash ratio ∆ Cash ratio Cash ratio Cash ratio
Intercept 0.137*** 0.007*** 0.125*** 0.102***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009)
∆ Cash ratio -0.067***
(0.006)
L1.Cash -0.124***
(0.003)
Industry Sigma 0.785*** 0.694***
(0.083) (0.182)
Tobin’s Q 0.065*** 0.022*** 0.064*** 0.041***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Size -0.003*** 0.026*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 0.002
Cash Flow ratio -0.099*** -0.007*** -0.065*** -0.018***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) 0.006
Inventories ratio -0.051*** -0.079*** -0.048*** -0.076***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Capex ratio -0.582*** -0.263*** -0.593*** -0.359***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.041) (0.013)
Leverage -0.370*** -0.135*** -0.346*** -0.214
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008)
R&D-to-Sales 0.000 0.000 0.0215** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000)
Dividend dummy -0.041*** 0.003* -0.039*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 0.003
Acquisition Activity -0.302*** -0.185*** -0.308*** -0.218
(0.015) (0.010) (0.030) (0.012)
Year dummies Yes Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.466 0.300 0.043 0.253
Table 2.11. Comparison with Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) Estimates. In this Table I report the
estimates of regressions similar to those in Bates et al. (2009). The dependent variable is cash ratio explained by
cash flow volatility (Industry Sigma), Tobin’s Q, size, cash flow ratio, inventories ratio, capital expenditure ratio,
leverage, R&D expenditures (R&D/Sales), a dummy equal to one if firm pays dividend and acquisition activity.
For all estimators I use Newey-West (1987) standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
For FE estimates I report the within adjusted R-squared. Standard errors of estimates are reported in brackets.
Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated, respectively, with ***, **, and *.
The result of the estimation of my empirical model on inventories ratio are reported in Table
2.10. I use as dependent variable the first-difference of inventories ratio because of the high
persistence of inventories ratio in levels. Coherently, I adopt the first-difference of cash ratio
because the coefficient related to this variable is of interest. In addition, I dynamically specify
my model in order to take into account the intertemporal economic mechanisms behind the
variables analyzed. According to Arellano and Bond (1991), given that endogeneity cannot be
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completely excluded, I choose a dynamic specification that at least rules out residuals’ serial
correlation for which I obtain positive response from the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for sec-
ond order autocorrelation of residuals. I use several estimators all robust to heteroskedasticity,
cross-correlation and autocorrelation of residuals.
In the first column of Table 2.10, I report standard pooled OLS estimates with temporal
dummies to take into account cross-correlation effects between firms, say, factors that affect
all firms in a given time period. All estimated coefficients have the expected sign except the
contemporaneous value of cash flow to assets which is negative. The coefficient related to
sales growth is always significant and positive in agreement with business cycle and firm level
empirical stylized facts reported in Blinder and Maccini (1991) and widely documented in the
inventories literature. This result is coherent with Kahn (1987) who argues that inventories
investment is performed in relation to expected sales. Substituting sales growth with expected
sales growth, computed through the autoregression of order one of sales growth, does not
change the sign of the coefficient. In addition, Belo and Lin (2012) and Jones and Tuzel (2013)
emphasize the positive relation between the return from investing in inventories, given by
increased sales, and inventories investment itself. The positive relation between sales growth
and inventories ratio provides support also to the substitution flexibility proposition. For a
given level of complementarity between production factors, firms expecting an increase of sales
will probably increase the inventories stock given the high cost of increasing capacity.
The volatility of industry cash flow is negatively related to inventories ratio. Accordingly,
the estimated coefficient is negative and significant. The construction of cash flow volatility
as a moving average based on historical data limits empirical analysis because of collinearity.
Indeed, when I take into account fixed effects with within transformation (Column 4), with
first differencing (Column 2 and 5) or with industry dummies (Column 6), industry cash flow
volatility must be dropped due to collinearity with fixed effects. Ignoring this technical limita-
tion, my empirical result is consistent with my results in the theoretical part of this work where
the increase of cash flow volatility leads to a decrease of the inventories ratio. This can be
explained with the strong incentive to hoard cash when cash flow is very volatile. In agreement
with this result, I find robust negative coefficients related to contemporaneous and lagged levels
of the first-difference of cash ratio even after controlling for industry fixed effects, as in Column
6 of Table xxx, that take into account possible differences in the optimal combination of cash
and inventories in operations related to firm’s production technology. In summary, I find a
strong substitution effect between inventories and cash also at the empirical level. This substi-
tution occurs for both operating and risk management reasons. As for risk management, even
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if inventories are easily reversible they are a second best choice with respect to cash especially
when cash flow is very volatile.
In agreement with the Q theory of investment, I find a significant and positive coefficient
for market-to-book ratio of inventories. The shadow value of inventories investment is given
by the contribution of inventories to productivity through substitutability with capital and by
the relatively easy reversibility. When these two sources of value exceed the cost of adjusting
inventories, firms invest more in inventories leading to an increase of the inventories ratio. On
the other hand, when fixed assets become profitable, say when capital Tobin’s Q increases,
firms tend to invest less in inventories in order to deploy resources to more remunerative assets
like capital. In agreement with this proposition, the coefficient related to capital Tobin’s Q is
negative and significant. Moreover, given the strong interaction between market-to-book ratios
of different assets I tested and found that capital and inventories market-to-book ratios are
jointly significant. The tendency to invest in assets other than inventories is primarily given
by the higher return from such investments given binding budget constraints. The coefficient
of capital expenditures ratio is negative and significant except when I use GMM-diff estimator.
This result corroborates the view that when firms have good investment opportunities in more
remunerative assets they do prefer to allocate fewer funds to inventories for a given level of
financial resources.
Financially constrained firms are typically small firms and firms with high leverage. Accord-
ingly, I find that both size and leverage are negatively and significantly related to inventories
ratio. The coefficient of size is very small when the variable is taken in levels, say when pooled
OLS or Fama-MacBeth estimators are used, while it is larger when variables are first-differenced
(Column 2 and 5). The negative coefficient in Table 2.10 can be related to the fact that small
firms, that cannot afford other forms of hedging like derivatives, at least rely on flexibility pro-
vided by inventories. This result is in agreement with the substitution effect between hedging
with derivatives and inventories that I find with my model. As for leverage, the negative relation
with inventories ratio can be explained with the fact that more leveraged firms have typically
fewer funds to allocate to investments because they have to repay debt obligations. Another
theory suggests that flexible firms have more chances to shift risk at the expenses of creditors
who consequently provide fewer funds. MacKay (2003) provide evidence in this sense finding
that while asset substitution can be reasonably controlled through debt covenants, operating
flexibility increases the likelihood of risk shifting from managers at the expenses of creditors.
Firms with higher inventories ratio may be identified as more flexible by financial intermediaries
who decide to cut the supply of credit for them.
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In contrast to size and leverage, short-term financing is positively and significantly related
to inventories ratio. This result may suggest that firms that more easily obtain trade credit
from suppliers invest more in inventories. However, I cannot exclude simultaneous causality
since inventories may act as a collateral to obtain credit form suppliers as it is argued in
the trade credit literature.19 In summary, although it is hard to detect the direction of the
causal relation between inventories and accounts payable, trade credit and short-term debt
are a prominent source of financing for inventories so the correlation between inventories and
short-term financing is positive.
In Column 5 of Table 2.10, I directly tackle the issue of endogeneity of explanatory vari-
ables. I estimate my model with the GMM-dif estimator from Arellano and Bond (1991) where
variables are first-differenced to control for fixed effects and lags in levels of the endogenous
variables are used as instruments. Inventories ratio and cash ratio are both the outcome of
simultaneous decisions from firm’s managers, then if we want to correctly gauge the effect of
a variation of cash ratio on inventories ratio we need to instrument cash ratio. I use suitable
lags of the dependent variable and lags of the first-difference of cash ratio to take into account
endogeneity of lags of the dependent variable and cash ratio. Specifically, I instrumented ∆
cash ratio and its lag with the first two lags of cash ratio following the traditional approach of
the IV/2SLS estimator. Secondly, I used all available lags of ∆ inventories ratio, starting from
the second lag, to instrument lags of the dependent variable. As it is explained in Arellano
and Bond (1991), the GMM-dif estimator treats panel data as a system of equations, one for
each time period. With this method it is possible to exploit more instruments than in standard
IV estimators. For each equation a different set of instruments is available because of data
availability. For example, in the equation relative to the latest date all lags of the endogenous
variable can be used while in the equation of the first date from which the sample starts no
lags can be used.
Also capex ratio and short-term financing can be endogenous. Capital expenditures are
jointly determined with inventories and cash, then I use the lag of capex ratio as instrument
for it. As explained above, it is not clear if inventories determines the level of accounts payable
or viceversa then I use the lag of short-term finance as an additional instrument. The lags of
capex ratio and short-term finance are used as standard IV’s. All instruments are exogenous
and relevant as tested with Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Exogeneity of
instruments is guaranteed by the good dynamic specification of the model from which I have
19See Petersen and Rajan (1997), Frank and Maksimovic (2004), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and Fabbri
and Menichini (2010).
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excluded lags of variables that were not significant. Lags of explanatory variables are relevant
instruments because they are highly correlated with endogenous variables. The economic mo-
tives that influence firm’s policies are very likely to affect decisions in two consecutive time
periods. Consequently, using, for example, the lag of capex ratio as instrument for itself is
a reasonable choice. In addition, the actual correlations between endogenous variables and
instruments are high and significant. For example, the correlation between ∆ cash ratio and
lagged cash ratio is -0.323 and the correlation between capex ratio and its first lag is 0.643.
In column 5 of Table 2.10 I report the results of estimates with GMM-dif. The coefficient
of ∆ cash ratio is -1.174 and significant. The substitution effect between cash and inventories
empirically holds also after controlling for endogeneity of cash. The coefficient of ∆ cash ratio
is very close to the FE estimate. This result is not surprising since for panel datasets with
many temporal observations the GMM-dif estimator converges to the FE estimator as pointed
out in Alvarez and Arellano (2003). GMM-dif and FE estimates are close also for the leverage
coefficient that is negatively related to the inventories ratio. The coefficient of ∆ short-term
finance is significant and with positive sign also after instrumenting it with its own lag. This
supports the well known fact that short-term liabilities, and particularly accounts payable, are
the main source of financing for working capital items like inventories. Firms that trade with
suppliers willing to extend credit have relaxed financial constraints for investments in working
capital assets.
For all estimators used in Table 2.10, the coefficient on the lagged level of cash flow ratio
is positive while the coefficient of the contemporaneous cash flow ratio is negative. This re-
sult contradicts findings in Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen
(1994). To be fair, the dependent variable in Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1994) is in-
vestment in inventories while here I focus on the inventories ratio. However, inventories ratio
contain information related to investment decisions taken in the past period so the estimates in
previous studies can be compared with mine. The analysis of the robustness of the sensitivity
of inventories investment to cash flow allows to get more information on two issues. First,
correctly estimating if inventories investment reacts to shocks to cash flows clarifies the quality
of cash flow sensitivities as a measure of financial constraints also in the case of working capital
items. Second, if inventories investment do not significantly respond to cash flow, it is likely
that the role of inventories as a reserve of liquidity has been overstated by previous literature.
In the literature studying the effect of financial constraints on real investments particular
attention has been devoted to the construction of measures of financial constraints. Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) propose that a good measure of financial constraints is the sen-
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sitivity of investment to cash flow arguing that more constrained firms rely more on internally
generated funds to finance investments. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) seriously questioned the
method used by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) finding that investments of less con-
strained firms are more sensitive to cash flow. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) rank firms on the
basis of a both qualitative and quantitative measure of financial constraints that more precisely
gauges the effect of financing frictions on investment. Erickson and Whited (2000) provide evi-
dence on the influence of errors in measurement of Tobin’s Q on the relation between cash flow
and investment. To assess the effect of cash flow on investment we need to control for Tobin’s
Q which measures firm’s investment opportunities and this is the method used in Fazzari, Hub-
bard, and Petersen (1988). However, Erickson and Whited (2000) find that measurement errors
in Tobin’s Q determine the sign and significance of the regression coefficient of investment on
cash flow. Indeed, their robust GMM estimates of the cash flow regression coefficient are never
significant and if so the coefficient is negative. Similarly, Riddick and Whited (2009) criticize
the findings in Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) on the cash flow sensitivity of cash on
theoretical basis and also because of mismeasurement of Tobin’s Q. The results in Table 2.10
can be explained by the fact that, even if internally generated funds enlarge the budget avail-
able to the firm, it is not guaranteed that the firm uses those resources for investments because
this decision is strongly influenced by investment opportunities and other firm’s policies.
To test the significance of the sensitivity of inventories investment to cash flow, first of
all I ran the same regressions as in Table 2.10 with a cash flow ratio exactly measured as in
Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1994), say, by dividing cash flow by lagged assets instead of
contemporaneous assets level. In this case the coefficient of cash flow ratio is never significant.
Secondly, I estimate the following equation
∆nit
assetsit−1
= ψ0 + ψ1
∆nit−1
assetsit−2
+ ψ2
CFit
assetsit−1
+ ψ3 TobinQit + ψ4
∆salesit
salesit−1
+ εit, (2.9)
where the dependent variable is the inventories investment ratio, explanatory variables are
the lag of the dependent variable, the cash flow ratio, Tobin’s Q and sales growth and εit are
i.i.d. errors. Equation (2.9) is similar to the one used in Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen
(1994) with the addition of Tobin’s Q and lagged inventories investment ratio. The latter
variable is included to obtain a good specification of the model, confirmed by the rejection
of first and second order autocorrelation of residuals tested according to Arellano and Bond
(1991). The coefficient of interest is ψ2 that measures the sensitivity of inventories investment
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to cash flow. I estimate equation 2.9 with standard POLS, FE and with IV estimator with
two groups of instruments. In the first IV estimation, I use the lag of cash flow ratio and the
R&D expense-to-assets ratio as instruments for the cash flow ratio. R&D expense is used as
a proxy for future growth opportunities in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) and it is useful to
capture growth opportunities not related to assets in place which are likely to be contained in
cash flow. Both instruments are valid. I regressed cash flow ratio on its lag, Tobin’s Q, sales
growth and R&D ratio and I obtained very significant coefficients for both lagged cash flow
ratio and R&D ratio with t-statistics respectively of 134.39 and -15.02. In addition, lagged cash
flow ratio and R&D ratio are not correlated with inventories investment. I estimated equation
(2.9) with lagged cash flow ratio and R&D ratio among the regressors finding not significant
coefficient for these two IV candidates. Estimation results are reported in Table 2.11.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variable POLS FE IV (CF) IV Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept -0.001 0.017*** 0.003 0.008 0.025*** -0.141*** -0.119***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
Inventories inv. ratio lag 0.026** -0.069*** 0.043*** 0.095** -0.283***
(0.010) (0.022) (0.008) (0.042)
CF ratio 0.006*** -0.006 0.015 0.007 0.162*** -0.346*** -0.281***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013)
Tobin’s Q 0.032*** 0.052*** 0.030*** 0.035** 0.208*** 0.193***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.015)
Sales growth 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.017 -0.003***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.078)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes Yes No No No
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.105 0.156 0.126 0.140 0.202 0.276
Table 2.13. The Sensitivity of Inventories Investment to Cash Flow. In this table I report estimates
of equation (2.9). In the third Column, I used lagged cash flow ratio and R&D ratio, R&D expense scaled by
total assets, as instruments for cash flow ratio. In Column 4, for IV estimates I use the second lag of inventories
investment ratio to instrument lagged inventories investment ratio, lagged cash flow ratio and R&D ratio to
instrument cash flow ratio, and the second and third lags of sales growth to instrument sales growth. For
estimates in Column 4, Hansen’s J test statistics equals 4.184. In Columns 5-7 I report regression estimates of
equation (2.9) on a panel of firms simulated with the model in the “Inventories” version presented in previous
Sections. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. In Columns 5-7 I omit standard errors because they
are all lower than 0.001. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated, respectively, with ***, **, and *.
As in Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1994) the OLS estimate of the sensitivity of in-
ventories investment to cash flow is positive and significant. However, using a very simple
estimator like the 2SLS/IV it is possible to see that the significance of ψ2 estimated with OLS
is driven by endogeneity of cash flow. After instrumenting cash flow ratio with its own lag and
with R&D ratio, the coefficient related to cash flow ratio is not significant, as it can be seen in
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.11. In addition, controlling for fixed effects is very important since
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also in this case the regression coefficient of cash flow ratio is not significant. One explanation
for these results is that firms invest in inventories first of all because of future revenues they
can get by exploiting operating flexibility, especially substitution flexibility, regardless of cash
flow. This means that investment decision is taken mainly on the basis of future revenues even
under financial constraints. For example, if the NPV of the investment is positive, firms prefer
to invest in inventories and to bear external finance costs instead of liquidating inventories
just to avoid raising external finance. Only after controlling for future revenues firms consider
liquidating inventories to raise funds.
Liquidation of asset is always among the last financing options because it is costly also for
liquid real assets like inventories. In addition, when the firm is experiencing a low cash flow
managers may decide to invest rather than disinvest in inventories because they are probably
expecting an higher product demand. This mechanism explains why in the numerical results
of Section 2.4 we observed no effect of the asymmetry of the investment cost function on the
contribution to value of inventories, simply because inventories are rarely used as a source of
liquidity. In summary, the sensitivity of inventories investment to cash flow does not seem
to be a good measure of financial constraints, first of all because investment is determined
by its expected returns. Secondly, since inventories investment is not sensitive to cash flow,
inventories are probably rarely used as a reserve of liquidity. As a further evidence, even if
Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1994) in their estimates control for unexpected variation
of product demand they do not control for future investment opportunities, say, they do not
control for Tobin’s Q. Then, their results are probably biased for this reason.
As a further robustness check of my results, I estimate equation (2.9) instrumenting sales
growth with its own second and third lags and inventories investment ratio with its own second
lag, in addition to the two IV’s for cash flow ratio. The use of the lags of sales growth as IV is
suggested in Dasgupta, Li, and Yan (2014) where sales growth is used as a measure of production
costs shocks that affect operating cash flow and consequently the inventories investment. The
concern about exogeneity of sales growth is raised in Dasgupta, Li, and Yan (2014) because
sales are to a certain extent endogenously determined jointly with investment decisions. In
Column 3 of Table 2.11 I report the results of IV estimates with the additional instruments for
sales growth. The coefficient on sales growth is not significant further confirming that measures
of internally generated funds, like cash flow ratio or sales growth, are not significantly linked to
inventory investment, then they are not good measures of financial constraints. Even Dasgupta,
Li, and Yan (2014) find that inventory investment, regardless of financial constraints, is not
responsive to negative sales growth.
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To compare my model’s predictions with empirical data, in Columns 5-7 of Table 2.11, I
reported the estimates of equation (2.9) on a panel of firms simulated with the “Inventory”
version of my model. Inventories investment ratio is (n′ − n)/(k + n + cb), cash flow ratio is
f(k, n, z)/(k+n+ cb), Tobin’s Q is value(k, n, z)/(k+n+ cb) where value(k, n, z) is firm value,
and sales growth is proxied with the growth rate of the shock (z′− z)/z. From simulated data,
in Column 5, cash flow has a positive effect on investment. This result may lead to think that
internal funds concretely influence the possibility to finance investment in real assets. However,
when I control for the return from inventories investment with Tobin’s Q, the regression coeffi-
cient of cash flow becomes negative indicating that more financially constrained firms invest in
inventories when, according to the theory of Fazzari and Petersen (1993), they should liquidate
to raise funds. The explanation for this result derives from the sensitivity of inventories invest-
ment to future revenues. Regressing inventories investment on cash flow ratio alone bias the
estimate because cash flow contains information about future revenues from investment given
the persistence of z.
In Column 5-7 of Table 2.11, also the regression coefficient on sales growth is negative,
although very small. In contrast to Dasgupta, Li, and Yan (2014), I find that firms invest
more in inventories when sales decline. They use sales growth as a proxy for exogenous produc-
tion costs factors that negatively affect firm’s cash flow and consequently investment decisions.
However, I find the opposite result on simulated data. Empirically, after controlling for en-
dogeneity of sales growth, the regression coefficient on sales growth is no more significant. In
summary, my results indicate that not only cash flow but also sales growth regression coeffi-
cients are poor measures of the inventories investment sensitivity to financial constraint, given
the forward-looking nature of investment decisions.
As a final comment, I draw a few conclusions on my empirical work. First, all explanatory
variables used to predict inventories ratio are found significant and with the expected sign
across different estimators. This confirms relationships between variables identified in other
studies and support the results from my model. In particular, I empirically found a significant
negative relation between cash ratio and inventories ratio supporting the view of these two
working capital items as substitutes at both the operating and risk management levels. In
addition, I empirically provided evidence on the negative relation between cash flow volatility
and inventories, in support of my model’s predictions. Although cash flow volatility plays a
stronger role to explain cash, inventories ratio is also clearly dependent on cash flow volatility
and on the uncertainty of the firm business in general. Reversibility makes the return from
inventories positively dependent on cash flow volatility. Second, firm fixed effects play a sig-
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nificant role to explain inventories ratio variability and they must be taken into account using
suitable estimators like FE or first-differences that transform data in order to capture unob-
servable firm-specific heterogeneity. Third, in agreement with other contributions that study
the effect of financial constraints on real investments, I find no significant relation between
cash flow and inventories investment because of the endogeneity of cash flow. This result is a
further signal of the scarce validity of cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints.
Furthermore, the unsignificant sensitivity of inventories investment to cash flow puts in serious
doubt the role of inventories as a reserve of liquidity, especially when cash flow is uncertain and
firms can rely on cash holdings.
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Chapter 3
Inventories as Collateral in Trade
Credit Contracts
3.1 Introduction
As an extension of my work on inventories, in this Chapter I study the interactions between
inventories, trade credit and cash holdings. The first objective is to show that even if trade
credit is typically considered a flexible form of short-term financing it requires guarantees to
suppliers that act as creditors. Consequently, trade credit imposes significant costs which
bound its effectiveness as a liquidity source leaving firms to prefer other risk management tools
like cash holdings. The second objective is to shed more light on the cross-sectional relations
between inventories, accounts payable and cash holdings. As we have already observed in the
previous Chapter, accounts payable and inventories are positively related. this the sign of the
relation is mainly determined by the role of inventories as collateral in trade credit contracts.
In the trade credit literature, relatively little attention has been devoted to the relation between
accounts payable and cash holdings. These two working capital items are bounded by both
operating and risk management factors. At the operating level, accounts payable substitute
for cash in the procurement of variable production inputs. At the risk management level, the
possibility to rely on credit from suppliers lowers the value of cash holdings against shocks to
cash flows. However, accounts payable and cash may also be complement. Indeed, firms may
need cash to repay trade credit and to avoid liquidation of inventories due to obligations in
trade credit contracts.
Trade credit represents a significant component of firms’ short-term financing sources. Rajan
and Zingales (1995) report that firm-level average of accounts receivable and accounts payable
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ranged, respectively, between 13% and 29% and between 11.5% and 17% of firm total assets in
their sample of the G7 countries in 1991 from Global Vantage. More recently, Garcia-Appendini
and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) report an average accounts receivables-to-sales ratio of 61% in a
COMPUSTAT sample of U.S. firms between 2005 and 2010. Marotta (2005), in a survey-based
sample, finds that Italian firms finance almost 100% of input purchases with payables. With
regard to the incidence of trade credit contracts, recent empirical evidence in Klapper, Laeven,
and Rajan (2012) suggests that trade credit is not confined to small, risky and financially
constrained firms as once believed. In addition, trade credit involves firms from all industries.
Trade credit terms are uniform and stable over time within industries while there is considerable
between variation across industries as reported in Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Ng, Smith,
and Smith (1999).
Here, I focus on the demand side of trade credit and especially on the relation between
inventories and trade credit. My first contribution is to shed further light on the motives that
lead firms to ask credit to their suppliers from a risk management perspective. Specifically, I
focus on firm-level financial flexibility provided by AP assuming no adjustment costs for vary-
ing the level of trade credit asked. From an operating point of view, Ferris (1981) argues that
a properly organized payment system between the supplier and the customer largely reduces
payment and receivables factoring transaction costs. In addition, trade credit does not entail
flotation costs and is less exposed to asymmetric information costs because suppliers know
customers better than traditional creditors like banks. Lewellen, McConnell, and Scott (1980)
explains how trade credit is irrelevant in a Modigliani-Miller world with no information asym-
metries that limits the supply of bank lending.1 However, information asymmetries cannot be
completely erased also in trade credit contracts. This leads suppliers to require a guarantee of
repayment at expiration of the contract. In my model this guarantee takes the form of collat-
eral based on inventories stock in agreement with Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Frank and
Maksimovic (2004). Alternatively, the supplier may charge a risk premium above the risk-free
interest rate.
In contrast to my study, the vast majority of literature on trade credit has rather focused on
theories explaining motives for granting credit from the supplier point of view assuming trade
credit demand as given.2 Few contributions have specifically studied buyers’ motivations for
1Trade credit is considered as a way to circumvent adverse selection and moral hazard problems that restrict
traditional lending from financial institutions. Suppliers obtain information on customers’ businesses and can
liquidate trade credit collateral much more easily and less costly than banks. The better enforceability of credit
makes suppliers willing to grant credit when banks are not. See Emery (1984), Mian and Smith (1992), Petersen
and Rajan (1997), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and Fabbri and Menichini (2010).
2For example, Nadiri (1969) treats AR as a production factor in the same manner as capital, Schwartz (1974)
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asking trade credit. Ferris (1981) proposes a payment transaction costs theory for both suppliers
and buyers. Organized payments make suppliers incur less frequently in costs of credit recover
and let liquidity available to customers. Lee and Stowe (1993) and Emery and Nayar (1998)
study the customer’s incentive to delay payment in order to inspect product quality. I also
focus on the study of the effects firm-specific liquidity shocks to customers’ cash flows on trade
credit as in Cunat (2007). In contrast, a large strand of literature has analyzed the impact of
macro liquidity provision on trade credit, concentrating on monetary policy, financial crisis and
overall financial system development.3
Of course, AP are not the only tool to manage liquidity and cash flow risk in general. Besides
derivatives hedging, insurance, operating flexibility, cash holdings help in avoiding costs created
by liquidity shortage. As explained in Gamba and Triantis (2008), cash is a valuable source
of flexibility when firms face debt adjustment costs. Trade debt adjustment costs are almost
non-existent but the very motivation that may lead firms to choose cash instead of trade credit
is the liquidation cost of inventories due to obligations in trade credit contracts. In the present
study, I explicitly compare financial flexibilities embedded in AP and cash. I exploit the basic
structure of the model developed in the previous Sections to study the interactions between
inventories, trade credit and cash holdings. Specifically, I model trade credit as contingent
source of funds that allows firms to avoid costs related to external finance triggered by negative
shocks on cash flows. However, trade credit is not a costless financing alternative because of
supplier’s collateral requirements and the possibility to liquidate inventories to meet obligations
in the trade credit contact. Petersen and Rajan (1997), Frank and Maksimovic (2004), Burkart
and Ellingsen (2004) emphasize the role of inventories as collateral of trade credit. In agreement
with this view, I impose a collateral on trade credit given by the outstanding stock of inventories
that can be repossessed and resold by suppliers. Because of the collateral, trade credit can be
repaid at the risk-free interest rate since the firm will always be able to repay trade debt even
at the cost of liquidating inventories.
Even if firms can alternatively use cash or AP to purchases inputs, AP and cash respond also
to other factors like investment opportunities. It is widely known in the trade credit literature
that AP are not used to finance long-term investments, then there exists a specific role for cash
not covered by trade credit. Cunat (2007) model admittedly misses an important stylized fact
proposes a supplier driven financing motive for granting trade credit, Smith (1987) and Cunat (2007) rely on
supplier asset specificity as the main reason for granting trade credit, Brennan, Maksimovic, and Zechner (1988)
focuses on suppliers’ price discrimination through trade credit, Petersen and Rajan (1997) focuses on better
credit enforceability of trade credit by suppliers.
3See Meltzer (1960), Brechling and Lipsey (1963), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), Fisman and Love
(2003), Choi and Kim (2005), Guariglia and Mateut (2006), Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013).
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regarding the joint use of AP and cash by firms. In Cunat’s model all firm’s available funds are
invested in projects with always positive NPV so that no cash is hold. This negative relation
between AP and cash, however, is not supported by previous empirical studies. Petersen and
Rajan (1997) find a positive, although not significant, coefficient for cash in their estimates
of AP determinants. Wu, Rui, and Wu (2012), studying a sample of listed Chinese firms,
conclude that more cash is hold to repay AP in the future. This reasoning is in agreement with
the transaction costs motive for holding cash since may be costly for the firm to find liquidity
to repay AP. Firms save also for precautionary motives and I take into account this incentive
thanks to the dynamic nature of our model where investment opportunities are stochastic.
3.2 Model
I assume risk neutral investors and a discrete-time environment with infinite horizon. The firm
is all-equity financed. I distinguish current period from next period variables indicating the
latter with a prime.
3.2.1 Technology
The firm uses input of production homogeneous across suppliers. Firm’s operating profit is given
by revenues, defined by a neoclassical CES production technology g
(
k, n, z
)
, less operating fixed
costs fc
f
(
k, n, z
)
= g
(
k, n, z
)− fc = [αk−ν + (1− α)n−ν]− θν − fc, (3.1)
where z > 0 is a technology shock that determines the state of the firm business. The operating
profit function f
(
k, n, z
)
is presented in reduced form with respect to the input provision deci-
sion. I assume that the optimal quantity of input to be purchased by the firm has been already
optimized and substituted for, so that the operating profit function is left as a function of the
stock of capital k ≥ 0, the stock of inventories n ≥ 0 and the technology shock. α ∈ (0, 1) is the
relative contribution of capital to output, ν ∈ (0,∞] measures the degree of complementarity
between capital and inventories and 0 < θ < 1 is the returns-to-scale parameter. The natural
logarithm of the technology shock log(z) follows an AR(1) process
log(z′) = φ log(z) + σzεzt ,
92
where the autoregressive parameter satisfies |φ| < 1, σz is the conditional standard deviation of z
and εzt are i.i.d. shocks with Normal distribution truncated within three times the unconditional
standard deviation. Investment in capital and inventories is defined as
Ik = k′ − (1− δk)k,
In = n′ − (1− δn)n
where Ijt and δj, for j = k, n, are investments and depreciation rates, respectively, for capital
and inventories. Inventories depreciation includes all costs of carry such as opportunity costs,
risk costs (obsolescence, damages, thefts), storage costs and insurance costs. The firm purchases
capital and inventories at unit prices if investment is positive, at prices `k and `n if assets are
liquidated. Adjustment costs for capital are given by
ACK(k, Ik) =
ξk
2
(
Ik
k
)2
k, (3.2)
where ξk = ξ+k · χ{Ik≥0} + ξ−k · χ{Ik<0} is the capital adjustment cost parameter that embodies
the asymmetry between increasing and reducing the stock of capital as in Zhang (2005).4
Adjustment costs for inventories are given by
ACN(n, In) =
ξn
2
(
In
n
)2
n, (3.3)
where ξn = ξ+n ·χ{In≥0}+ ξ−n ·χ{In<0} is the inventories adjustment costs parameter. McCarthy
and Zakrajsek (2000) and Belo and Lin (2012) provide evidence on the asymmetry of the
adjustment cost function also for inventories. I set `k < `n and ξ
+
k > ξ
+
n and ξ
−
k > ξ
−
n to
emphasize the higher degree of liquidity of inventories.
3.2.2 Financial Policies
In each period inputs can be paid using cash or credit (purchase on account). In the second
case, the supplier extends credit to the firm, for one period, requiring the payment of the
nominal value ap at expiration of the credit. In the same moment an input provision deal is
arranged, the supplier is granting an option to pay later to the buyer even if at higher cost.
The use of trade credit entails an intertemporal trade-off between the avoidance of liquidity
shortage costs today and the future cost of repaying the amount borrowed. I assume, as in
4χ{A} is an indicator function of event A.
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Schwartz (1974), Emery (1984) and Cunat (2007), deep-pocket suppliers, always willing to
extend credit, in order to focus on demand of trade credit. It is widely recognized in the
literature that suppliers should have enough financial resources to be able to extend credit to
buyers. Another typical requirement is that suppliers should not be credit constrained. Garcia-
Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) stress that liquidity and easy access to financing are
two fundamental characteristics of suppliers that grant credit. However, there are situations
in which also financially constrained suppliers extend trade credit. Boissay and Gropp (2007)
argue that a firm is willing to provide credit whenever credit is received from its suppliers.
Boissay and Gropp (2007) find evidence of credit flowing along chains of firms starting from a
sufficiently liquid firm at the beginning of the chain. Then, a firm, to grant trade credit, does not
need to have access to financial markets but just to trade credit offered by its suppliers. Finally,
if we consider trade credit as a selling expense in the same manner as in Nadiri (1969), suppliers
are always eager to extend credit because in this way they can increase sales. Bougheas, Mateut,
and Mizen (2009) show that for the seller is preferable to extend credit financed-sales instead
of carrying costly inventories.
Trade credit must be collateralized so that at expiration of the credit period the amount
to be repaid by the firm ap must not exceed the liquidation value of inventories outstanding,
ap ≤ `n(1− δn)n. I also assume that buyers that do not meet debt obligations are not excluded
from future trading relationships with any supplier. I assume that the whole stock of inventories
can be used as collateral. However, in real contract only a fraction of inventories may be used as
a guarantee reflecting many factors that influence the recovery of inputs by suppliers. Firstly,
suppliers’ seniority is considered important by Frank and Maksimovic (2004) who classify trade
credit as unsecured debt because of the low probability of recovering collateral due to banks’
priority at default. Secondly, the composition of collateral matters as well. Trade credit collat-
eral is typically given by inventories of raw materials and products that can be easily resold by
suppliers (Petersen and Rajan (1997), Frank and Maksimovic (2004)). The further a product
goes through the production process the higher the liquidation costs faced by suppliers that
exploit their selling channels to resale inputs. Thirdly, collateral characteristics are important.
For example, Fabbri and Menichini (2010) theoretically demonstrates that buyers of services
receive less credit than buyers of tangible products. This fact is implicitly confirmed in the
empirical work of Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999) who find evidence on cross-industry variability
and within-industry stability of trade credit contract terms. Furthermore, Fisman and Love
(2003) provide empirical support to trade credit theory based on product characteristics in
Mian and Smith (1992) and Frank and Maksimovic (2004). According to these studies, in
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industries where inputs are homogeneous across buyers, inputs inventories are easily resellable.
This leads to higher amounts of credit granted by suppliers because of the better quality of
buyer’s collateral.
Cash is another tool to preserve liquidity. According to the precautionary motive, firms
hoard cash in order to meet future obligations without incurring in payment transaction costs
(Miller and Orr (1966)). In addition, firms save to avoid costs of liquidity shortage that become
more likely the higher the volatility of cash flow. External finance costs can be avoided by saving
cash or by contingently asking trade credit. Thus, cash can be thought as a substitute of AP
from a risk management perspective.
Because of the possibility to liquidate inventories to meet obligations on trade credit, inven-
tories investment (disinvestment) can be larger (lower) implying a loss for the firm equal to the
part of ap not covered with internal funds f(k, n, z) + (1 + r)cb. Consequently, the investment
in inventories must be modified as
In = n′ − (1− δn)n+ 1
`n
max{ap− f(k, n, z)− (1 + r)cb, 0}.
3.3 Firm’s Problem
The firm’s cash flow is
cf(u, u′, s) = f(k, n, z) + (1 + rcb)cb− ap+ ap
′
1 + r
− cb′ − ηk
(
Ik; `k
)
− ξk
2
(
Ik
k
)2
k − ηn
(
In; `n
)
− ξn
2
(
Int
n
)2
n, (3.4)
where
ηj
(
Ij; `j
)
=
I
j if Ij ≥ 0
`jI
j if Ij < 0
for j = k, n.
Operating profit, f(k, n, z), plus the amount ap′/(1 + r) saved thanks to trade credit, and
cash proceeds, (1 + rcb)cb, determine the funds available that are allocated to next period cash
cb′, capital k′, inventories n′ and to repayment of trade credit ap. I underscore that liquidity
shortage can be generated by both operating and financial factors. Indeed, fixed operating costs
and assets depreciation, in the same manner as AP repayment, contribute to absorb funds that
may be alternatively allocated to profitable investment opportunities.
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The assumption of compact support for log(z) translates into the compactness of the set
Z = [zl, zu]. I assume capital and inventories take value, respectively, in K = [0, ku] and
N = [0, nu] where ku and nu are chosen as explained in the Appendix. ap takes value in
P = [0, `n(1 − δn)n]. The lower bound derives from our assumption of no cash flow from the
buyer to the seller. I exclude cash flow from customers to suppliers in the form of prepayment
of inputs since I concentrate on customer flexibility to ask for credit. The upper bound is
defined in each period by `n(1 − δn)n because of the limit imposed by suppliers on the credit
granted with the collateral constraint. C = [0, cbu] is the compact set for cash stock with upper
bound cbu determined by the economic convenience for holding cash. Specifically, cbu is chosen
large enough so that retaining an amount of cash larger than cbu is not profitable. The benefit
of holding cash is the possibility to cope with financing needs in the future and to have funds
available to repay suppliers while the cost is given by the lower amount of funds available to
be invested elsewhere. Such an opportunity cost, in addition to the interest penalty rcb < r on
savings, ensures an upper bound to retained cash stock.
The hyper-rectangle D = K×N ×P × C ×Z ∈ R5 is a convex and compact set. The four
control variables k′, n′, ap′ and cb′ take value in the feasible set Γ(u, z) where u = {k, n, ap, cb}.
Γ(u, z) is non-empty, compact-valued and continuous because it is a function of compact-valued
and continuous variables. The cash flow in (3.4) is bounded (because it is defined on a compact
and continuous set) and continuous. I compute firm value v(u, z) by numerically solving the
Bellman equation
v(u, z) = max
{
max
u′∈Γ(u,z)
[
cf(u, u′, z) + χcf(u,u′,z)<0Λ(cf(u, u′, z)) + βEu,zv(u′, z′)
]
, 0
}
, (3.5)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a deterministic discount factor, Eu,z is a conditional expectation under the
risk neutral probability measure Q equipped with the Feller property, and Λ(cf(u, u′, z)) is
the external finance cost function similar to that used in the previous Chapter. Firm value is
given by the unique and continuous function v : D → R+ satisfying (3.5) (Stokey and Lucas
(1989), Ch. 9, Th. 9.6.) that can be found with the method of successive approximations. In
addition, firm value function is monotonically increasing in capital and cash and monotonically
decreasing in accounts payable (Stokey and Lucas (1989), Ch. 9, Th. 9.7.) . Finally, given the
concavity of the firm value function, provided by functional form of the cash flow function, the
optimal policy function is unique and continuous (Stokey and Lucas (1989), Ch. 9, Th. 9.8.).
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3.4 Results
In this Section I study the relationships between accounts payable ratio, inventories and cash
holdings by comparing regression estimates on a simulated panel of firms and on the same
sample of U.S. firms used in the Section 2.5 of Chapter 2. I calibrate the model on trade credit
using then same parameters as in Table 2.1. In addition, I calibrate the parameters of the
adjustment cost functions of capital and inventories. In literature, the parameter ξ+k of capital
adjustment costs is typically estimated between zero and 2.2. Hall (2004) reports a range of
values between zero and one which is lower than Shapiro (1986) estimate of 2.2. Whited (1992)
finds an adjustment cost parameter between 0.5 and 2. I select 1.25 as the base case parameter
which is also the value chosen by Zhang (2005). To set ξ−k I rely on Zhang (2005) choice
of ξ+k /ξ
−
k = 1/10 taken from Hall (2001). Evidence on the magnitude of adjustment costs for
inventories is quite scarce. Chirinko (1993) and Hall (2000) report small inventories adjustment
costs. In addition, we know that they are lower than capital adjustment costs because of the
relatively higher reversibility of inventories compared to capital. From Jones and Tuzel (2013)
estimates I derive a ratio ξk/ξn = 25 for both ξ
+
n and ξ
−
n consistent with the level of ν = 0.5.
Given this guidance on the relative magnitude of inventories adjustment costs, I set ξ+n = 0.05
and ξ−n = 0.5.
I estimate a regression with accounts payable as dependent variable and inventories ratio
and cash ratio as the main explanatory variables in addition to Tobin’s q (or market-to-book
ratio) and size (log of assets)
(
apit
assetsit
)
= γ0 + γ1
(
nit
assetsit
)
+ γ2
(
cbit
assetsit
)
+ γ3 TobinQit + γ4 sizeit + ηit, (3.6)
where assetsit = kit + nit + cbit. The regression is estimated on a panel of firms simulated with
my model for 10000 paths and 200 time periods, excluding the first 50 observations for each
firm to avoid biased results because of the arbitrary initial values assigned to variables.
My hypothesis is that if cash and accounts payable are substitute, at both the operating and
risk management levels, there exists a negative relationship between these two variables. Fabbri
and Menichini (2010) underscores that trade credit is particularly relevant for financially con-
strained firms that can rely on suppliers’ credit when internal funds are scarce. However, there
may exist also a transaction motive explanation that makes accounts payable positively related
with cash holdings. Indeed, even if accounts payable provide valuable contingent financing, it
also true that trade credit must be repaid in the future.
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Also important is the relation between trade credit and the collateral pledgeable by the firm.
If the buyer firm has enough inventories the supplier will provide credit. I cannot differentiate
firms on the basis of input standardization or how much input have been transformed by the
production process of the buyer. These two characteristics may moderate the supposed posi-
tive relation between inventories and account payable. My second hypothesis is that inventories
and accounts payable are positively correlated. Finally, accounts payable are expected to be
inversely related to size. The negative relationship between size and accounts payable is ex-
plained by the fact that small firms are typically financially constrained and ask more actively
trade credit. Even if in Petersen and Rajan (1997), Marotta (2005) and Fabbri and Menichini
(2010) it is emphasized that not only financially constrained firms obtain trade credit, it is
widely accepted in the literature that trade credit displays its beneficial effects more on small,
risky and financially constrained firms.
1 2 3 4
Variable Simulated POLS FE POLS Industry FE
Intercept 0.010 0.101 0.141 0.041
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Inventories/Assets 0.010 0.165 0.127 0.127
(0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Cash/Assets 0.032 -0.094 -0.071 -0.087
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Size -0.186 -0.002 -0.011 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sales growth 0.009 0.010 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage -0.041 -0.024 -0.041
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Time Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.488 0.154 0.110 0.250
Table 3.1. Working Capital Items Relations. In this table I present estimates of equation (3.6) with a
panel of firms simulated with my model and estimates of a sample of U.S firms between 1980 and 2006. POLS
refers to pooled OLS estimates, FE refers to fixed effects estimates. Both POLS and FE estimates are performed
with Newey and West (1987) standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of residuals. For
fixed-effects estimates in Column 3 I report within R2. All estimates are significant at 1% level.
In Table 3.1 I report estimates of equation (3.6) performed on a panel of firms simulated
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with my model and with the sample of U.S. firms between 1980 and 2006 that I used in the
previous chapter. Firstly, I observe that in the simulated panel the transaction cost motive is
prevalent on the risk management motive for demanding trade credit by firms. The coefficient
of cash ratio is positive and equal to 0.032. This result is due to the fact even if accounts
payable are a flexible source of financing they are, at the same time, a liability for the firm. On
the other hand, cash provide a way to manage cash flow risk and to meet financial obligations
without incurring liquidation costs in general and liquidation costs due to accounts payable.
In summary, in my model firms demand trade credit and hold cash which are not substitutes
because of the need to save in order to pay obligations from account payable. Empirically, the
story is different. In Columns 2 and 3 the coefficient associated to cash ratio is negative and
significant lending more support to a substitution effect between accounts payable and cash.
In Table 3.1, the coefficient of inventories ratio is positive in both the simulated and the
empirical samples. The coefficient on inventories ratio in Columns 3 and 4 becomes lower com-
pared to the standard POLS estimate in Column 2. The availability of collateral for trade credit
changes dramatically across industries because of the different composition and characteristics
of inventories. Once we control for fixed-effects the relation between inventories and accounts
payable becomes slightly weaker because inventories capture some of the between industry vari-
ability. Industrial fixed effects are important to explain the behavior of trade credit as pointed
out in Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999). Indeed, I find an higher adjusted R2 for estimates in
Column 4. These findings are also in agreement with Mian and Smith (1992) and Petersen and
Rajan (1997) whose empirical evidence supports the link between inventories and trade credit.
Firms with more inventories obtain more funding because of the liquidation advantage of the
supplier that can resell inputs through his or her selling channels at default. When default does
not occur the liquidation of inventories by the firm increases the costs related to trade credit. To
test the magnitude of inventories liquidation costs, I simulated the same model described above
without liquidation costs due to obligations accounts payable. In the that case, the estimated
coefficient on inventories ratio becomes even larger as expected. Availability of collateral is a
crucial condition for demanding trade credit also for large firms as Fabbri and Menichini (2010)
explain. Indeed, after controlling for size I still find a positive effect of inventories ratio on
accounts payable.
In agreement with the bulk of the literature on trade credit I find that larger firms demand
less credit to suppliers. Moreover, financially constrained firms are typically small firms that find
very helpful credit extension from suppliers. In the empirical estimates I controlled also for other
variables like sale growth and leverage. Sales growth positively impacts accounts payable. This
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result is explained in Petersen and Rajan (1997) with the fact that even financially constrained
firms are able to obtain trade credit if they are in a period of growth. Suppliers are eager to
provide credit to growth firms even if they are experiencing temporary shortage of liquidity.
Finally, leverage is negatively related to accounts payable. This result is in agreement with
Petersen and Rajan (1997) where it is found that firms with availability of unused credit lines
and with more access to traditional credit, from banks for example, demand less trade credit.
In summary, accounts payable are an important source of flexible financing especially for
financially constrained firms. This benefit, however, does not come without costs since the
amount of trade debt that can be asked is bounded by the collateral requirements and by the
liquidation costs due to obligations in the trade credit contract. Given liquidation costs related
to trade credit cash holdings provide a better solution to manage cash flow risk and to provide
the necessary funds to cover obligations from trade credit. On the other hand, small firms with
good growth opportunities may find trade credit very useful since they have a sharper need of
funds to finance investments. In general, except for financially constrained firms, the overall
contribute to firm value of trade credit is very small. The incremental contribution of accounts
payable to enterprise value, 0.65% on average, is shown in Figure 3.1. However, in bad states
of the business (low values of z) trade credit is a valuable financing option. In those states, in
which the firm has low or even negative cash flows, trade credit contributes to enterprise value
as much as 4-5%.
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Figure 3.1. The Incremental Contribution to Firm Value of Accounts Payable. In this table I show
the marginal contribution of accounts payable to enterprise value. Value increase is shown for unconditional
averages of capital, inventories, cash holdings and accounts payable. Enterprise value is firm value less cash
stock.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have examined the role of inventories as a risk management tool. Internally
generated funds are shocked by many risk factors and negative operating cash flows generate
the need for costly external finance. Inventories help to mitigate shocks to cash flows thereby
reducing the likelihood of recurring to external finance.
Inventories are a source of operating and financial flexibility. Firms holding inventories can
mitigate the impact of production disruptions or input supply shocks. In the first case, the firm
relying on output inventories continue to satisfy demand when the firm is not able to produce
or simply managers do not want to switch on production. On the input side, the negative
effects of supply chain shock can be faced can be curbed with input inventories. Firms holding
inventories obtain also a source of financial flexibility. Inventories are typically easy reversible
with liquidation costs lower than capital liquidation costs. This creates a benefit for firms that
for example have low cash stocks and have good investment opportunities. In this case, firms
avoid tapping financial markets and finance investment by liquidating inventories.
Of course, inventories are not the only tool that provide flexibility. Hedging with derivatives
and management of cash are two traditional risk management tools to deal with shocks to
internal funds. However, derivatives only cover price risk leaving many operating risks unhedged
like quantity or quality risks in the input supply. In addition, recent studies like Rampini and
Viswanathan (2010) and Gamba and Triantis (2014) have emphasized the costs associated to
hedging with derivatives mainly related to the counterparty risk born by counterpart of the
firm in a future contract. Another cost of hedging with derivatives is the possibility for the
firm to liquidate assets if internally generated funds are not enough to cover payments in the
contract. All these costs deeply impact the hedging performance of derivatives suggesting to
firms the use of alternative hedging strategies.
In alternative to hedging with derivatives the firm may choose to hold cash to face neg-
ative fluctuations of internal funds. Also cash implies costs like the tax penalty incurred by
shareholders when managers decide to retain cash in the firm or agency costs. Another cost of
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holding is the opportunity cost of investing in more remunerative assets. All these costs must
be counterbalanced against the future avoidance of costs of external finance.
I embedded all these features of inventories management, hedging with derivatives and
management of cash in dynamic model that I solved by means of the dynamic programming
approach. The results indicate a significant contribution of inventories to firm value around
5.60% under base case parameters. My results suggest that the contribution to risk management
of inventories mainly derives from flexibility of substitution with other production factors. In
contrast, I found scarce evidence in support of inventories as reserve of liquidity. The percentage
value increase given by the dynamic management of inventories is crucially moderated by
operating leverage and the degree of complementarity between capital and inventories. As
explained in Ramey (1989), inventories provide higher benefits to firms with higher operating
fixed costs. Accordingly, I find that the contribution of inventories to firm value is very much
reduced when fixed operating costs are low. Secondly, increasing complementarity between
capital and inventories reduces firm value but at the same time increases the contribution of
inventories to value because they cannot be easily substituted in the production process.
Derivatives contribute less to firm value than inventories. This result hold under different
parameters settings except in the case in which the cash flow is highly correlated with the
underlying asset in the derivative contract. In this case, the firm may even decide to hedge with
futures forgoing the possibility to manage inventories because of the very good performance of
the derivative. However, it also true that perfect correlation between cash flow and derivative’s
underlying asset is very hard to find in reality. Cash holdings have a positive impact to firm
value, 5% on average under base case parameters. Indeed, cash allows the firm to avoid external
finance costs more cheaply than inventories given that inventories, even if more liquid than fixed
assets, are nevertheless exposed to liquidation costs. Moreover, substitution flexibility provided
by inventories is state-contingent while cash can be hold independently of the state of cash flow.
However, opportunity costs heavily bound the benefit provided by cash holdings thereby leaving
space for inventories that provide an higher return than cash.
The substitution effect between inventories and cash documented in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz
(2009), among other important operating factors, can be explained also under a risk manage-
ment perspective. According to the precautionary theory for holding cash, higher cash flow
volatility leads firms to increase cash holdings. With higher cash flow volatility firms are also
willing to hold more inventories thanks to their high reversibility. However, according to my
results the increase in cash holding due to higher cash flow volatility is much higher than the
increase in inventories. This results indicate that in a very volatile business environment the
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benefit provided by cash in terms of liquidity is higher than the benefit from inventories, given
the presence of liquidation costs also for inventories. In addition to my theoretical study, I
developed an empirical estimation of the relationship between the inventories ratio and cash
ratio in sample of U.S. firms in the same period analyzed by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) be-
tween 1980 and 2006. My empirical results, robust across different estimators, confirm a strong
substitution effect between inventories and cash at both the operating and risk management
levels. I also empirically tested the role of inventories as a reserve of liquidity by measuring the
sensitivity of inventories investment to cash flow. I found evidence on the scarce performance
of inventories as reserve of liquidity and I provided further evidence on the weakness of cash
flow sensitivities as measures of financial constraints, also in the case of inventories investment.
As an extension of my study of inventories, I studied the relationship between accounts
payable, inventories and cash. My theoretical results confirm what it is found empirically in
the literature. First of all, my model generates a positive relation between inventories and
accounts payable because input inventories provide collateral for trade credit. Empirically,
I found evidence in support of this prediction and in support of the explanatory power of
industry fixed effects with respect to trade credit. Secondly, I theoretically found a positive
relation also between accounts payable and cash, that, however, is not confirmed in the data.
With this study on trade credit, I pointed out another benefit of inventories related to their
role as collateral for short-term trade financing.
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Appendix
Proof of Propositions
Proofs are presented only for the model with hedging with derivatives but can be easily ex-
tended to the model with cash holdings. The solution of the Bellman equation (B) exists, it
is continuous and it coincides with the unique maximum attained solving (SP) because the
following conditions hold (Stokey and Lucas (1989), Ch.9, Ass. 9.4-9.7 and Th. 9.6):
1. the set of endogenous state variables, Azx, is a compact and convex Borel set in R3 for
all (z, x) ∈ S;
2. Aknh is a compact and convex Borel set for all (k, n, h) ∈ U and µ(s, ds′) has the Feller
Property ;
3. the correspondence Γ : U × S → U is non-empty, compact-valued and continuous;
4. the return function cf : A → R is bounded and continuous and the discount factor
satisfies 0 < β < 1.
Γ(u, s) is non-empty, compact-valued and continuous because all variables take value in
continuous compact sets. e(u, u′, s) is bounded because it is a continuous function on a compact
set.
(B) has a unique solution v∗ corresponding to the unique-point of the operator T : C(A)→
C(A) defined on the space C(A) of bounded and continuous functions:
(Tv)(u, s) = max
u′∈Γ(u,s)
{
e(u, u′, s) + β
∫
S′
v(u′, s′)µ(s, ds′)
}
. (3.7)
Moreover, the following correspondence defining the optimal policy,
G(u, s) =
{
u′ ∈ Γ(u, s) : v(u, s) = e(u, u′, s) + β
∫
v(u′, s′)µ(s, ds′)
}
, (3.8)
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is non-empty and compact-valued.
The firm value function is monotonically increasing in k, n and h because the first derivatives
of the payout function e(u, u′, s) with respect to k, n and h are positive on the set Azx for all
(z, x) ∈ S and because the feasible set Γ(u, s) is increasing (Stokey and Lucas (1989), Ch.9,
Th.9.7). The first derivatives of the cash flow function with respect to k and n are both positive
in the set K×N where fk > (1 + δk) and fn > (1 + δn) are both satisfied. The first derivative
of cash flow with respect to h is the payoff of the put option which is always non-negative. The
feasible set is increasing in the sense that for a set A′ ≥ A follows that Γ(A′) ≥ Γ(A).
The firm value function is also strictly concave and the optimal policy function, G(·, s), is
unique and continuous since e(u, u′, s) is concave in u and the feasible set Azx is convex for
all (z, x) ∈ S (Stokey and Lucas (1989), Ch.9, Th.9.8). The Hessian matrix of e(u, u′, s) is
negative definite. The payout function is concave because second order derivatives with respect
to h are all zero and we know that the cash flow is concave in both k and n by construction.
Numerical Algorithm
To find ku we start by initializing the domain of two consecutive periods cash flows for the part
dependent on k and n, say, z[αk−ν + (1− α)n−ν ]− 1ν − δkk − δnn. The intervals for k and n are
[0, k¯] and [0, n¯] where k¯ and n¯ are chosen large enough (the procedure is robust to even larger
upper bounds) and the interval for z is the same used for computing firm value. Secondly,
we compute the intertemporal cash flow in the domain [zl, zu] × [0, k¯] × [0, n¯] and we find the
value z∗ (along with the values k∗ and n∗) for which the intertemporal cash flow is maximized.
Thirdly, we find kju for each nj ∈ [0, n¯] by solving z∗[αk−νu + (1− α)n−νj ]−
1
ν − δkku − δnnj = 0.
This procedure implicitly defines a function g(n)→ k that associates a value ku ∈ [0, k¯] to each
value in [0, n¯]. Given the properties of the production function, g(n) is strictly concave in n so
we take the maximum value as our ku. The same procedure is applied to find nu.
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